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Abstract: 
 
The present research examines the post-formative Islamic legal literature surrounding 
the question of women’s leadership to gauge whether and to what extent the 
development of Islamic legislation pertaining to women was determined by gender 
attitudes prevalent in Muslim society.  
 
There are three main theories to explain the prevalence of Islamic legal rulings 
divesting women of leadership roles. The first is the traditional view that these rulings 
are best explained by the application of the theoretical and hermeneutical approaches 
of classical Islamic legal theory to the Islamic source texts, the Qur’ān and Sunnah. 
The second is that the rulings are best explained as the consequence of the widespread 
gender attitudes in near-eastern society during the formative and early post-formative 
period of Islamic Law. The third is that legal inertia is the primary factor in explaining 
the existing post-formative Islamic legal corpus and little can be determined from it 
regarding the origin and early perpetuation of the laws. 
 
These competing theories are tested and explored by returning to a broad survey of 
Islamic legal texts from the four canonical schools of thought. The relevant passages 
from these texts are first translated and then examined according to three separate 
analytical approaches – a legal-hermeneutical analysis, an analysis of gender motifs, 
and a diachronic analysis of legal arguments – to explore the ways in which classical 
legal scholars arrived at and justified the prohibition of female leadership in politics, 
the judiciary, and congregational prayer.  
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Introduction 
Historically, the majority of Muslims have regarded it as impermissible for a Muslim 
woman to act as an imam and lead men in congregational prayers. A small number of 
Muslims today are beginning to challenge this stance, and they face considerable 
opposition from the broader Muslim community. Likewise, women have historically 
been regarded as legally unqualified to hold high public office. Though there is more 
openness today to the idea of women serving as political leaders, it still faces 
considerable opposition in conservative Muslim circles and in many Muslim countries 
where women’s leadership is regarded as contrary to Islamic teachings.  
 
These prohibitions are articulated in Islamic Law as specific legal rulings pertaining 
to prayer, judicial procedure, and political authority. This research investigates the 
post-formative Islamic legal literature to explore why Muslim jurists arrived at those 
legal rulings, and why those rulings have persisted. 
 
The Islamic legal corpus provides a body of rulings governing religious and worldly 
practices. Some of these rulings define the role of women in religion and society, 
including those which prohibit women from assuming various positions of leadership. 
Traditionally-minded Muslims defend these rulings as the inevitable consequence of 
embracing the Qur’an and Sunnah as the primary sources of Law. Recently, feminist 
scholarship has challenged this assumption, arguing that such rulings are dependent 
upon the patriarchal nature of the society in which Islamic Law developed, which they 
claim must have inevitably introduced bias into the interpretations of the (almost 
exclusively male) Muslim juristic community. For instance, Amina Wadud contends 
that “interpretations of the textual sources, applications of those interpretations when 
constructing laws to govern personal and private Islamic affairs and to construct 
public policies, and institutions to control Islamic policies and authority, are based 
upon male interpretive privilege.”1  
 
                                                 
1 Amina Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
2006), 22. 
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As for the patriarchal nature of pre-Islamic and early Muslim Near Eastern society, 
this has been well documented by Leila Ahmed2, Fatima Mernissi3 and others. Within 
the context of feminist scholarship, this has been presupposed to be sufficient to 
explain the existence of Islamic legal rulings disfavouring women’s leadership.  
 
The present research contends that this is not sufficient. Though Near Eastern society 
was patriarchal in nature, it is a mistake to jump to the conclusion that this was the 
primary factor in the development of Islamic legal rulings prohibiting women from 
leading prayer and holding public office. The evolution of Islamic Law was a 
complex process shaped by numerous cultural, historical, political and social factors, 
and the importance of scriptural sources (the Qur'an and Sunnah) to this process 
cannot be dismissed. The factors and influences that shaped the reasoning, 
interpretations and deductions of the juristic interpretive community should be evident 
in the jurists’ writings, and a careful analysis of their legal texts is needed to bring 
those influences to the fore. Assumptions about women, just like any other influences, 
need to be demonstrated from the legal texts themselves rather than pre-supposed. 
Furthermore, it needs to be determined whether or not the same rulings could have 
come about for other reasons in the absence of those assumptions. 
 
This research analyses the relevant passages from a broad survey of Islamic legal 
texts representing the four canonical Sunni schools of law. These texts are selected 
from various eras, and are of the kind that provide arguments and justifications for the 
legal rulings. The passages that elaborate rulings about women’s leadership are 
presented in translation (as an appendix to the research) and then subjected to a 
variety of critical analyses to identify the reasons, influences, and assumptions 
underlying those rulings.  
 
 
                                                 
2 See: Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992). 
3 See: Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in 
Islam, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland. (New York: Basic Books, 1991). 
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I. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The current debate in the Muslim world regarding the status of women in Islam, and 
especially with respect to holding public office and leading prayers, has led to a 
considerable body of writings debating these issues, as well as studies surveying 
current Muslim attitudes, and writings detailing the present state of women’s rights 
under Shariʿah law in various countries.  
 
A number of these studies identify tradition cultural attitudes towards women as the 
primary factor to explain traditional Islamic teachings about women. Etin Anwar4 
explores how cultural perceptions of gender influenced the way classical Muslim 
scholars understood and interpreted the sacred texts and focuses mainly on 
philosophical questions, from ontology to ethics, but does not engage much with the 
legal literature or the particulars of Islamic Law. 
 
Amina Wadud provides alternative readings to a number of verses of the Qur’an 
which she argues have been traditionally understood to promote inequality due to 
“historical androcentric reading and Arabo-Islamic cultural predilections”.5 This is 
useful in demonstrating the possibility of alternate readings. However, her research 
does not critically explore the standard interpretations of the verses and the ways in 
which those interpretations came about, nor does she address their use within Islamic 
legal texts. 
 
Fatima Mernissi focuses on how pre-Islamic misogynistic tendencies that existed in 
Arabia during the Prophet’s lifetime and shortly thereafter could have helped shape 
the character of rulings that would later be adopted by Muslim society, which she 
argues did not conform with the Prophet’s teachings themselves.6  
 
Leila Ahmed traces how meaning of gender in Abbasid society – and its unique 
blending of the Judaic, Christian, and Persian heritage – helped to shape society at 
crucial junctures in the development of Islamic Law. She provides considerable detail 
                                                 
4 See: Etin Anwar, Gender and Self in Islam (London: Routledge, 2006). 
5 Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Texts from a Woman’s Perspective (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), ix. 
6 Mernissi, Veil. 
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regarding gender practices and perceptions during those times. Ahmad contends that 
these were “inscribed into the literary, legal, and institutional productions of the age – 
productions that today constitute the founding and authoritative corpus of 
establishment Muslim thought” and that it is this “technical, legalistic establishment 
version of Islam… that continues to be politically powerful today.”7  
 
Khaled Abou El Fadl explores how gender attitudes may have influenced the 
development of Islamic Law and addresses specifically how patriarchal attitudes 
might have biased jurists in favour of the hadith of Abū Bakrah.8 Though his focus is 
generally on the formative period of Islamic Law, he also engages in a critique of 
some contemporary Saudi fatwa regarding women and evaluates the underlying 
assumptions of those fatwa. He does not engage exhaustively with the post-formative 
legal literature or the development of particular traditional legal rulings. 
 
Nevin Reda looks at the Qur’an and early sources to argue that gender segregation in 
prayer was not instituted in the earliest era, and that it came about by the end of the 
third Islamic century, since by that time a “system of total segregation and seclusion 
of women had been instituted, and women no longer had the right to participate freely 
in public life.”9 She does not engage with the post-formative legal literature in 
asserting this claim. 
 
Works like those of Ahmed, Mernissi, and Reda mentioned above are typical in 
focusing on the gender perceptions and norms during the earliest Islamic era up to the 
formative period of Islamic Law, meaning until the third century when rigidity began 
to set in with the supposed “closing of the doors of ijtihad”.10 Such research has 
always taken the historical, sociological, and cultural analysis of Muslim society as a 
point of departure for studying Islamic legal positions. What is needed is the reverse: 
                                                 
7 Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 238-239. 
8 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2001), 114. 
9 Nevin Reda, “Women in the Mosque: Historical Perspectives on Segregation.” American Journal of 
Islamic Social Sciences 21, no. 2 (2004): 93.  
10 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 71-72. 
Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that this notion is a myth which “seems to have emerged in the nineteenth 
century as a simplistic explanation of the purported stagnation of the Islamic legal system and as a 
justification for the legal reforms of the time.”. Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Islamic Legal Tradition” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law. ed. Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) p. 304. 
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to engage with the legal texts as the point of departure for identifying the ideological, 
social and cultural influences present within them. It may be easy to prove historically 
that the societies of the Near East during the formative period of Islamic Law (from 
the advent of Islam to the beginning of the fourth Islamic century) were strongly 
patriarchal. However, it is wrong to assume that one can then simply assume gender 
bias on the part of Islamic jurists and jump to the conclusion that this is sufficient to 
explain the Islamic legal rulings that disinvest women of leadership positions. Proving 
the existence of a patriarchal worldview may be necessary to assert the possibility that 
gender perceptions are primarily responsible for the development of those rulings, but 
it is not sufficient to conclude that this is indeed the case. Failure to make this 
distinction, as Sa`diyya Shaykh warns11, means we run the risk of anachronism, 
making summary judgements about the past from a contemporary frame of reference. 
She then identifies the need to “ask critical questions about the nature of human 
beings and gender differences assumed within the traditional fiqh discourse.”12  
 
Just as supporters of women in leadership often claim that it is culture and not religion 
which denies women the right to lead prayers and hold public office, opponents claim 
that the methods of classical Islamic jurisprudence are soundly based upon the sacred 
texts and those methods have demonstrated the impermissibility of women’s 
leadership. For instance, in direct response to Amina Wadud leading Friday prayers in 
2005, the famous Egyptian scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi declared: “Rulings pertaining 
to leadership in prayer are established by evidence of authentic hadiths as well as the 
scholarly unanimity of Muslims. They are based on religious teachings, not on social 
customs as it is has been claimed.”13 
 
Zaid Shaker, responding to arguments presented by Nevin Reda14, provides a 
description of “the Sunni legal and linguistic tradition, as it has been historically 
                                                 
11 Sa`diyya Shaikh, “In Search of al-Insān: Sufism, Islamic Law, and Gender,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 77, no. 4 (2009), 5. Citing Rita Gross, she emphasises the need to make a 
distinction between an analysis and description of the past on the one hand, and passing judgements on 
the other.  
12 Shaikh, “In Search of al-Insān”, 8. 
13 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, “Woman Acting as Imam in Prayer” OnIslam.net, 1995, 
http://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/acts-of-worship/prayer/congregational-
prayer/170796.html (30 December 2010). 
14 He is responding to her article “What Would the Prophet Do? The Islamic Basis for Female-led 
Prayer” in 2005 on www.muslimwakeup.com in support of Amina Wadud leading Friday prayer. 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
understood. This is the tradition of the Islamic orthodoxy, which remains until today 
the only religious orthodoxy that has not been marginalized to the fringes of the faith 
community it represents.”15 He offers legal evidence and arguments, focusing on the 
four schools of law. The assumption underlying his response is that the Sunni legal 
tradition is sufficient to explain why the rulings regarding women’s prayer leadership 
exist as they are. 
 
Hina Azam, also responding to Reda and Wadud, argues that the ruling prohibiting 
women from leading men in prayer are a direct consequence of the application of 
Islamic legal theory. She states confidently that the only way to change this ruling 
would be to “provide an alternate methodology that is more capable than the existing 
one at discerning the divine intent.”16  
 
Notwithstanding her challenge to provide a new juristic methodology as a basis for 
Islamic Law, there are more essential questions that need to be asked:  
 
1. To what extent does the jurists’ acceptance of the Qur’an and Sunnah as their 
primary sources of law explain the classical rulings on women’s leadership?  
 
2. Also, to what extent do the application of their various methods of textual 
interpretation, rules of evidence, and other sources of Law, explain the 
rulings?  
 
3. Conversely, to what extent can those rulings be explained as the result of other 
influences, particularly the perceptions about women and their role in society, 
that were prevalent among Muslims at the time? 
 
Very recently, and often concurrently with the present study, there has been a positive 
trend in surveying post-formative legal literature to explore various rulings 
concerning women.  
                                                 
15 Zaid Shakir, “An Examination on the Issue of Female Prayer Leadership (2005),” in The Columbia 
Sourcebook of Muslims in the United States, ed. Edward L. Curtis IV (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009), 240. 
16 Hina Azam, “A critique of the argument for woman-led Friday prayers” AltMuslim, 2005, 
http://www.altmuslim.com/a/a/a/a_critique_of_the_argument_for_woman_led_friday_prayers/ (3 June 
2009). 
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In an early example of this kind of engagement, Cristina de la Puente studies Mālikī 
legal works to investigate the legal capacity of women in Islamic Law. In doing so, 
she distinguishes between a woman’s “juridical capacity” and her “capacity to act”.17 
This is a very important distinction to make, since it explains how jurists could assert 
the essential equality of women and men as full legal entities while greatly restricting 
women’s capacity to act in numerous instances. This has the potential to address  the 
arguments made by Amina Wadud and others who cite the essential equality of 
Muslims before God as a basis to critique gender discriminatory legal rulings, since it 
pinpoints where this falls short as a basis for critique. Everyone would agree, for 
instance, that children and the insane are restricted in their legal capacity, though they 
share with adult, sane Muslim men and women the same essential equality before 
God. This focuses the question on why the jurists equate female gender with minority 
and insanity as factors for determining legal capacity, insofar that “only free adult 
Muslim males have total and complete capacity to act.”18 De la Puente  presents many 
instances where Mālikī jurists make (often unfavourable) comments on women, their 
status, and their public role, but she does not trace how these attitudes contributed to 
the development of particular rulings, nor the extent to which those rulings are 
grounded in scriptural sources. Since her purpose is to use the legal texts to shed light 
on the social reality of women in the Medieval Islamic West, she follows many other 
researchers in assuming that social values are operating behind the rulings. Though 
she does not tackle questions of leadership, she is among the first to go beyond family 
law when investigating questions of gender in the Islamic legal corpus. 
 
Ahmed Alewa and Laury Silver, while examining contemporary responses to Amina 
Wadud leading Friday prayer, briefly address the classical literature on women prayer 
leadership. They discuss the ḥadīth evidence that can be used to support women 
leading prayer and classical scholars’ responses to those ḥadīth. They conclude that 
their differing methodologies regarding the use of weak ḥadīth played an important 
                                                 
17 Cristina de la Puente, “Juridical Sources for the Limitations of the Female’s Capacity to Act 
According to Mālikī Law.” In Writing the Feminine: Women in Arab Sources edited by Manuel Marin 
and Randi Deguilhem( London: I.B. Taurus, 2002) 96. 
18 de la Puente, “Juridical Sources”, 97. The consequence of a person acting outside of their capacity is 
that the act will be void if the person is deemed incapable of acting on their own behalf in the matter in 
question; or voidable if the person has a restricted capacity to act. 
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role in how those particular ḥadīth were received.19 They do not delve deeply into the 
evidence and arguments the jurists used to prohibit women’s prayer leadership, nor do 
they discuss the dynamics of gender attitudes on the development and presentation of 
those rulings. 
 
Scott C. Lucas undertakes a diachronic survey of post-formative Shāfīʿī legal works 
to explore two gender-related questions: the disproportionate compensation for death 
or injury between women and men, and the question of women’s court testimony. He 
emphasises the importance of legal texts, because they: “have long served and 
continue to serve as the curriculum for aspiring jurists, judges, and jurisconsults, and 
thus influence the ethical and legal perspectives on a host of issues, including 
gender.”20 After meticulously detailing legal arguments presented in the texts, he 
concludes that despite a stability in the rulings over time, there is instability in the 
evidence and arguments used to support them. He also identifies weak hadith as 
playing a disproportionate role in supporting the rulings, as well as heavy reliance on 
consensus and analogy. He exposes weaknesses in some of the analogical arguments 
and calls into question the “quality of a school’s supporting evidence”. He also 
contends that “flagrant sexism” is on display in the jurists’ statements, but often cites 
the rulings themselves as proof of this. He research does not explore the actual role 
played by gender attitudes, or how they interacted with interpretive methodology, in 
the formulation and perpetuation of those rulings. 
 
Karen Bauer undertakes a diachronic survey of a large selection of post-formative 
Islamic legal works of the various schools of law regarding their rulings on women 
serving as judges and acting as witnesses. In doing so, she seeks to determine how 
jurists justified their rulings and explores to what extent their arguments, including 
arguments about women’s status and intellect, were developed to defend established 
legal rulings. She finds that certain attitudes about women are constant over time, 
these being “that men are in authority over them, and this authority is generally 
justified by the sexes’ inherent mental and physical differences” and that that this 
“represent a coherent picture of a ‘natural’ social hierarchy and ‘natural’ gender roles” 
                                                 
19 Ahmed Elewa and Laury Silver, “ ‘I Am One of the People’: A Survey and Analysis of Legal 
Arguments on Woman-Led Prayer.”  Journal of Religion & Law 26, no. 1 (2010-11): 156. 
20 Scott C. Lucas, “Justifying Gender Inequality in the Shafii Law School: Two Case Studies of 
Muslim Legal Reasoning”. Journal of the American Oriental Society 129, no. 2 (2009): 256. 
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which “explains women’s disadvantages in the law in general.”21 At the same time, 
she argues that differing opinions regarding women’s capacity reflected in legal 
arguments do not necessarily represent differences in the jurists’ attitudes towards 
women, but “must be seen in light of their function within the juridical manuals as 
points in a debate that lasted for many centuries.”22 She specifically argues that 
certain relatively positive Ḥanafī depictions of women’s intellect and authority were 
later defences against their Shāfiʿī opponents that “developed over time precisely in 
order to justify the existing Ḥanafī rules on testimony and judging,”23 and that “the 
Ḥanafī view of women’s capacities is not essentially different from the dominant idea 
of the gender hierarchy.”24 Her work comes closest in methodology to the present 
research; however, she does not explore to what extent the jurists’ arguments might or 
might not conform with or be explained by the underlying legal principles of their 
respective schools.   
 
Behnam Sadeghi engages in an in depth, diachronic study of Ḥanafī legal rulings 
regarding women and prayer, using a vast number of Ḥanafī legal source works.25 His 
work overlaps with the present research in addressing a woman leading other women 
in prayer, which he analyses in meticulous detail. He only touches very briefly upon 
the issue of women leading men in prayer. Intent on unlocking the logic behind the 
formulation of those laws, he asserts that the laws have an inner dynamics and 
concludes that very little can be determined about society, attitudes, ideology, or even 
religious tenets from the law. He argues that the desire to defend established legal 
rulings is a primary motivation for the persistence and defence of laws in the post-
formative legal corpus.  
 
From the literature surveyed above, three reasons emerge as possible factors to 
explain the presence and perpetuation of Islamic legal rulings prohibiting women 
from assuming leadership positions. These are:  
 
                                                 
21 Karen Bauer, “Debates on Women’s Status as Judges and Witnesses in Post-Formative Islamic 
Law,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 130, no. 1 (2010): 2. 
22 Bauer, “Debates”, .2 
23 Bauer, “Debates”, 13. 
24 Bauer, “Debates”, 10. 
25 See: Behnam Sadeghi, The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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1. The Traditional View. According to this view, legal rulings are primarily 
determined by scriptural sources, or by adherence to certain hermeneutical and juristic 
principles in combination with those sources. At the very least, the perpetuation of 
these rulings during the post-formative period can be explained on this basis. Among 
those who advocate this “classical” view are Hina Azam and Zaid Shakir. This is also 
the view of the majority of religious scholars in the Muslim world who uphold the 
legal rulings. 
 
2. Legal Inertia. The second view is that the jurists’ desire to defend the preferred 
rulings of the school of law is a strong determinative factor in their citing evidence 
and developing arguments, rather than the evidence and arguments determining the 
rulings or accurately representing the reasons behind them. This is supported by a 
clearly conservative tendency among later jurists to preserve the rulings they inherited 
from tradition. According to this view, the legal literature tells us very little about the 
the rulings’ true causes. This case has been strongly argued by Sadeghi.  
 
3. Gender Attitudes. A final possible factor is the often asserted but insufficiently 
proven contention that prevailing attitudes in the Muslim world about women and 
their role in society were a decisive factor in both the formation and perpetuation of 
these laws. The existence of attitudes and perceptions shaped by a patriarchal 
worldview has been well established by Leila Ahmed and others, though the extent to 
which these attitudes actually explain specific classical legal rulings has yet to be 
satisfactorily explored. 
 
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Islamic legal texts are multi-textured documents, and they must be analysed from 
multiple angles in order to explore what they can tell us about the reasons for the 
development and persistence of legal rulings disallowing women's leadership.26 The 
                                                 
26 There is a growing awareness that the analysis of religious texts not only permits but may require the 
application of multiple approaches to answer a particular question.  One example of this is Vernon 
Robbins’ socio-rhetorical criticism. Of course, Robbins focuses on the New Testament, while the 
present research focuses on Islamic legal texts which have different demands, particularly the analysis 
of the texts’ legal-hermeneutical dimensions along with their social and cultural dimensions. 
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need for a multi-dimensional analysis stems from the conviction that merely 
identifying the existence of various social contexts, attitudes and objectives within the 
interpretive community is not a sufficient condition for concluding that those factors 
have determined or influenced particular conclusions. What the present research does 
assume is that the legal texts should contain indications of these reasons and 
influences, which can be revealed if the texts are analysed from the relevant 
dimensions.  
 
The critical approaches that are applied to the surveyed texts have been chosen for 
their potential to assess the relative importance of the three potential causative factors 
for the legal rulings which have been identified in the literature review.  The surveyed 
texts have been subjected to three separate analyses, each presented as a distinct 
chapter in the work. These approaches are as follows: 
 
1. Legal-hermeneutical analysis. The four schools of law recognize the authority of 
revelation and conceive of the law as being God’s law. Traditionally, it has been 
assumed that a particular ruling is either derived from the sources of revelation or is 
the result of the jurists applying hermeneutical principles to those sources. The 
present research contends that the degree to which this is actually the case must be 
ascertained from the texts themselves. A synchronic legal-hermeneutical analysis is 
employed by focusing on the jurists’ ideological and methodological framework, 
Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh). The purpose of this analysis is to determine the 
extent to which the legal rulings pertaining to women’s leadership can be explained 
by textual sources (the Qur’an and Sunnah) and by the jurists’ application of 
preconceived methodological and hermeneutical principles. The legal arguments 
found in the surveyed texts are identified according to the theoretical rubrics they 
come under, and are then analysed with respect to how well they conform to those 
rubrics.  Legal arguments found in the texts which do not correspond exactly with the 
theoretical ideals of the school, but which nevertheless exhibit significant legal 
reasoning, are also identified and analysed within the rubric they are most closely 
related to, since these arguments may also explain or indicate the reasons for the 
ruling. This is important because legal theory developed after the codification of 
Islamic Law was at an advanced state. Therefore, a lack of perfect correspondence 
between theory and practice may not be indicative of extra-legal influences, but may 
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be the consequence of other legal approaches that were simply not well articulated or 
accurately represented in the legal theory literature. The legal theory literature simply 
provides a structural framework for the analysis. 
 
2. Analysis of gender motifs. Considerable work has been done by Leila Ahmed and 
others to demonstrate the patriarchal nature of Near-Eastern society during the 
formative period of Islamic Law. However, this is insufficient to conclude that any 
particular ruling about women resulted from, or was significantly influenced by, a 
patriarchal worldview. This needs to be demonstrated by identifying and analysing the 
gender assumptions found explicitly or implicitly in the legal texts. Various motifs are 
identified from their appearance in the texts and subsequently explored, including: the 
woman as temptress, women’s perceived deficiency and how it relates to authority, 
and the presence of gender hierarchies. The focus of this synchronic analysis is on 
how these motifs are directly and indirectly used to justify the rulings, how they affect 
the interpretation of scriptural texts, and how they contribute to the structure of legal 
arguments. The purpose of this analysis is to determine to what extent gender attitudes 
can explain the existence of particular legal rulings and how much they influenced the 
thinking of legal scholars.  
 
3. Diachronic analysis. The jurists were certainly concerned with preserving the legal 
traditions they worked in. However, we cannot assume that particular legal rulings 
were advocated for this reason alone. The extent to which this is the case needs to be 
demonstrated through a diachronic analysis of the legal texts. Changes in arguments 
over time can indicate the extent to which they were constructed to defend the rulings, 
while changes in the rulings themselves can be used to guage the strength of legal 
inertia. 
 
These separate analytical approaches are used to determine the relative extent to 
which each set of factors contributed to shaping the legal arguments and verdicts 
pertaining to women in leadership. Consequently, the role of gender attitudes on the 
origin and persistence of those rulings can be properly assessed. 
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III. SCOPE OF THE STUDY & DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY AREA 
 
 
A. Legal Schools 
 
The present study surveys the legal literature of four canonical Sunni schools of law – 
the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shafiʿīʿ and Ḥanbalī schools. This may seem ambitious, but it is 
essential to provide the breadth of examples needed to derive the broad conclusions 
sought about the relationship between gender attitudes and the development of 
particular legal rulings. Abou El Fadl identifies all “Sunni schools of legal thought” as 
possessing sufficient overlap in their methodologies of discourse to constitute a single 
interpretive community, with each of the four schools constituting communities of 
interpretation within this broader one.27 
 
Only by comparing the arguments and evidence cited by all four schools, as well as 
points of convergence and disagreement, can broad patterns be discerned for each of 
the three possible factors identified in the literature review. Also, since temporal 
trends are important to determine the trajectories of rulings and arguments, especially 
with regards to legal inertia, it needs to be seen how these trends play out in multiple 
instances. 
 
 
B. Legal Questions 
 
Two distinct sets of legal rulings are brought under scrutiny. The first set deals with 
rulings on judicial appointments, and to a lesser extent political leadership. The reason 
why political leadership is not addressed equally is because it is not as well developed 
in the Islamic legal literature. However, political appointments are often discussed in 
conjunction with judicial ones, and therefore these questions are addressed together in 
the present research. The second set of rulings deals with prayer leadership. There are 
two questions. The first is the question of a woman leading men in prayer, and the 
second is that of her leading a congregation exclusively made up of women. In Ḥanafī 
                                                 
27 Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, 124. 
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Law, there is a question of what happens when a woman comes in line with a man in 
prayer which is closely tied in with the ruling of her leading men in prayer. Though 
this question is not the focus of the present study, it will be addressed to the extent 
that it has relevance to the question of her prayer leadership.28 
 
Consequently, two types of leadership are examined: leadership in civil society and 
spiritual leadership. This allows for a comparison between how concepts of leadership 
and authority are handled by Islamic legal scholars in two different spheres of 
activity. The degree of overlap and divergence can be examined for each of the three 
factors brought under scrutiny, providing a broader and deeper understanding of how 
women’s leadership, spiritual agency, and social roles were conceived by the jurists 
and brought to bear for various legal questions.  
 
A number of legal theorists, especially later ones, made a sharp distinction between 
laws pertaining to acts of worship (ʿibādāt) and laws dealing with human societal 
interactions (muʿāmalāt). By exploring questions that fall under both categories, the 
importance of this theoretical distinction can be examined as well as how much its 
holds true in actual practice.29 Also, since a larger and more diverse sampling of 
leadership questions are examined, there is a larger number of examples for 
determining general historical trends and trajectories. 
 
 
C. Legal Literature 
 
The scope of the study encompasses the post-formative legal literature of the four 
canonical Sunni schools. The focus is on post-formative literature, because the 
formative period of Islamic Law prior to the time of the founding of the four schools 
is poorly documented. Though opinions attributed to the Companions, Successors, 
                                                 
28 This question is treated exhaustively by Behnam Sadeghi in The Logic of Lawmaking in Islam, 50-
75. 
29 This distinction is not always clear-cut. Khaled Abou El Fadl says: “Beyond this clear categorical 
division, negotiating the extent to which a particular human act or form of conduct, whether it be public 
or private, primarily involved ibadat or mu’amalat, was not a simple or unequivocal issue.” He then 
cites the prohibition of fornication and alcoholic beverages as matters in which scholars differed 
regarding their categorisation. Abou El Fadl, “The Islamic Legal Tradition”, 306. 
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and earlier jurists are sometimes narrated, they are fragmentary, rarely cite 
justifications, and almost never provide complete arguments.  
 
Moreover, the post-formative legal literature has been recognized as authoritative by 
the Muslim community for most of its history, and it is also the body of literature that 
is referred to today by traditionally-minded Muslims to justify prohibiting women 
from holding positions of political and spiritual leadership. It is in these legal works 
where we find the views of their foundational scholars being narrated in detail, 
sometimes along with narrations of some of their predecessors and students. It is also 
these works which provide the scriptural evidence and legal reasoning each school 
uses to support its rulings, as well the arguments used in refuting the conclusions and 
evidence of those who disagree.  
 
A broad survey of post-formative texts are used to determine each of the schools’ 
rulings for various questions of female leadership as well as the evidence and 
arguments they present to justify their rulings. Classical legal works representing the 
four schools of thought in different historical eras have been chosen for their 
authoritativeness and thoroughness in presenting evidence. In an appendix, a complete 
translation is provided for the relevant sections of the surveyed works.  
 
 
IV. LIMITATIONS & CHALLENGES  
 
 
A. Limitations of Legal Theory & Legal Texts 
 
Classical jurists of Islamic Law claimed to be seeking God’s rulings. They laboured 
under the belief that this legislative imperative began with God communicating His 
law to humanity by revealing it to the Prophet. At the same time, they differed widely 
in the interpretations and legal conclusions they derived from the revealed texts, and 
they admitted it was impossible to know in many cases who had hit upon the correct 
ruling. Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) purported to objectify this process through 
established methods of interpretation and deduction. Therefore, classical scholars 
claimed that Islamic Law, though it had to negotiate uncertainty and accommodate 
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disagreement, still aspired to be an objective science and that the body of legal rulings 
was none other than their best attempt to approximate God’s own law.  
 
Umar Abd-Allah cautions, however, that juristic theory for the most part developed 
after the formative period, and was largely deduced by later scholars from the rulings 
and statements of the each school’s foundational jurists, and as a consequence the 
legal theory of the school may not accurately represent the way in which the earlier 
jurists conceived of the law.30  
 
Bauer makes the salient point that the arguments and evidence brought by later jurists 
in their legal works do not necessarily reflect the actual reasons why the rulings were 
determined in the formative period, just like she cautions that certain arguments about 
women advanced to justify certain laws might have less to do with the jurists’ 
attitudes towards women than with the simple need to justify the established rulings 
of their school. She also contrasts the idea of jurists basing their rulings on 
“systematic methods of interpretation of the canon, undertaken by generations of 
jurists through time” with the idea of “most rulings [being] actually received law, the 
ideas of the earliest jurists handed down, which the jurists of each subsequent 
generation need to justify”.31 
 
Sherman Jackson concurs with the latter possibility when he argues that legal theory 
is not a primary determiner of law, but rather “provides the parameters within which 
practical, religious, ideological or other views can be validated as law.”32 
 
Sadeghi goes further and argues that it is not possible to determine what the original 
causes of the law are, not from legal theory, nor from the methodological principles 
implicit in the legal works themselves, since he sees legal inertia as the primary factor 
that perpetuates the law through time, and only a severe clash with later values can 
bring about a change in the law.33 He asserts that since the received laws are “the 
starting point for the jurist”, the “role of the methods of interpretation, therefore, is 
                                                 
30 Umar Abd-Allah, “Malik's Concept of `Amal in the Light of Maliki Legal Theory” (PhD 
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978), 6-7. 
31 Bauer, “Debates”, 2. 
32 Sherman Jackson, “Fiction and Formalism” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Ruud Peters and 
Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 200. 
33 Sadeghi, Logic 145. 
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not to generate the laws, but rather to reconcile them with the textual ‘sources,’ the 
Qur’an and the Prophet’s sayings.”34 
 
These are valid points. Even a cursory perusal of the legal literature in the present 
survey makes it clear that post-formative jurists were generally interested in justifying 
and defending the rulings formulated by their school’s foundational scholars. All the 
same, the post-formative jurists were the direct inheritors, both historically and 
geographically, of the legal tradition of the formative period. In their desire to 
preserve the legal tradition, they expended their intellectual energies and gave what 
was their best defence. As Bauer points out: “Jurists’ justifications may or may not 
reflect the actual source for, or cause of, the law; they are, however, their best 
attempts to explain why the law makes sense.”35  
 
This is informative even when the jurists’ arguments fail to conform with their 
respective school’s attested theoretical and methodological underpinnings. 
Fortunately, a number of the jurists whose legal works are surveyed in this research 
also produced works of juristic theory which can be compared to their practice. Where 
they deviate in practice from their own professed theory, it shows that their theoretical 
framework is not flexible enough for them to produce within its context a justification 
for the ruling, and it also eliminates the possibility that the purported theoretical 
principle gives an accurate indication of how the ruling came about.   
 
Though legal inertia is definitely an important factor in the persistence of legal 
rulings, the laws regarding women and leadership are not wholly static. By contrast, 
attitudes and norms pertaining to gender remained largely consistent over the same 
time period.36 There are cases where later jurists disagreed with or departed from the 
established rulings of their school, or where the school started out with more than one 
opinion. This can be revealing in a number of ways: first, by looking at the reasons 
why the particular jurists disagreed, and second by seeing how these rulings were 
handled by subsequent jurists in the school. Were those rulings adopted or rejected? 
Looking at the texts diachronically, it can be determined if there was a historical 
                                                 
34 Sadeghi, Logic xii. 
35 Bauer, “Debates”, 2. 
36 Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 238. 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
trajectory, whether variant rulings favourable or unfavourable to women’s leadership 
were more likely to be accepted. To the extent that a trend is found, it is possible to 
ask what factors caused the trend, how long those causes were in operation, and to 
what extent legal inertia worked against a trend towards change and was able to resist 
it. It can also give clues as to why certain rulings from the formative period persisted 
and other competing rulings did not.  
 
Therefore, the temporal dimension is critical, especially since the interpretive 
community whose texts are being studied – the community of Islamic jurists – shared 
essential epistemological assumptions, goals, and basic values.37 Changes, variations, 
and historical trends in the texts can provide insights into the ideas and influences that 
helped to shape the development of the laws, and give clues to their origins. These 
patterns become clearer when the texts are considered together and in reference to 
their place in the historical development of the various legal schools to which they 
belong as well as when compared to contemporaneous texts from the other canonical 
schools. 
 
In the legal works of the four schools, we find an historical process where 
commentaries are written on older legal texts, followed by later writers appending 
glosses to those commentaries, and finally even later writers composing abridgements 
of the earlier commentaries and glosses into new texts, which, in their turn, become 
the focus of another cycle of commentaries and glosses. This process can be 
understood as each legal community’s attempt to remain faithful to their respective 
legal traditions while interpreting those traditions in a way that is relevant and 
accessible to their own times and localities. It is a process of both continuity and 
change. Gadamer emphasises how interpreters of earlier texts will bring a pre-
understanding to the text from the vantage point of their own historical situation, even 
when they belong to the same tradition.38 These later interpreters will have to achieve 
a “fusion of horizons”39 with the perspective of the text of an earlier historical era, 
which will be successful when the interpreters are able to relate the insights obtained 
                                                 
37 Abou El Fadl , Speaking in God’s Name, 122. 
38 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans.  Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 296. 
39 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 305. 
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from engaging with the text to their own purposes.40 This is true even when the goal 
of the interpreters is to strictly follow the intent of the earlier works of their tradition, 
since it is not possible for them to view those works except from their later historical 
vantage point. 
 
Therefore, when jurists justify a ruling by giving value judgements about women or 
by making claims about gender, it reveals what they think society, or at least the 
religious scholarly class, believes about women. It may also reflect their personal 
convictions as individuals, but not necessarily. Admittedly, their motivation is to 
defend a pre-existing ruling, but they would only invoke an argument they thought 
would be convincing to others. An exception to this could be made where particular 
claims about gender are being disputed within a polemical debate against another 
school’s ruling, as is the case with the Ḥanafī examples cited by Bauer. Even then, the 
fact that these attitudes are being debated sheds light on the ruling’s possible cultural 
background. Furthermore, when gender perceptions are implicitly assumed, or 
underlie a textual interpretation, or are subtly embedded in analogies and other legal 
arguments, it is less likely that they are being invoked for their own polemical value 
in a way that disconnects with the jurist’s own values. Instead, as Shaikh points out, 
they would more likely indicate “the specific understandings of gender relationships 
assumed by dominating discourses in the fiqh canon.”41 This means that Islamic legal 
texts can provide a record of the gender attitudes prevalent in the society at the time of 
their writing, especially when they are consistent across a number of legal texts and 
different schools of thought. When certain attitudes reappear in different eras, this is a 
strong indication that those attitudes remained constant and were pervasive in society, 
and therefore could have had an effect on the initial development or persistence of 
specific legal rulings. 
 
 
B. Delimiting the Influence of Gender Attitudes 
 
Since this research seeks to determine the role that attitudes about women and gender 
played in the development of specific legal rulings, it is important to identify how 
                                                 
40 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 307. 
41 Shaikh, “In Search of al-Insān”, 8. 
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those attitudes operated behind the formal interpretive principles. Consequently, the 
research does not call the scriptures and interpretive principles into question, but 
focuses on how they were understood and used by the jurists. 
 
For example, it must be acknowledged that the Sunni interpretive community 
accepted the Qur’an as God’s word. This was essential to their methodology. 
Otherwise it could be argued that the Qur’an is a product of its historical and cultural 
contexts and reflects the gender attitudes prevalent in Arabian society at that time. 
What matters in this study, however, is not how the Qur’an came about, but rather 
how it was used by Islamic legal scholars to deduce and defend certain laws about 
women. The questions being asked are: To what extent are those legal rulings a 
consequence of the jurists’ acceptance of the Qur’an as a primary source of law? How 
much are those rulings based on applying arguably gender-neutral hermeneutical 
principles to the Qur’an? How much, by contrast, do they depend on other 
assumptions, especially gender assumptions, held by the interpretive community?  
 
The same approach is taken with the Sunni ḥadīth corpus. This is important, because 
Stowasser argues that the surviving ḥadīth literature reflects the concerns and biases 
of the early Muslims. She writes: “…even in Bukhari and Muslim and other Sahih 
collections, contradictory traditions abound that give both sides of an argument, with 
the noteworthy exception of traditions on some women’s issues – especially regarding 
matters of social status and rights – in which only one side of the argument, the 
restrictive side, is documented.”42 Similar assertions are made by Ahmed43 and 
Barlas.44 These allegations of “absent narrations” are not relevant to the present study. 
The early Muslim traditionists showed great concern for the Prophet’s words. If a 
direct, memorable and significant prophetic ḥadīth about women in leadership had 
been circulating at the time of the Companions and Successors, it is unlikely to have 
gone unrecorded by later generations, regardless of its content. It would tend to 
remain in circulation among ḥadīth transmitters, if for nothing other than its value as a 
unique narration.  Though selective bias would have been a factor in what narrations 
                                                 
42 Barbara Freyer Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, Traditions, and Interpretation. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994),105. 
43 Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 47. 
44 Asma Barlas, "Believing Women" in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur'an. 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), 46. 
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would be fabricated later on, it is certain that a portion of the recorded ḥadīth were 
genuinely related from the Companions and Successors45, and the preservation of 
these ḥadīth would have been less vulnerable to selective bias. Therefore, whenever 
the ḥadīth corpus is silent on a matter, it is safe to assume that relevant ḥadīth were 
not in circulation during the time of the Companions and Successors, and that 
discussion of the matter was a later development. 
 
Moreover, by the post-formative period, the ḥadīth corpus came to be fixed and 
recognized by jurists as a primary source of Islamic Law, and as such, Muslim jurists 
claimed to deduce legal rulings from it. What needs to be gauged is how gender 
perceptions may have influenced the way jurists used or disregarded various ḥadīth 
texts. For instance, a lack of coherence or consistency in the use of a particular ḥadīth 
indicates that it was not influential to the ruling’s development. How conclusions 
about women are read into or drawn from the ḥadīth can reveal the interpreters’ 
underlying gender assumptions. 
 
Also, since the ḥadīth literature developed during the formative period, even weak and 
fabricated ḥadīth are historically significant.46 This is especially true for narrations 
that were not attributed to the Prophet by the ḥadīth narrators themselves, but co-
opted as such by later legal thinkers. These inauthentic narrations are still statements 
Muslim thinkers made during the first two centuries, and as such they reflect the legal 
issues and concerns of that era. Their later incorporation into the legal literature as 
“hadīth” provides valuable information on the relationship between the formative and 
post-formative periods. 
 
                                                 
45 See, for instance, Mustafa Azami, On Schacht’s Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. (Riyadh: 
King Saud University, 1985), and Nabia Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyrus, II: Qur'anic 
Commentary and Tradition. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967). These works 
demonstrate the early origins of ḥadīth literature and answer the claims made by Goldziher and Schacht 
that the ḥadīth came into existence at least a century after the Prophet’s death, as later legal opinions 
were back-attributed to earlier authorities and ultimately the Prophet. See: Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim 
Studies. (Chicago:Aldine, 1971) II, 89-125, and Joseph Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence.(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). 
46 Spectorsky appreciates the historical value of these weak narrations, arguing that even weak ḥadīth 
“contain information that was part of the scholarly understanding of the past, regardless of whether 
they are preceded by a ‘reliable’  chain of transmitters.” Susan A. Spectorsky, Women in Classical 
Islamic Law. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 9. Musallam also uses these traditions for their historical value, 
where he says: “regardless of whether these traditions can be traced back to the Prophet or not, they are 
authentic documents of the first two Islamic centuries”. B.F. Musallam, Sex and Society in Islam. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 15. 
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C. Disclaimer 
 
This research is not normative. It does not seek to place a value judgment on the 
rulings arrived at by the various legal schools regarding women’s leadership, nor is it 
concerned with determining whether those rulings are “right” or “wrong”. Likewise, 
in evaluating the methodological approaches employed by the jurists in their legal 
texts as well as those outlined in their works of juristic theory, the purpose in not to 
determine the inherent soundness or strength of those methods, but rather how those 
methods were employed and to what effect. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LEGAL THEORY: IDEOLOGICAL & 
METHODOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is concerned with the evidence and methodological approaches used in 
the surveyed legal texts to justify rulings pertaining to women and leadership. 
Classical Islamic legal theory is used as an organisational framework for presenting 
and analysing the arguments and evidence. The degree to which the arguments in the 
surveyed works conform with theoretical expectations is examined as well as the role 
of legal arguments found in the works that do not conform with what is outlined in 
theory, but which nevertheless may reflect the actual legal thinking behind the rulings.  
 
Islamic legal theory, or jurisprudence, is referred to in Arabic as Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 
meaning “the principles or foundations of the law”. It is widely held that Islamic legal 
theory was first established as an independent discipline by al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), 
with the writing of the Risālah. This view has recently been challenged by Lowry, 
who argue that mature legal theory is quite different than what al-Shāfiʿī conceived, 
and he identifies the work of the Ḥanafī jurist al-Jaṣṣās (d. 370/980) as being the first 
work representative of the discipline in its classical form.47 In either case, it means 
that the development of legal theory took place sometime after Islamic Law began to 
be systematically codified, but before the composition of the major post-formative 
legal works which provide the evidence and rationales for their respective schools’ 
legal rulings. The works of legal theory identify the sources from which laws can be 
derived as well as the methods for interpreting those sources and deriving laws from 
them.  
 
                                                 
47 Joseph Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 360-361. 
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There are four primary sources of law that are agreed upon by all the canonical 
schools of law. They are: the Qur’an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijmāʿ), and juristic 
analogy (qiyās).48 There are other sources recognized by some but not all the legal 
schools. They are: juristic preference (istiḥsān), preventative legislation (sadd al-
dharā’iʿ) which refers to preventing legal loopholes or preventing the means to sin, 
considerations of general welfare (al-māṣāliḥ al-mursalah), general practice of the 
people of Madīnah (ʿamal ahl al-Madīnah), and local customs (ʿurf). Moreover, even 
where the schools agree on recognizing a source of law, they differ in many ways 
regarding their understanding and approach to using that source. 
 
This chapter is divided into sections corresponding to the sources of law mentioned 
above. Each section begins with a general introduction providing a brief overview for 
that particular source of law, which is followed by a discussion of every identifiable 
instance where this source of law is applied in the texts under survey. When a formal 
legal argument is brought up in the surveyed works which does not conform perfectly 
with one of the sources of law, it is discussed in relation to the source it most closely 
resembles.  
 
The introduction to each section does not set out to elaborate on all the questions of 
Islamic legal theory related to that source of law, which would be an exhaustive work 
in its own right. Instead, it highlights the important areas of convergence and 
disagreement between the four schools. Elaborations on the finer points of theory are 
introduced as needed in the discussions of the particular legal arguments drawn from 
the surveyed texts.  
                                                 
48 The early Ḥanafī legal theorist, al-Shāshī is probably the first to list the four sources in this way in a 
legal theory text, where he writes: “The sources of Islamic Law are four: God’s Book, the Sunnah of 
His Messenger, the consensus of the community, and analogous reasoning (qiyās), and it is imperative 
to study each of these in order to know how to derive legal rulings fom them.” Aḥmad b. Muḥammad 
al-Shāshī, Uṣūl al-Shāshī. ed. ʿAbd Allah Muḥammad al-Khalīlī. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 
no date), 12. See also: Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kalbī, Taqrīb al-Wuṣūl ilā ʿIlm al-Uṣūl. ed. Dr. 
Muḥammad Mukhtār b. Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Shinqīṭī. (Madinah: Published by the editor, 2002), 
265; Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā fī ʿIlm al-Uṣūl. ed.Najwā Daww. 
(Beirut:Dār īḥyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, no date) 1:99; and Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl al-
Sarakhsī. ed. Dr. Rafiq al-ʿAjam. (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1997)., 1:290-291. The four sources are not 
always mentioned together explicitly as the “agreed-upon”, but they are always included in the works 
of jurisprudence. Some theorists, like Ibn Qudāmah, list istiṣḥāb (the assumption that a previously 
established ruling has not changed in the absence of evidence to indicate a change) as the fourth 
agreed-upon source of law. ʿAbd Allah b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Qudāmah al-Maqdisī. Rawḍah al-
Nāẓir wa Jannah al-Munāẓir. ed. Dr. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Namlah. (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 2003), 
1:264.  
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
II. THE QUR’AN 
 
The Qur’ān is the first source of Islamic Law recognized in works of Islamic 
jurisprudence.49 Its authority is above question, since all Sunni Muslims accept the 
theological doctrine that the Qur’an is God’s complete, direct and infallible word.50 
Moreover, the Qur’ān is unanimously regarded by all legal theorists as being of 
undisputed authenticity (qaṭʿī al-thubūt),  meaning that its textual integrity is a matter 
of absolute certainty. They support this claim by arguing that the text has been 
confirmed through numerous chains of transmission from the Companions, and these 
various lines of transmission validate one another to the point of certainty. 51 They 
also cite verses from the Qur’an to argue that it is a matter of faith that the Qur’an is 
divinely protected from corruption.52 
 
In spite of the authoritative status that the Qur’ān enjoys as a source of Islamic Law, 
one thing that becomes clear from the legal works in the survey is that Muslim jurists 
rarely support their arguments against women’s leadership with the Qur’an. The 
majority of the surveyed texts do not cite the Qur’an at all. In fact, there is only a 
single instance where a jurist cites a verse of the Qur’an as direct evidence for 
                                                 
49 See, for example: al-Kalbī, Taqrīb al-Uṣūl, 265; ʿAbd al-Malik b. `Abd Allah b. Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, 
al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh. ed. Dr. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Maḥmūd al-Dīb. (Mansoura: Dār al-Wafā’,1999), 
1:72;  al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 1:99; Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 1:266; and  al-Sarakhṣī, al-Uṣūl, 
1:291. 
50 Al-Ṭaḥāwī sums up the orthodox Islamic position on the Qur’ān as follows: “The Qur’an is the 
speech of God, emanating from Him in a manner that is incomprehensible to man, as a word, and sent 
down to His Messenger as revelation. The believers believe it to be the truth and they are certain that it 
is literally the speech of God.” ʿAlī b. ʿAlī b. Abī al-ʿIzz, Sharh al-ʿAqīdah al-Ṭaḥāwiyyah. ed. Dr. 
ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī and Shuʿayb al-Arna’ūṭ. (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 2003), 
1:254. A number of jurists and legal theorists were Mu`tazilites in their theology, and upheld the 
doctrine that the Qur’an is created. This is especially the case for some of the earlier legal theorists, like 
the important Shafiʿī scholars al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadānī and Abū al-Husayn al-Baṣrī. Be 
that as it may, since the Qur’an refers to itself as “the speech of God” [Sūrah al-Tawbah: 6], all legal 
theorists, whether they believed the Qur’ān to be God’s eternal attribute or His created speech, agreed 
that the Qur’an is indeed God’s word, not the word of any human being, nor the human expression of a 
divinely inspired meaning. Hence, they do not speak about “the authors of the Qur’an”, nor do they 
describe it as the result of Prophet Muhammad expressing the divine inspiration in his own words as 
best he could. 
51 See: al-Kalbī, Taqrīb al-Uṣūl, 268-269; al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 1:100; Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-
Nāẓir, 1:267-268; and al-Sarakhsī, al-Uṣūl, 1:291-292. 
52 The verses most often cited in this regard are: “Indeed, We have sent down the Reminder, and indeed 
We are its protectors.” [Sūrah al-Ḥijr: 9] and: “Indeed it is a Mighty Book. Falsehood cannot approach 
it from before it or behind it; a revelation from One who is Wise and Praiseworthy.” [Sūrah Fuṣṣilat: 
41-42] 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
disallowing women’s leadership. Then there are two other isolated instances where a 
verse is cited by a jurist within the context of a more complex argument.53 These three 
verses will be discussed. 
 
 
A. Sūrah al-Nisā’ (4), Verse 34 
 
The verse reads in full: 
 
Men are responsible (qawwāmūn) for women because God has favoured some 
over others and because they spend out of their property; the good women are 
therefore obedient, guarding the unseen as God has guarded; and (as to) those on 
whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the 
sleeping-places and beat them; then if they obey you, do not seek a way against 
them; surely God is High, Great. 
 
The Shāfiʿī jurist al-Māwardī cites the first part of verse in al-Ḥawī al-Kabīr to argue 
against women holding judicial authority. He is the only one to do so, saying:  
 
“Men are responsible (qawwāmūn) for women on account of what God has 
favoured some over others,” meaning in intellect and opinion, so it is not 
permissible for them [women] to be in positions of responsibility over men. 
 
He cites the verse again to rule that women cannot lead men in prayer. For prayer 
leadership, he is following al-Shāfiʿī’s lead in al-Umm, who supports his ruling 
against women leading men in prayer by saying: “God has appointed men to be 
                                                 
53 A further two verses are mentioned in the surveyed literature, but as support for other matters. One is 
cited merely to give a linguistic precedent for defining a word found in a ḥadīth. It is verse 1 of Sūrah 
al-Ḥujurāt, which reads: “O you who believe, let not a people (qawm) ridicule another people (qawm), 
perhaps they might be better than them. Nor let women [ridicule] other women, perhaps they might be 
better than them.” The verse is cited by the Shāfiʿī jurist al-Māwardī and the Mālikī jurist al-Māzirī to 
define the meaning of the Arabic word qawm (a people). They cite a verse of classical poetry for the 
same purpose. This is to help them advance certain arguments in their discussion of the hadith “The 
most well-versed among the people (qawm) should lead them in prayer.” Their arguments will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter on the Sunnah. The other verse is cited by the Ḥanafī jurist al-
`Aynī to assert a general legal premise. He cites part of verse 33 of Sūrah Muḥammad: “and do not 
nullify your deeds.” to support the general legal obligation of safeguarding acts of worship from being 
rendered invalid. 
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responsible (qawwāmūn) for women and restricted them [women] from being people 
in authority, among other things.” Al-Māwardī is one of the only Shāfiʿī jurists in 
history to take up this argument.54 Likewise, none of the jurists surveyed from the 
other three schools suggest this verse as evidence.  
 
Al-Shāfiʿi does not cite the verse outright in al-Umm, but vaguely alludes to men 
being responsible (qawwāmūn) without explaining its connection to the ruling of 
leading prayer. Al-Bayhaqī’, in his biographical work Manāqib al-Shāfiʿī, quotes 
from al-Shāfiʿī a more elaborate argument than the one which appears in al-Umm, 
which is worth repeating in full:55 
 
We are told by Abū Saʿīd b. Abī ʿAmr from Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Aṣamm from al-
Rabīʿ that al-Shāfīʿ said:  
 
It is impermissible for a woman to lead a man in prayer, as they are restricted in 
it where men are not, because God said: “Men are responsible (qawwāmūn) for 
women”, and He said: “And men have a degree above them.”56 
 
Since prayer is a matter in which the imam stands in charge of the follower 
(yaqūm bihi), it is impermissible for the woman subject to a man who is 
responsible over her (qayyim), to be in the position of a responsibility 
(qayyimah) over that man who is in a position of responsibility over her.”  
 
Also, since prayer leadership is a degree of favour, it is impermissible for her to 
have a degree of favour over the one whom God has given a degree of favour 
over her. 
 
                                                 
54 I have surveyed forty-seven Shāfiʿi legal works for the use of this verse, and have found only one 
instance of a later scholar following al-Māwardī’s example of citing it for prayer leadership or judicial 
authority. The verse is cited in both contexts by al-Ḥiṣnī in Kifāyah al-Akhyār. He seems to like 
following al-Māwardī’s lead, since he also cites: “Send them to the back...” as ḥadīth evidence to 
prohibit women from leading men in prayer, which the overwhelming majority of Shāfiʿī scholars do 
not do. Abū Bakr b. Muḥammad al-Ḥiṣnī, Kifāyah al-Akhyār fī Ḥall Ghāyah al-Ikhtiṣār. ed. ʿAlī ʿAbd 
al-Ḥamīd Balṭajī and Muḥammad Wahbī Sulaymān. (Damascus: Dār al-Khayr, 1994), 131 and 550. 
55 Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī, Manāqib al-Shāfiʿī. ed. Al-Sayyid Aḥmad Ṣaqr (Cairo: 
Dār al-Turāth, 1970), 1:358-359. 
56 Sūrah al-Baqarah (2), verse 228. 
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Since it is from the Prophet’s Sunnah – and then that of Islam – that she is 
supposed to stay back behind the men, it is not permissible for her to be ahead 
and right in front of them. 
 
If someone were to say: “a slave is disfavoured”, [the reply would be:] likewise 
the free man can be disfavoured. Then it is possible that someone could come 
along who is favourable to him. It might be that the slave is better than the free 
man. He might come into circumstances where he will be manumitted and 
become a free man, but under all circumstances he is one of the men. The 
woman will never be, in any circumstance, anything but a woman with someone 
from among the men responsible over her in the generality of her affairs. 
  
The two verses cited in this passage are interpreted in the most general terms possible. 
The position of responsibility that verse 4:34 refers to is taken as all-inclusive, so a 
woman is never to be put into any situation where she is in a position of responsibility 
over a man. Then the “favour” in verse 4:34 is linked to the “degree” of 2:228, to 
arrive at the conclusion that a woman must be prevented from attaining any “degree 
of favour” over a man whatsoever, since that would be against the divine will. 
Moreover, a woman is always under a man’s responsibility, so her disfavour is a 
constant state for her, unlike that of a slave, who has the potential for manumission.   
 
These arguments are highly subjective and in stark contrast to the type of language 
and careful arguments we find in al-Umm and in al-Shāfiʿi’s many other writings. 
This difference is quite clear when we compare this passage to the passage from al-
Umm in the surveyed texts, where we find al-Shāfiʿī to be far more reticent. It is 
significant that he refers to the verse without actually citing it, since he does not 
hesitate to quote the verse in numerous other places in al-Umm.57  By not citing the 
verse here, he is able to discuss the implications of God making men responsible for 
                                                 
57 Al-Shāfiʿī has no difficulty in quoting the verse directly in al-Umm on at least eight different 
occasions, all of them dealing with marriage. He enumerates the verse as one of the verses where “God 
mentions the duties between the husband and wife.” (940). He mentions it with regard to a wife’s 
disobedience to her husband (961 and 1034). He cites it as evidence for the man’s obligation to pay a 
woman a dowry (915 and 1004). The closest he comes to al-Māwardī’s way of looking at the verse is 
when he cites it in reference to a woman not being able to enter into a marriage on her own, without her 
guardian’s consent. (878, 1010, and 1356). Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm. ed. Ḥassān ʿAbd 
al-Mannān. (Amman: Bayt al-Afkār al-Dawliyyah, no date). 
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women without being encumbered by the verse’s context. His language is careful, 
referring the matters of responsibility and authority to prayer leadership while 
avoiding any sweeping generalisations that would strip women of their legal agency 
altogether.  
 
Another issue in the passage from Manāqib quoted above is that some of the 
generalisations are contrary to other rulings in the school. For instance, the conclusion 
that a woman has “...someone from among the men responsible over her in the 
generality of her affairs” contradicts a number of rulings where the woman is a legally 
independent agent.  
 
What can account for this? We need to consider that the sources of the two texts are 
very different. The text in Manāqib is related from al-Shāfiʿī’s student al-Rabīʿ, 
whereas the passage in al-Umm is what al-Shāfiʿī is recording for posterity in a highly 
systematic and rigorously argued book of law. The most likely possibility is that al-
Shāfiʿī was freer in his words when speaking to his students than when he set down to 
write his magnum opus. It may also be that the details of the argument narrated from 
al-Rabīʿ have been altered somewhat in their wording, whereas the text in al-Umm is 
in al-Shāfiʿi’s own carefully chosen words. Though al-Rabīʿ is regarded as al-
Shāfiʿī’s strongest and most precise student in narrating his opinions58, and the others 
in the chain of transmission are regarded as highly reliable59, narration by paraphrase 
was quite common, even with prophetic ḥadīth, and it is easy to conceive how an 
oblique reference to a verse can turn into a full quotation, and cautiously worded 
arguments can become more general and sweeping in their terms and implications. 
Long, elaborate arguments like the one above are highly vulnerable to such alterations 
during transmission. 
                                                 
58 Al-Rabīʿb. Sulaymān al-Murādī was the principle narrator of al-Shāfiʿī’s books. Al-Shāfiʿī referred 
to him as “my narrator”. He is given preference to all of al-Shāfiʿī’s other students in what he relates 
from him, even to al-Muzanī. See: Tāj al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿīyyah al-
Kubrā. ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Ṭanāḥī and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥilū (Cairo: Hajar, 
1992), 2:131. 
59 Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Aṣamm studied under a number of al-Shāfiʿīs students and compiled the 
ḥadīth collection Musnad al-Shāfiʿī from the ḥadīth narrations he heard from al-Shāfiʿī’s students. al-
Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:292. Abū Saʿīd b. Abī ʿAmr al-Ṣayrafī al-Naysābūrī, whose given names were 
Muḥammad b. Mūsā b. al-Faḍl b. Shādān, was a student of al-Aṣamm who related a considerable 
amount of material from him. He is graded as a very reliable narrator. Al-Bayhaqī was his student and 
relied upon him heavily. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalā’. ed. Ḥassān ʿAbd 
al-Manān. (Amman: Bayt al-Afkār al-Dawliyyah, 2004), 3:3730. 
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Whatever the case, al-Māwardī does not take his cue from al-Shāfiʿī’s reticence in al-
Umm. Instead, he goes further and makes the assumption that the favours in question 
are “intellect and opinion” and concludes that the disparity between men and women 
in these qualities is severe enough to prevent women from holding any leadership 
position over men. This line of reasoning also necessitates that he understands the 
word qawwāmūn (plural of qawwām), translated here as “responsible” to refer to 
positions of authority in general.60 
 
Since al-Māwardī’s book is a commentary on al-Muzanī’s abridgement of al-Umm, it 
is understandable that he would draw some of his arguments from the original source 
work. However, this line of argument is not seen again in the legal works under 
survey, nor in almost any other Shāfiʿī legal text. Even his younger contemporary al-
Juwaynī, whose work is also a commentary of al-Muzanī’s work, did not follow suit.  
 
In order to understand why, it is necessary to turn to the commentary of the Qur’an to 
determine how the majority of Islamic scholars and jurists understood the verse and 
its implications. What this reveals is that exegetes and jurists took the verse to refer 
only to marriage. The earliest commentators of the Qur’an are consistent in discussing 
the term qawwāmūn – and the verse as a whole – strictly in the context of marital 
relations. This can be seen in the Tafsīr of Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, which is an early 
compendium of the opinions expressed by the Companions and Successors on the 
meanings of the Qur’an. They interpret each and every term and phrase of the verse 
with reference to the husband-wife relationship. 
 
For instance the Companion Ibn ʿAbbās defines qawwāmūn in terms of marital duties, 
saying: “It means that they are in charge. She has to obey him in what God 
                                                 
60 Translating the word is problematic. Kecia Ali makes this point by surveying how the major English 
Qur’an translations differ in rendering qawwāmūn as: “‘bread earners’, ‘maintainers’, ‘protectors and 
maintainers’, ‘the managers of the affairs of’, ‘in charge of’, ‘have authority over’, or ‘shall take care 
of’.” In her note on this passage, she adds: “These are the translations of, respectively, Ahmed Ali, 
Shakir, ʿʿAbdullah Yusuf Ali, Arberry, Pickthall, Dawud, and Asad.” Ultimately, she opts to defines 
qawwām literally as: “one who ‘stands over’ or ‘stands up for,’ thus potentially encompassing both 
authority and responsibility. These dual elements were recognized by classical commentators on this 
verse.” Kecia Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qur’an, Hadith, and 
Jurisprudence. (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), 117-118, and note 24 on p. 184.  
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commanded her to obey him in. This obedience is for her to be good to his family and 
to safeguard his wealth.”61  
 
Al-Ṭabarī relates from two of the Successors that the word refers essentially to the 
husband’s right to discipline his wife, which is consistent with the claim that the verse 
was revealed after a woman complained to the Prophet about her husband beating 
her.62  
 
In this light, al-Ḍahhāk defines qawwāmūn in terms that clearly refer to the husband’s 
authority in marriage: “The man is in charge of the woman. He orders her to obey 
God, and if she refuses, he can beat her without causing injury.”63 He relates from al-
Suddī: “They (the men) take them (the women) by the hand and discipline them.” 
 
The phrase “because God favoured some over others” is interpreted by the 
Companions and Successors as being a definite preference of men over women. In the 
words of Sufyān, this is “by God favouring men over women.” But how do they 
understand the nature of that preference? The do so strictly in terms of marital 
responsibility. Al-Ṭabarī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim relate from Ibn ʿAbbās: “His favour over 
her is in his spending on her and his providing for her.” Al-Ṭabarī relates the same 
from al-Daḥḥāk.  
 
Al-Ṭabarī provides no alternative reading in what he relates from the Companions and 
Successors, nor does he suggest any alternative reading in the conclusions he arrives 
at himself:64  
 
It means by what God has given preference to men over their wives by their 
rendering to them [the wives] their dowries, spending their wealth on them and 
providing for them their daily needs. This is God’s preference for the [men] over 
                                                 
61 Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr Āy al-Qur’ān. ed. Dr. ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-
Muḥsin al-Turkī. (Giza: Hajar, 2001), 6:687; and with a slightly different wording in Jalāl al-Dīn al-
Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-Manthūr. ed. Dr. ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. (Cairo: Hajar, 2003), 
4:384. 
62 al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6:688-690, where he gives various accounts of the incident. 
63 This and all subsequent opinions cited are found in al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6:687-688 and al-
Suyūṭī, al-Durr,  4:384-385. 
64 al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6:687. 
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them. This is how they become responsible for them, carrying out their authority 
over them in what God has given them charge. 
   
The verse goes on to deal with shunning the bed and beating in the same general 
language with which it begins. Therefore, it would be difficult to argue, as al-
Māwardī seems to do, that the generality of the wording in the first part of the verse 
extends to legal rulings beyond the scope than marriage. No one would suggest that 
the second part of the verse applies to all women within every societal context, 
political, judicial, economic and so forth. Since the injunctions dealing with shunning 
the bed, disciplinary beatings and so forth appear in the same verse, this strongly 
indicates a unity of context restricted to marital relations. Al-Māwardī’s suggestion 
that the responsibility in the verse can be extended to political and judicial 
appointments, and even to leading prayer, takes considerable interpretive liberties 
with the verse’s context. It might be argued that these rulings are alluded to by the 
verse,65 but it is far more difficult to suggest that they can actually be deduced from it. 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that later scholars of the Shāfiʿī school refrain from 
following al-Māwardī’s precedent. The same applies to the other three schools of law. 
Even the author of the Mālikī work, Sharḥ al-Talqīn, who seems to have borrowed 
heavily from al-Māwardī’s arguments in al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, chooses not to include this 
verse in his own discussion. 
                                                 
65 Many later commentators of the Qur’ān elaborate on “what God has favoured some over others” by 
listing a number of legal rulings where men are given preference to women. They also elaborate on 
men’s “greater possession of reason and organized thinking”, to quote al-Qurṭubī. Muḥammad b. 
Ahmad al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Ahkam al-Qur'an. ed. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Mahdī. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb 
al-ʿArabī, 2001) 5:162. Indeed, a number of commentators use this occasion to propound at length on 
all the ways men are better than women, with Ibn Kathīr going as far as to proclaim categorically that 
“men are preferable to women and the man is better than the woman”. Ismāʿīl Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-
Qur’ān al-ʿAẓīm. ed. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Mahdī. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 2002), 2:261. It is 
significant that we do not see these legal rulings being suggested by the Companions or the Successors 
when discussing this verse, but only by later commentators who come well after the formal codification 
of Islamic Law. These commentators are, by their own admission, reading these rulings and ideas about 
women back into the verse, with statements like “They mention some ways in which men are given 
preference to women…” Muḥammad b. Yūsuf Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī. al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ. (Beirut: 
Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turath al-ʿArabī, 2002), 3:335. They do not argue that the verse establishes these rulings, 
but rather that the authority in marriage which is established by the verse is another such ruling. In their 
commentaries, they are quite consistent in restricting the verse’s actual legal dimension to the marital 
relationship. In the same way, al-Qurṭubī discusses qiwāmah as comprehending a broader 
understanding of authority, saying: “It means that they [the men] spend on them [the women] and 
protect them. Also, included among [men] are those who are rulers, governors, and soldiers, and this is 
not to be found among women.” al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ, 5:161. He is reading these meanings back into 
the verse, not deducing them from it, and he presents these meanings in the context of clarifying the 
rationale for the qiwāmah of men over women in the marital relationship.  
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In stark contrast to al-Māwardī’s approach, we find some scholars of the Shāfiʿī 
school citing the verse as evidence for removing the husband’s authority over his wife 
if he fails to provide for her, by arguing that the verse makes the effective legal cause 
of his being in charge of her that he provides for her from his wealth.66 This illustrates 
how counter-intuitive al-Māwardī’s interpretation is to the preponderance of legal 
reasoning on the subject in the Shāfiʿī legal school. 
 
Indeed, al-Māwardī reverses his opinion regarding the general scope of the verse. 
Elsewhere in al-Ḥawī al-Kabīr, he argues that the verse’s meaning should be 
restricted to the issue of the husband’s responsibilities in marriage. He even takes 
certain scholars to task67 for using the verse as evidence to prohibit a woman from 
disposing of her own money without her husband’s permission, objecting to their line 
of reasoning by saying: “Its meaning is that the men are authorized with respect to 
their women to discipline them to carry out their obligations.”68 He then explains that 
the verse was revealed was to clarify the matter of a husband beating his wife and 
concludes: “So the verse does not contain the evidence for what Mālik cites it to 
prove.”69 Here, al-Māwardī’ quite forcefully rejects the possibility of applying the 
verse to matters outside of the husband’s responsibilities in marriage. This is in direct 
contradiction to his own use of the verse to prohibit women from being judges and 
leading prayers.  
 
The development of these legal arguments gives us clues as to the kinds of changes 
that took place between the formative to the post-formative eras. The passage quoted 
in Manāqib reveals the kinds of arguments that were in circulation at the critical 
period in history when the schools of law were crystallising, especially the ways in 
                                                 
66 ʿImād al-Dīn b. Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī Ilkiyā al-Harrāsī, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyyah, 2001), 2:449. 
67 He specifically identifies Mālik b. Anas. 
68 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr. ed. ʿAbd Allah Muḥammad Najīb 
ʿAwwāmah. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2009), 8:16. He reaffirms this meaning when 
discussing a husband punishing his wife for her disobedience (12:172). Elsewhere, he argues that the 
verse proves the wife “is in her husband’s possession” and this could be used as a possible argument 
for a woman not having to face criminal punishment for stealing from her husband, since “what she has 
stolen is still in her husband’s possession.” (17:154) He also cites it as proof that a husband is 
responsible to provide financially for his wife (15:3-4), since “one who is responsible for someone else 
must undertake to meet their needs.” 
69 al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī, 8:16. 
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which the Qur’an’s verses were being contextualised in relationship to the value of 
women and their perceived role in society. In the Manāqib passage, we see al-Shafiʿī 
appealing to general principles about women to assert the ruling, with the Qur’an 
being used to help establish the principles. These principles are that a woman shoud 
never be in a position of responsibility over a man and that she shoud never be in a 
position which shows her to have a degree of favour over him. The passage in al-
Umm follows the same line of reasoning in a more cautious way, without explicitly 
quoting the texts or articulating the principles in detail. Nevertheless, this is still law 
drawn from broad principles about women. If this is how the ruling about women 
leading men in prayer came about in Shāfiʿī Law, it is very different from the legal 
theory al-Shāfiʿī envisioned, and which the school continued to uphold, which derives 
essential legal rulings from direct textual evidence, or from consensus, or by way of 
clear analogies on rulings established by those sources.  
 
It is significant that verse 4:34 was not understood by the earliest generation of 
Muslims to pertain to these issues and that it again disappears from discussions of 
women’s leadership in the post-formative legal works. Likewise, verse 2:228 
mentioned in the Manāqib passage is not used as a direct argument against women’s 
leadership in the post-formative corpus and is not even alluded to in al-Umm. This 
locates the time of these explorations into women’s leadership within the legal 
thinking of the formative period. It also demonstrates that the formal codification of 
law and legal theory had a real impact on the arguments and evidence that later jurists 
would use, since these verses were dropped from their discussions. This shows how 
legal theory has the potential to obscure the origins and initial development of specific 
legal rulings.  
 
 
B. Sūrah al-Baqarah’ (2), Verse 228 
 
The verse reads in full: 
 
And they [women] have [rights] like [the obligations] they are under with 
beneficence, and men have a degree above them, and God is Ever-Mighty, 
Ever-Wise. 
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This verse is mentioned by the Ḥanafī scholars al-ʿAynī and Ibn Nujaym to support 
the validity of using a particular ḥadīth as evidence that women cannot be in line with 
men in prayer. The hadīth in question, “Send them to the back, whence God has sent 
them to the back”, is a individual-narrator ḥadīth, so it is not suitably authoritative on 
its own in the Ḥanafī school to establish the ruling. To get around this, they argue that 
the ḥadīth merely clarifies an ambiguity in the above verse, so its weakness in 
transmission is not an issue. Therefore, the verse is not cited to say anything about 
prayer, but rather to gives a window within the framework of Ḥanafī juristic 
methodology for using the individual-narrator ḥadīth as evidence. Consequently, 
discussion of this verse will be deferred until the discussion of that particular ḥadīth in 
the next section. 
 
 
C. Sūrah al-Baqarah’ (2), Verse 282 
 
The verse provides a lengthy exposition on commercial transactions. It is, in fact, the 
longest verse in the Qur’an. The crucial section reads: 
  
And call to witness, from among your men, two witnesses. And if two men be 
not (at hand) then a man and two women, of such as you approve as witnesses, 
so if one of them errs the other one can remind her. 
 
1. Ḥanbalī Use of the Verse 
The Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Qudāmah cites a portion of this verse, “…so if one of them errs 
the other one can remind her”  in his discussion on judicial appointments. He does not 
try to claim that it is direct evidence to prohibit women from being judges, but rather 
to establish about women “their propensity to err and their forgetfulness”. This in turn 
is used to bolster his general contention about women that they are “deficient in 
intellect, lacking in opinion, and unsuited to be present in the assemblies of men.” He 
is followed in this use of the verse by al-Zarkashī.  
 
After al-Zarkashī, Ḥanbalī jurists continue to take up this description of women’s 
deficiencies to justify their being unsuited to serve as judges, but they do not enlist the 
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support of this verse. This is in spite of their reiterating Ibn Qudāmah’s description of 
women almost verbatim, and their citing this verse elsewhere in the same works (with 
reference to witnesses) without bringing up the topic of intellectual deficiency.70 
 
This raises the question of why they did not follow Ibn Qudāmah’s precedent of 
quoting the verse, in spite of their almost verbatim copying of his arguments in 
general. The answer may be that the verse specifically relates to forgetfulness, and 
strictly with reference to commercial contracts.71 This could have a potential limiting 
effect on the scope of the alleged intellectual deficiency that can be attributed to 
women. Since the Ḥanbalī argument against women’s leadership, as we shall see, is 
heavily dependent on asserting the intellectual inferiority of women, any evidence 
with the potential to limit the extent of this inferiority might be viewed as counter-
productive.72 
 
2. Ḥanafī Use of the Verse 
Ḥanafī jurists cite this verse to differentiate between the types of cases where a 
woman can give testimony and those cases where her testimony is invalid. This is 
important for the question of women presiding as judges, because in the Ḥanafī 
school, the authority to serve as a judge hinges on the capacity to give testimony. In 
Ḥanafī law, prescribed capital punishments, like the death penalty, cutting off the 
hand, or flogging, and likewise cases of retribution, cannot be executed in the face of 
suspicion.  
 
In the case of a woman witness, there is a suspicion in the notion that the the two 
women witnesses are serving as a substitute for the one man.73 This is referred to as 
                                                 
70 Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Mufliḥ, al-Mubdiʿ Sharḥ al-Muqniʿ. ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad 
Ḥasan Ibrāhīm al-Shāfiʿī. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1997), 8:333; Muṣṭafā b. Saʿd al-Suyūṭī 
al-Ruḥaybānī, Maṭālib Ūlī al-Nuhā fī Sharḥ Ghāyah al-Muntahā. ed. Abū Muḥammad al-Aṣyūṭī. 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2009), 6:468; and Manṣūr b. Yūnus al-Bahūtī, Kashshāf al-Qunnāʿ 
ʿan Matn al-Iqnāʿ. ed. Muḥammad  Adnān Yāsīn ʿ Darwīsh. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 
1999), 6:464. 
71 Refer, in particular, to the Ḥanabī exegete Abū al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Maṣīr fī ʿIlm al-Tafsīr. 
ed. Muḥammad Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh, Shuʿayb al-Arna’ūṭ, and ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arna’ūṭ. (Beirut: al-
Maktab al-Islāmī, 2002), 172. This is the understanding of the majority of commentators from the 
earliest times, and the one determined to be most correct by al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, 5:91-93. 
72 This may also explain the behaviour of jurists with reference to the ḥadīth referring to women as 
“deficient in intellect and religion”, as will be discussed in the next section. 
73 Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, al-Bināyah Sharḥ al-Hidāyah. ed. Ayman Ṣāliḥ Shaʿbān. 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2012), 6:358. 
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the “suspicion of substitution”. It is merely a suspicion, since unlike other examples 
of substitution, like using dirt for ablutions in the absence of water, it is possible to 
accept the testimony of women even if men are available, so the women are not really 
acting as substitutes. Nevertheless, the “suspicion of substitution” is deemed sufficient 
grounds in the Ḥanafī school to prohibit the testimony of women in capital crimes, 
and consequently to prohibit them from serving as judges in such cases. However, 
since women’s testimony is valid in other cases, they can preside as judges in those 
cases as well. This verse, therefore is evidence for the scope of cases in which women 
can preside as judges, both confirming their legal capacity to do so and setting 
limitations on it.   
 
 
D. Summary 
 
Only one verse of the Qur’an, 4:34, is cited as providing evidence against women’s 
leadership, and this in only the earliest of the Shāfiʿī works in the survey. Due to the 
weakness of the argument, this line of evidence is not taken up by later jurists, neither 
within the Shāfiʿī school of thought, nor within the other schools. The overwhelming 
juristic stance on the verse is that it pertains only to the marital relationship. 
Moreover, al-Māwardī, who cites this verse, concedes elsewhere in the same work 
that the verse is only suitable as evidence for rulings concerning marriage. 
 
Consequently, it can safely be concluded from the legal works in the survey, as well 
as from numerous other legal texts, that classical Muslim jurists have generally not 
used the Qur’an as a basis to derive, deduce, or seek support for their respective 
schools’ legal rulings regarding women’s leadership in Islam. It can be seen as a 
testament to these jurists’ objectivity that they did not resort to interpretive 
gymnastics in order to find verses of the Qur’an to prove their positions against 
women’s leadership, in spite of the decisive authority that the Qur’an has as a source 
of Islamic Law. 
 
At the same time, it must be understood that the Sunnah is such a strong textual 
authority in Sunni Islam that jurists working within this legal framework would not 
have felt too strong a compulsion to cite the Qur’an in establishing their legal 
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positions. The Sunnah is the second of the four primary sources of Islamic Law, and it 
is deemed to be sufficient on its own as a basis for establishing legal rulings. This is 
what will be discussed below. 
 
 
III. THE SUNNAH 
 
The Sunnah is the second of the four primary sources of Islamic law accepted by all 
four legal schools.  
 
The Sunnah, at least as defined by post-formative jurists and legal theorists, comprises 
what has been received from the Prophet Muhammad of his statements, his actions, 
and those matters for which he gave his tacit approval.  In general, a far greater 
number of legal rulings in the Islamic Law corpus are supported either directly or 
indirectly with evidence from the Sunnah, as represented by the ḥadīth, than those 
which are supported with evidence from the Qur’an. As we have already seen, this is 
very much the case with the Islamic legal rulings pertaining to women and leadership, 
where the Qur’an is rarely cited.  
  
Even though the Sunnah is regarded as an undisputed source of religious knowledge, 
the same cannot be said of the total body of ḥadīth literature through which the 
Sunnah is generally known in the post-formative period.74 The authenticity of 
individual ḥadīth can vary considerably, and this has engendered a number of Islamic 
sciences related to the criticism of ḥadīth. 
 
With the exception of a very few ḥadīth which have been widely transmitted by the 
masses so that that their authenticity is deemed beyond question (none of which are 
cited as evidence for the legal issues in the present survey)75, ḥadīth are related from 
                                                 
74 A ḥadīth is a report. In the context of the Prophet, it is a report conveying something of the Sunnah. 
Refer to: Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Nuzhah al-Naẓar fī Tawḍīḥ Nukhbah al-Fikr. ed. ʿAlī b. 
Ḥasan al-Ḥalabī al-Atharī. (Dammam: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 2003), 52-53. 
75 With respect to how a ḥadīth reaches us, it is classified either as a report of the general masses 
(khabar mutawātir) or a report of individual narrators (khabar al-wāḥid pl: akhbār al-āḥād. For a 
narration to qualify as being a report of the general masses (mutawātir), it must be conveyed by such a 
large number of people that it is, according to the norms of nature, impossible for them to have 
conspired upon a falsehood. This number must be sustained in every level of the narration’s chain of 
transmission from the beginning to the end, and the topic being reported about must stem from the 
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generation to generation by one or more individual narrators.  It is necessary to 
determine the authenticity of these individual-narrator reports (akhbār al-āḥād). This 
is a matter of general agreement among scholars. The Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Taymiyah 
writes: “No one possessing sense has ever claimed that the report of every individual 
bequeaths knowledge.”76 
 
 
A. The Sunnah and the Schools of Law 
 
Different schools of law have applied different standards as to which individual-
narratorhadith are acceptable as evidence for deriving Islamic legal rulings.77 They 
differ as to the conditions under which isolated individual-narrator ḥadīth can be 
relied on as a source of law. They likewise differ as to whether mursal ḥadīth (ḥadīth 
with incomplete chains of transmission) and āthār (statements of the Companions) are 
valid sources of law, and what limitations are to be placed on that validity. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
direct sensory experience of those reporting it. See: Abū Muẓaffar Manṣūr b. Muḥammad al-Samʿānī, 
Qawāṭiʿ al-Adillah. ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Shāfiʿī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1997),  1:325;  
Aḥmad b. Qāsim al-ʿAbbādī, al-Āyāt al-Bayyināt. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1996), 3:272-
273; and al-Kalbī, Taqrīb, 287. In other words, they must have seen or heard what they are reporting. 
Mutawātir ḥadīth are accepted as being certain in their authenticity (qaṭʿī al-thubūt), in the same way 
as the text of the Qur’ān is considered to be authentic. This is a matter of consensus among scholars. 
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ḥarrānī, al-Muswaddah fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh li-Āl Taymiyah. ed. Dr. Aḥmad 
Ibrāhīm ʿAbbās al-Dharwī. (Riyadh: Dār al-Faḍīlah, 2001), 1:467. Probably the most well-known 
mutawātir ḥadīth is the Prophet’s statement: “Whoever invents a lie and attributes it to me 
intentionally, let him prepare his seat in the Fire.” [Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (110) and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (3).] 
Other mutawātir narrations include the ḥadīth relating to the fountain of Kawthar in the Hereafter, the 
ḥadīth about the believers seeing God in the Hereafter, the ḥadīth about wiping over leather socks, and 
those relating to the prohibition of all intoxicants. These ḥadīth are quite rare. None of the ḥadīth cited 
in the legal literature to prohibit women from leadership positions fall into this category. 
76 Quoted in al-Ḥarrānī, al-Muswaddah 1:490. 
77 According to scholars of ḥadīth criticism, individual-narrator ḥadīth are not accepted as authentic 
until both their texts and their chains of transmission are subjected to a careful and rigorous scrutiny. It 
is in order to carry out such an assessment that the sciences of ḥadīth criticism were developed. 
Different types of evidence are used to evaluate a report and assess its degree of authenticity. Taken 
into consideration are factors like the reliability and honesty of the narrators, the ability to demonstrate 
that all the narrators met one another and that there is no break in the chain of transmission, and the 
absence of any inconsistency between the text and other texts that are comparable with it. Uthmān b. 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Ṣalāḥ, Muqaddimah fī ʿUlūm al-Ḥadīth. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 
1995), 15-16. Equipped with these methods, scholars of ḥadīth criticism grade individual-narrator 
ḥadīth on the basis of how likely it is that those ḥadīth are true. These grades include authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), 
good (ḥasan) – which are generally accepted for establishing Islamic teachings – as well as weak 
(ḍaʿīf), rejected (munkar), and fabricated (mawḍūʿ), which are not accepted. Scholars of law, however, 
have developed different standards for accepting and rejecting individual-narrator reports, and this is 
one of the important points of divergence between the four schools of law.  
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1. The Māliki School 
It appears that Mālik b. Anas had a broader view of the Sunnah than to restrict it to 
the ḥadīth corpus.78 For him, the Sunnah represented the pattern of life passed down 
from the Prophet to the Companions and through their words and practice to the 
Successors and subsequent generations who came afterwards, which may or may not 
be recorded in the ḥadīth. Likewise, any single ḥadīth may or may not be 
representative of the overall normative pattern that comprises the Prophet’s Sunnah.79 
The shift from ascertaining the Sunnah from the practice of the Muslim community as 
well as from ḥadīth to taking it exclusively from the ḥadīth corpus had already 
occurred within the Mālikī school well before the time of the post-formative legal 
texts in this study, which take the “classical” view that the Sunnah is represented 
solely by the ḥadīth corpus.80 Nevertheless, Mālik’s broader concept of the Sunnah 
shaped the conditions that would later be elaborated in Mālikī legal theory for 
accepting ḥadīth, as well as how ḥadīth would be presented, interpreted, and 
understood in the legal literature of this school of law. 
 
For instance, the Mālikī school places restrictions on the validity of isolated ḥadīth as 
evidence for legal rulings, even if those ḥadīth have sound and complete chains of 
transmission. One of these restrictions is that the ḥadīth must not be contrary to the 
practice of the people of Madīnah, a rule which stems directly from the view that the 
Sunnah is preserved in their practice.81 Another is that it cannot contradict an analogy 
on the generally accepted precepts of the school.82 
                                                 
78 Umar Abd-Allah asserts: “Mālik regarded both ḥadīth and āthār or fatwā of the Companions to be 
sources of sunnah.” He also writes: “In light of the relatively few ḥadīth transmitted from the older and 
more prominent Companions, the use of their āthār and fatwās to establish the content of the Prohetic 
sunnah has special value.” Abd-Allah, “Malik’s Concept”, 165; 168. 
79 Yasin Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law: The Qur'an, the Muwatta' and Madinan Amal. (London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2002) 168. 
80 Both Abd-Allah and Dutton refer to this as the “classical” view of the Sunnah, since it was held by 
jurists and legal theorists of all four schools of law during the post-formative period, including those of 
the Mālikī school. Abd-Allah, “Malik’s Concept”, 121; Dutton, Origins, 169. 
81 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿUmar b. al-Qaṣṣār, al-Muqaddimah fī al-Uṣūl. ed. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasayn 
al-Sulaymānī. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1996), 77. This early Mālikī legal theorist writes: “The 
reports about [the practices of] the people of Madīnah are reports of the general masses, so they take 
precedence over individual-narrator reports.” Likewise, `Abd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī writes: “If an 
individual narrator report is related that contradicts their unbroken practice, it must be rejected and 
their practice adopted, since their practice comes in the same way as a report of the general masses… 
We assume the [single-narrator] report to be the result of a mistake on the part of the narrator, or that 
the report had been abrogated, or that some other factor necessitates its being rejected. This has nothing 
to do with the allegation that we reject reports that are not reinforced by [Madinite] practice, for if a 
report is found on a matter about which nothing is substantiated from the practice of the people of 
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At the same time, the Mālikī school acknowledges the validity of mursal ḥadīth from 
the most trusted narrators, for whom it can be demonstrated that they only narrate 
ḥadīth from other equally trustworthy and reliable narrators. If this condition is met, 
mursal hadith are regarded equally as authoritative as ḥadīth with complete chains of 
transmission. One reason for this was the belief that if a reliable narrator heard a 
ḥadith from a large number of sources, he would leave out mention of those numerous 
sources and attribute the ḥadīth directly to the person those sources related it from.83  
 
The statements of the Companions were also a potential source of the Sunnah for 
Mālik, who certainly adopted the opinions of a number of Companions. Abd-Allah 
argues that Mālik held the Companions’ statements to be similar in their authority as 
sources of law to individual-narrator ḥadīth. and that the āthār and legal verdicts of 
older and more prominent Companions had special value, due to their intimate 
knowledge of the Prophet’s Sunnah and the long time they spent in his presence. He 
supports his claim with a number of Mālik’s legal decisions and what Mālik said in 
his famous letter to Layth b. Saʿd. 84 
 
However, the authority of a Companion’s statement and its evidentiary nature was a 
matter of considerable discussion for Mālikī legal theorists. The early Mālikī theorist 
Ibn al-Qaṣṣār considers the authority of a Companion’s statement to be based on a 
presumption of consensus (ijmāʿ), and that it only stands as evidence of no other 
Companion is on record expressing a dissenting view.85 In Iḥkām al-Fuṣūl, al-Bājī 
                                                                                                                                            
Madinah, we accept it.” ʿAbd al-Wahhāb  b. ʿAlī b. Nasr al-Baghdādī, al-Muʿawwanah ʿala Madhhab 
Ahl al-Madīnah, published with Ibn al-Qaṣṣār’s al-Muqaddimah, 247. A similar justification is given 
by Ibn Rushd al-Jadd. See: Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Rushd al-Jadd, al-Bayān wa al-Taḥṣīl. ed. 
Muḥammad Ḥajjī et al. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988), 17:331. 
82 Ibn al-Qaṣṣār explains the justification for this as follows: “A individual-narrator report might be 
abrogated, or affected by error or omission, or be a lie, or be specified by something else. There is only 
one possibility for falsehood with an analogy (qiyās), and that is whether the original ruling is truly 
brought about by the [identified] effective cause. Therrfore, it is stronger than a individual-
narratorreport and must be given preference.” al-Muqaddimah fī al-Uṣūl, 110-111. This argument is 
repeated verbatim by Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, where he adds: “That which can possibly be falsified as 
evidence from many angles is weaker than that which can only be falsified from one.” al-Bayān wa al-
Taḥṣīl, 17:332. 
83 Ibn al-Qaṣṣār, al-Muqaddimah fī al-Uṣūl, 71-74.  
84 Abd-Allah, “Malik’s Concept”, 161-169.  
85 He writes: “In Mālik’s view, it is permissible to specify the apparent meaning [of a text] with the 
statement of a single Companion if no other [Companion] is known to have said something else and 
that Companion’s statement had become open knowledge. It becomes a binding statement requiring the 
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identifies the authority of a Companion’s statement to be a contentious issue wherein 
the earliest Mālikī scholars differed.86 In al-Minhāj, he asserts the same disagreement, 
but subsumes the entire question under the rubric of ijmāʿ.87  However, he also 
mentions that Mālik b. Anas may have personally regarded the statement of a 
Companion as evidence, even if it did not become widely circulated.88 Ibn al-Ḥājib 
resolves that “it does not stand as evidence”, and identifies the opposing view to be 
strictly that of the Ḥanafī and  Hanbalī schools.89 
 
2. The Shāfiʿī School 
The Shāfiʿī school is closest in methodology to the approach of ḥadīth scholars as to 
which ḥadīth it deems acceptable. The Sunnah is known through what is recorded in 
authentic ḥadīth. It is no accident that most of the pivotal scholars in the development 
of ḥadīth criticism have been from the Shāfiʿī school. 
 
The Shāfiʿī school accepts isolated authentic ḥadīth (those that have sound and 
complete chains of transmission) as valid evidence for legal rulings. In the terms of 
ḥadīth scholars, these are the ṣahīh and ḥasan ḥadīth. Indeed, in the absence of 
evidence to establish that an authentic ḥadīth has been abrogated, it is obligatory to 
accept it.90 
 
                                                                                                                                            
specification of [the text] with it, because it is effectively a form of consensus.” Ibn al-Qaṣṣār, al-
Muqaddimah fī al-Uṣūl,  104. 
86 Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, Iḥkām al-Fuṣūl. ed. ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
1995), 1:274 
87 Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, al-Minhāj fī Tartīb al-Ḥijāj. (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 2004), 41-42. 
88 al-Bājī, al-Minhāj, 229. 
89 Ibn al-Ḥājib not only resolves that “it does not stand as evidence”, but also identifies the opposing 
view to be that of the Ḥanafī and  Hanbalī schools.  ʻUthmān b. ʻUmar b. al-Ḥājib, Mukhtaṣar Muntahā 
al-Su’l wa la-Amal fī ʿIlmay al-Uṣūl wa al-Jadal. ed. Nadhīr Ḥamādū (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2006) 
2:845. 
90 Al-Shāfīʿī writes: “As for what is found in the Sunnah reported by individual narrators wherein it is 
possible for disagreement to exist and wherein interpretation is possible, when such reports come to us 
from individual narrators, then I would say that the evidence it contains has the force to make us abide 
by it, so they cannot reject what is stated therein any more than they can reject the testimony of a 
reliable witness. This is not because there is absolute certainty in the report like there is in the text of 
the Qur’ān or in a report of the general masses about God’s Messenger. If anyone is in doubt about this 
point, we would not tell him to repent. We would say to him: If you were a person of knowledge, you 
would have no right to doubt it, just as you would have no right if you were a judge to offer a judgment 
except in accordance with the testimony of reliable and trustworthy witnesses. Though a mistake is a 
possibility, you must pass judgment on the face value of their honesty, and God assumes responsibility 
over what you cannot perceive from them.” Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risālah. ed. Aḥmad 
Muḥammad Shākir (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿIlmiyyah, no date), 461.   
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In the Shāfiʿī school, unlike the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools, mursal ḥadīth are not 
accepted as evidence for legal rulings.91 The early Shāfiʿī theorist, al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī writes: “An individual-narrator ḥadīth is not accepted until the integrity of 
its narrators and the continuity of its chain of transmission are verified.”92 The reason 
for this is that the unmentioned narrator’s acceptability cannot be ascertained. Even if 
the narrator who makes this omission is of the highest calibre, there is no guarantee 
that the narrator made a correct assessment of the reliability of un-named person from 
whom the ḥadīth was received.93 Shāfiʿi scholars, likewise, do not accept the 
statements and legal opinions of the Companions as evidence.  
 
3. The Ḥanbali School 
The Ḥanbalī school accepts isolated authentic ḥadith as an independent source of law 
in the same way that the Shāfiʿī school does, and they regard those ḥadīth as 
possessing the same degree of legislative authority. Ḥanbalī scholars differ from their 
Shāfiʿī counterparts in accepting mursal ḥadīth94 as well as certain ḥadīth with other 
forms of weakness in their transmission.95 They also accept the āthār and legal rulings 
                                                 
91 al-Shāfīʿī gives a number of stringent conditions for accepting the mursal narrations of senior 
Successors, but these conditions require corroborative evidence that relegates such reports to a mere 
supporting role. The mursal narrations of the elder Successor Saʿīd b. al-Musayyib were among those 
most readily accepted, some of which are cited in al-Risālah. However, none of the ḥadīth that appear 
as evidence in support of legal rulings concerning women’s leadership come from this narrow category 
of mursal narrations. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risālah, 461-464. 
92 Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Kitāb al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih. ed. ʿĀdil b. Yūsuf al-
Ghazāzī. (Dammam: Dār ibn al-Jawzī, 2000),  1:291. 
93 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī , al-Faqīḥ, 1:292. 
94 Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā’, al-ʿUddah fī `Uṣūl al-Fiqh. ed. Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Sīr al-
Mubārakī (Riyadh: published by the editor, 1993), 3:906. 
95 Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā’, al-ʿUddah, 3:941. Abū Yaʿlā explains that the weakness Aḥmad accepts is quite 
limited in scope. He writes: “When Aḥmad says [he accepts] weak narrations, he means weak 
according to the ḥadīth scholars, because they describe as weak things that jurists are not compelled to 
regard as weak, like mursal narrations, chains of transmission with ambiguous terms of narration 
(tadlīs), and a single narrator relating a ḥadīth with additional wording not narrated by the rest of the 
narrators. This is found in their books: ‘So-and-so is the only one to come with this.’ So when he says: 
‘It is weak’, this is what he is referring to. When he says: ‘It is to be acted upon’, he is referring to 
[what is acceptable] according to the jurists.” This means that the degree of weakness tolerated by 
Aḥmad is minor. Indeed, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that the weak narrations Aḥmad accepts would actually 
be categorised ad good (ḥasan) narrations in the terminology of ḥadīth specialists: “Mursal and weak 
ḥadīth are accepted if there is nothing else on the topic to take precedence over them, and they are what 
takes precedence over analogical reasoning (qiyās). He does not mean by weak that which is false 
(bāṭil) or rejected (munkar), nor what has a suspect narrator in its chain of transmission, for acting upon 
such narrations cannot be justified. Rather, what he refers to as a weak ḥadīth is a division of what is 
authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), specifically it is a category of a good (ḥasan) ḥadīth. He did not categorise ḥadīth as 
authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), good (ḥasan), and weak (ḍaʿīf). Instead, he categorised them as authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) and 
weak (ḍaʿīf), with weak having many levels. If he did not find on a topic a narration, a statement of a 
Companion, or consensus which indicted something else, he would act upon this [weak ḥadīth] and 
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of the Companions as sources of law.96 For this reason, Abd-Allah observes that 
Ḥanbalī legal theory accepts more textual sources to be valid than any of the other 
schools.97 
 
These sources are accepted with various conditions and have different degrees of 
textual authority. However, Ḥanbalī jurists will not resort to analogical reasoning 
(qiyās) or any other approach to deriving laws until they have exhausted all of these 
textual possibilities.98 Whereas Mālikī and Ḥanafī acceptance of mursal ḥadīth can be 
traced back to what was originally a broader and understanding of the Sunnah, one 
that was inclusive of the practices and understandings of the community, this cannot 
be said for the Ḥanbalī school, whose jurists have always regarded the ḥadīth as the 
sole repository of the Sunnah. It is rather that their commitment to textual evidence is 
so strong that they prefer reliance upon a weak ḥadīth to any exercise of juristic 
reasoning. 
 
4. The Ḥanafī School 
The Ḥanafī school, like the Mālikī school, traces its development back before the time 
the Sunnah became strictly synonymous with a standardised ḥadīth corpus. This had a 
similar influence in shaping Ḥanafī legal theory regarding the acceptance of ḥadīth. 
Like the Mālikī school, a number of restrictions are placed on the use of isolated 
individual-narrator ḥadīth as a source of law, though the restrictions themselves differ. 
Many of these conditions reflect the authority that the established practices of the 
community had in contrast to a individual-narratorhadīth, irrespective of the 
soundness of its chain of transmission. For instance, a individual-narrator ḥadīth 
cannot contradict the well-known general axioms of the Ḥanafī school, nor the well-
known Sunnah, nor the practice of the Companions and Successors. Significantly, a 
individual-narrator ḥadīth cannot refer to something that would have to be generally 
known by the broader Muslim community (ʿumūm al-balwā), especially if the 
                                                                                                                                            
give it precedence over qiyās.” Muḥammad b Abī Bakr b. Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn 
ʿan Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn. ed. ʿIṣām Fāris al-Ḥarastānī. (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1998) 1:45. 
96 Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā’, al-ʿUddah, 4:1178. 
97 Abd-Allah, “Mālik’s Concept” 125. 
98 Ibn al-Qayyim writes: “If Imām Aḥmad did not find any textual evidence on the issue, nor the 
opinion of the Companions or of one of the Companions, nor a mursal or weak narration, he would 
then resort to the fifth source of law, qiyās, out of necessity.” Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Iʿlām al-
Muwaqqiʿīn, 1:47. 
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ḥadīth’s ruling is not found to have been expressed by the jurists.99 On the other hand, 
they treat mursal narrations and ḥadīth with connected chains of transmissions as 
having equal strength, as long as all of the narrators are reliable and trustworthy who 
in turn only narrate ḥadīth from other equally trustworthy and reliable narrators.100 
They regard the āthār and legal rulings of the Companions as additional sources of 
evidence for determining and clarifying the Sunnah.101  
 
From the above, we can see that Ḥanafī scholars recognise an inherent uncertainty in 
individual-narrator ḥadīth. Ḥanafī legal theory places great emphasis on the certainty 
or uncertainty of evidence. Unlike the other three schools of law, they make a 
distinction between legal obligations, designating some as compulsory (farḍ) and 
others as obligatory (wājib). The former are more heavily binding due to their being 
established with evidence that engenders certainty (qaṭʿ), while the latter rulings are 
less emphatic due to the uncertainty (ẓann) of the evidence upon which they are 
                                                 
99 Al-Kawtharī explains the logic behind these conditions as follows: “Regardless of whether a report 
has a connected chain of transmission or is mursal, a condition for its acceptance is that it does not go 
against their generally accepted axioms. This is because the jurists exercised every effort to account for 
all textual sources from the Qur’an, Sunnah, and verdicts of the Companions, until they referred every 
comparable and agreed-upon textually-supported ruling back to a general axiom that it could be 
derived from, the general axiom being what all comparable rulings fall under. They did this for every 
set of comparable rulings, until they had thoroughly examined and surveyed everything. In this way, 
they developed general principles – which are elaborated in books dedicated to the topic of axioms and 
divergent rulings –  and they used these to critique individual-narratorreports. Whenever a [single-
narrator] report contradicted or deviated from these principles, they regarded it to be in conflict with 
what constituted more firmly grounded evidence, since a principle derived from multiple sources of 
law is equivalent to a report of the general masses.” Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Fiqh Ahl al-ʿIrāq 
wa Ḥadīthuhum. ed. Muḥammad Sālim Abū ʿĀṣī. (Cairo: Dār al-Baṣā’ir, 2009),  35. He also says: 
“Another of their principles is to reject individual-narratorreports in matters which would clearly have 
to be known to everyone and therefore the need to relate it would make the report widespread. The 
circumstances therefore attested to its falsehood. It is also a condition that the report is well-known by 
the generality of the jurists.”Fiqh Ahl al-ʿIrāq, 36. 
100 Al-Sarakhsī invokes the possibility that mursal narrations from trustworthy narrators might actually 
be stronger, because these narrators leave out mentioning their sources only when they have heard the 
ḥadīth from a large number of reliable sources. He cites statements to this effect from prominent early 
narrators like Ibrāhīm al-Nakha’ī and ʿĪsā b. Abān. Al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl, 1:371. 
101 With respect to matters wherein there is no room for the exercise of reason, Ḥanafī legal theorists 
are agreed that the statement of a Companion is legal proof if there is no contradictory opinion 
expressed by another Companion. Al-Sarakhsī says: “There is no disagreement among our earlier and 
later scholars that the statement of one of the Companions is legal proof in matters wherein analogical 
reasoning (qiyās) has no role in determining the ruling. This includes the determination of quantities 
that cannot be known through the exercise of opiniuon,. Therefore, we adopted ʿAlī’s statement that the 
dowry is set at ten silver coins.” As for other matters, he mentions some disagreement about which is 
given precedence, but favours the view that the Companion’s statement takes precedence over qiyās. 
al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl, 2: 110 and 2:108. 
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established.102 This is unique to Ḥanafī Law. The terms farḍ and wājib are essentially 
synonymous in the other legal schools. The Ḥanafī school makes an equivalent 
distinction with respect to prohibited things. The term “prohibited” (ḥarām) is used 
for prohibitions established by certain evidence, while the term “disliked as 
prohibited” (makrūh taḥrīman) is used for prohibitions established by uncertain 
evidence.103 
 
Likewise, Ḥanafī scholars regard any addition to the meaning of a ruling in the 
Qur’an to be a form of abrogation requiring evidence providing certainly to make 
such additions.104 A individual-narrator ḥadīth, being uncertain, cannot provide 
anything that adds to or modifies a ruling in the Qur’an. It can, however, be 
strengthened by other factors which enable it to do so. One of these is to claim that the 
ḥadīth should be graded as well-known (mash-hūr), which means that though it 
begins by being narrated by a limited number of Companions, it subsequently then 
becomes widespread in later stages of its narration.105 
 
In summary, the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools set conditions upon the acceptance of 
individual-narrator ḥadīth that give them greater leeway in rejecting a ḥadīth with a 
sound chain of transmission if it goes against established general precepts or practices 
within the school, whereas the Shāfiʿi and Ḥanbalī schools place the final authority in 
                                                 
102 A ruling is farḍ if “it is established  by evidence which is certain, containing no uncertainty” and 
wājib if “it is established  by evidence containing uncertainty, like a verse requiring interpretation or an 
authentic individual-narratorreport.” al-Shāshī, Uṣūl, 239. 
103 The ruling of “disliked as prohibited” (makrūh taḥrīman) should not be confused with “disliked as 
disdainful” (makrūh tanzīhan), the latter being equivalent to the ruling of “disliked” (makrūh) in the 
terminology of the other three schools of law. It is rather a subcategory of what the other schools of law 
recognize as “prohibited” (ḥarām). Nevertheless, the expressions of the Ḥanafī theorists sometimes add 
to the confusion. Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah discusses the discrepancy between the terminology’s wording of the 
and the actual division of the rulings as follows: “The ruling of being disliked is two types: disliked as 
disdainful, which is closer to the ruling of permissibility, and disliked as prohibited, which is closer to 
the ruling of prohibition. According to Muḥammad [al-Shaybānī]: ‘Indeed, [disliked as prohibited] is 
the ruling of prohibition, but with evidence that is uncertain, in the same way as wājib is to farḍ’.” Ṣadr 
al-Sharīʿah ʿUbayd Allah b. Masʿūd al-Maḥbūbī, Tanqīḥ al-Uṣūl. (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 
2001 – published with al-Talqīḥ), 453. 
104 Al-Sarakhsī says: “An addition to a text is abrogation, so it cannot be established except with what 
can establish abrogation, and abrogation cannot be established by a individual-narratorreport, so 
likewise, an addition cannot be established by it.” He also says: “An addition to the text takes the form 
of a clarification [of the text], but is an abrogation in its actual meaning, regardless of whether the 
addition is to the [ruling’s] cause or to the ruling [itself].” al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl, 1:126 and 2:81-82. 
105 Al-Sarakhsī explains: “It is permissible to use this type of report to establish an addition to the text, 
since the scholars received it with full acceptance and acted upon it. This indicates that it is binding 
evidence, because consensus (ijmāʿ) occurring in the second and third eras is binding evidence. 
Therefore, we permit it to establish an addition to the text.” al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl, 1:303.    
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the text of the ḥadīth as long as its chain of transmission is sound. Ḥanafī and Mālikī 
jurists accept mursal narrations – those in which some of the narrators are not 
mentioned – as being comparable in authority to narrations with continuous chains of 
transmission as long as the narrators who are mentioned are trustworthy. This is 
because of their conviction that a trustworthy narrator would not neglect to mention a 
source unless that source was also trustworthy, or because the omission was possibly 
due to the large number of sources that the narrator heard it from. Ḥanbalī scholars 
accept mursal narrations as being of lesser authority than ones with complete chains 
of transmission, while Shāfiʿi jurists reject nearly all mursal narrations. All four 
schools of law agree on the principle of rejecting narrations with extremely weak, 
unreliable, or suspect narrators in their chains of transmission. 
 
The ḥadīth that are cited as evidence in the surveyed legal works will now be 
discussed in detail. For each ḥadīth, the text of the ḥadīth is given, followed by where 
it appears in the surveyed works. The authenticity of its chain of transmission is then 
briefly discussed to provide a frame of reference for the jurists’ potential acceptance 
and rejection of the ḥadīth on that basis, bearing in mind that different jurists will 
have been aware of, or concerned with, these considerations to varying degrees, 
depending on their school of law and the time period in which they lived. Finally, 
how that ḥadīth is used by the jurists’ in their legal arguments is analysed in detail. 
 
 
B. A People Who Grant a Woman Authority to Rule Them 
 
Al-Ḥasan al-Basrī relates from Abū Bakrah:106 
 
God benefited me during the days of the [Battle of the] Camel with words I had 
heard from God’s Messenger, after I had almost joined in the fight on the side of 
the companions of the Camel.107 When God’s Messenger had heard that the 
                                                 
106 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (4425) and in a slightly abridged form (7099). 
107 This was the faction led by the Prophet’s widow ʿĀ’ishah in opposition to the faction led by his 
cousin and son-in-law ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib at the battle of the camel which took place in Basra in the year 
656 CE. ʿAlī’s faction was victorious. 
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Persians appointed Khosrau’s daughter108 to rule them, he said: “A people who 
grant a woman authority to rule them will not succeed.” 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works 
This ḥadīth is the primary textual evidence cited in the classical legal literature to 
prohibit women from assuming positions of political leadership, often to the exclusion 
of other textual evidence. This is the case for all four schools of law109, though it is 
only cited in the Ḥanafī works quite late. The hadith is also cited consistently 
regarding judicial appointments by the texts of the three schools of law that prohibit 
women from serving as judges. Only the Mālikī jurist Ibn Rushd refrains from 
mentioning it from among the Mālikī jurists who cite textual evidence. Though the 
Ḥanafī school does not categorically prohibit women from being judges, the ḥadīth is 
cited by later Ḥanafī scholars, from Ibn al-Humām onwards, to argue that anyone who 
appoints a woman to a judicial post has committed a sin.  
 
Regarding prayer leadership, it is mentioned in two of the surveyed Mālikī works  as 
direct evidence for prohibiting a woman from leading prayers, Manāhij al-Taḥṣīl and 
al-Fawākih al-Dawānī.110 It is neglected by the other works which come before and 
after them, and does not appear to be a serious line of evidence for Mālikī arguments 
against women’s prayer leadership.  
 
It is also rarely cited in the early and middle-period works of the Shāfīʿī school of 
law, though it is hinted at by al-Shāfiʿi himself in al-Umm. The only early scholar 
who mentions it is al-Māwardi.111 This line of evidence is not taken up by his 
                                                 
108 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī identifies Purandokht as the daughter in question, adding on the authority of 
al-Ṭabarī that her sister Azarmidokht also ascended the throne. Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, 
Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd Allah b. Bāz. (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 
1998), 8:149. 
109 What is true for the classical texts still holds for Muslims who argue against women leaders today. 
Fatima Mernissi says: “This Hadith is the sledgehammer argument used by those who want to exclude 
women from politics” since “it is practically impossible to discuss the question of women’s political 
rights without referring to it, debating it, and taking a position on it.” Mernissi, Veil, 4. 
110 It’s mentioned under prayer leadership in Manāhij al-Taḥsīl as evidence for prohibiting a woman 
from political leadership. The work expressly states that the ruling prohibiting prayer on this basis is by 
way of analogy on political leadership. Therefore, this is not a case where the ḥadīth is directly being 
used as evidence to prohibit prayer leadership. This will be discussed in depth in the chapter on qiyās. 
111 It will become clear that al-Māwardī’s strategy in al-Ḥawī al-Kabīr is to mention all possible lines 
of evidence, regardless of their questionability or methodological soundness. We have already seen an 
example of this in his use of Q 4:34 to prohibit women from leadership. Therefore, his use of evidence 
cannot be seen as indicative of Shāfiʿi methodology unless it is taken up by later scholars.  
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immediate successors, nor by the revisionist scholars of the middle period. 
Significantly, it becomes more or less the exclusive evidence later Shāfiʿī scholars 
rely upon by for prohibiting women from leading men in prayer. 
 
It is not cited at all with reference to prayer in the Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī works. 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
This ḥadīth is found in the canonical collection Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, the ḥadīth 
compilation which enjoys the highest reputation for authenticity in Sunnī Islam. The 
chain of transmission given by al-Bukhārī is solid and unbroken.112 No jurist or ḥadīth 
scholar would have any reason to objection to it. It is supported by other corroborative 
transmissions, all going back to Abū Bakrah.113 Indeed, it is the soundest and 
strongest ḥadīth cited with reference to women in leadership in the legal works under 
survey. Classical scholars faced with these chains of transmission would have no 
reason to doubt that Abū Bakrah narrated this account of the Prophet’s reaction to 
hearing the news that a woman had ascended the Persian throne. It is therefore not 
surprising that this ḥadiṭh shows itself to be the favourite piece of textual evidence for 
scholars of all four schools of law to justify preventing women from assuming 
political and judicial authority.  
 
A number of contemporary scholars have challenged this assessment. For instance, 
Fatima Mernissi argues that Abū Bakrah’s integrity as a narrator is impugned because 
he was flogged by ʿUmar for the crime of false accusation. She goes so far as to say 
that his narrations would have to be rejected according to the principles of Imam 
Mālik.114 She also feels that the narration is suspect because of possible political 
motives that Abū Bakrah might have had for narrating the ḥadīth when he did, after 
                                                 
112 This chain of transmission is as follows: ʿUthmān b. Haytham from ʿAwf al-Aʿrābī from al-Ḥasan 
al-Baṣrī from Abū Bakrah. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī mentions that all the narrators in this chain of 
transmission are from Baṣrah and that al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī heard ḥadīth from Abū Bakrah. al-Asqalānī, 
Fatḥ al-Bārī, 8:149. 
113 Nufayʿ b. al-Ḥārith (d. 52/672), known as Abū Bakrah, was a slave from Tā’if, a town located to the 
east of Mecca. He acquired his freedom during the Prophet’s siege of the city in of the year 630. 
114 Mernissi, Veil (60-61). She quotes Mālik as saying he would reject the ḥadīth of narrators whom he 
saw to be dishonest in their daily relationships. However, Mālik was not referring to the Prophet’s 
Companions when he said this. Mālik was born in 93 AH / 711 CE, and would not have met any of the 
Companions. The senior narrators Mālik relied on from were from the generation of the Successors. 
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the defeat of ʿĀ’ishah’s forces at the Battle of the Camel.115 What adds to her 
suspicions is that no one else cited gender as an issue among those who opposed 
ʿĀ’ishah or advocated remaining neutral in the conflict, though their discussions and 
objections are all well-documented.116 
 
There are two methodological reasons, shared by all four schools of law, why these 
objections would not cause classical legal theorists, jurists, and ḥadīth scholars to call 
the ḥadīth’s authenticity into question. First, there is the theological principle that all 
the Companions are just.117 To cast suspicion on the integrity of any one of the 
Companions is held by the majority of Sunnī scholars to be a violation of a 
theological tenet. It is possible for any jurist to fault a Companion’s memory or the 
completeness of transmission for a particular ḥadīth. Likewise, Ḥanafī and Mālikī 
scholars might dismiss a ḥadīth if it contradicts a sound analogy or established 
practice, on the basis that the Companion may have unwittingly changed the meaning 
through paraphrase. However, the Companion’s honesty and integrity are never called 
into question.  
 
The second methodological principle is the distinction legal theorists and ḥadīth 
scholars make between narration and testimony118, a distinction which means that 
Abū Bakrah being flogged for false accusation does not prevent his narrations from 
being accepted.119 
                                                 
115 Mernissi, Veil, 53. 
116 Mernissi, Veil, 56-58. 
117 Al-Samʿānī writes: “Know that the Companions are all just and upright, and their narrations must be 
accepted without exception.” al-Samʿānī, Qawāṭiʿ, 1:343. 
118 In al-Qarāfī’s celebrated book al-Furūq (The Differences) wherein he analyses 274 sets of 
differences and distinctions which exist in islamic law and methodology, the first set of differences he 
addresses is “the difference between testimony and narration”, showing the centrality this distinction 
had in Islamic thought, both for ḥadīth criticism and legal theory. Aḥmad b. Idrīs Shihāb al-Dīn al-
Qarāfī, al-Furūq. ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Hindāwī. (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿAṣriyyah, 2002), 1:9-22. 
119 Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī explains the effect of a failed accusation of adultery on the accuser’s 
testimony and narration as follows: “If the accuser [of adulatery] makes the accusation in terms of 
giving testimony, and the accusation does not stand, then his narrations are accepted even though his 
testimony is rejected, as long as he is of upright character, because Abū Bakrah’s testimony was 
rejected but his narrations were accepted. This is because his wrongdoing is by way of interpretation. 
However, if he makes an accusation of adultery ouside of the context of giving testimony, then his 
narrations are rejected unless he repents. This is because his wrongdoing by casting doubt on lineage is 
confirmed, whereas in the context of giving testimony, it is the exercise of judgment.” Badr al-Dīn 
Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allah al-Zarkashī, al-Nukat ʿālā Muqaddimah Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ. ed. Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn 
Muḥammad Bulā Furayj. (Riyadh: Dār Aḍwā’ al-Salaf, 1998) 3:410. Ibn Qudāmah understands the 
distinction differently: “The one punished for accusation made it in terms of giving testimony, then his 
narrations are not rejected, because the insufficient number [of accusers] was not due to his action. This 
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Had early scholars made no distinction between narration and testimony, it would 
have meant the rejection of all uncorroborated ḥadīth narrated by individual women, 
since they do not recognize a lone woman’s testimony to be sufficient in the majority 
of cases. However, they accept the ḥadīth narrations of lone women without 
hesitation. Therefore, it would appear that this principle of distinguishing between 
narration and testimony is gender-neutral in and of itself, and was certainly not 
established merely to preserve this particular tradition of Abū Bakrah.120 
 
Khalid Abou El Fadl brings a different suggestion, the possibility that Abu Bakrah 
might have misremembered the ḥadīth. He suggests the Prophet might have said: “A 
people who are led by this woman will not succeed.”121 However, this particular 
possibility seems unlikely, since the Prophet would not have known anything about 
the leadership qualities of the woman in question, so there is no reason why classical 
jurists would have had reason to suspect this particular error in transmission.  
 
It can be concluded that there is nothing exceptional about the jurists of the four legal 
schools accepting this ḥadīth as sufficiently authentic for the purpose of establishing 
legal rulings.  
 
3. Its Use in Questions of Political and Judicial Authority 
An important question that Abou El Fadl raises is the possibility that the Prophet was 
making a general comment on the political situation in Persia. He points out that the 
wording of the ḥadīth – as it appears in its most authoritative narration in Saḥīḥ al-
Bukhārī and elsewhere – “leaves open the possibility that the Prophet was simply 
predicting the downfall of Persia, i.e. the Prophet was saying, ‘With this woman in 
                                                                                                                                            
is the reason why people narrated from Abū Bakrahand agreed on doing so, though he was punished 
for accusation. If [an accusation of adultery] is made outside of the context of giving testimony, then 
his narrations are not accepted unless he repents.” Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:405. 
120 Leila Ahmed denies the gender-neutrality of the principle distinguishing between narration and 
testimony, and argues that the rule of needing two female witnesses to equal the testimony of one man 
was simply not considered binding in the early days of Islam when the ḥadīth narrations were collected 
from ‘Ā’ishah and other female Companions. Had the two-witness condition been regarded as binding, 
she argues, many of their ḥadīth would not have been accepted. She further argues that the undeniable 
and indispensable presence of these early women-narrated ḥadīth is precisely what ensured the 
continued toleration of female ḥadīth narration in later eras. See: Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 
74. 
121 Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, 113. 
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power, Persia will fall.’”122 He supports this interpretation by observing that some 
ḥadīth compilers did not relate this ḥadīth in their books in the chapter on governance.  
 
This is a highly pertinent point. The fact that the ḥadīth is a comment on a particular 
political development raises serious hermeneutical difficulties for jurists wishing to 
derive a general prohibition from it. There are two ways a prohibition can be derived 
from a text. The first is directly from the text’s structure, specifically a negative 
imperative statement like “Do not…”. This follows a principle in Islamic legal theory 
that a negative imperative indicates prohibition in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary.123 If the structure does not indicate a prohibition, the other approach is to 
consider contextual indicators (qarā’in) to make a claim that the speaker intended a 
prohibition when uttering the statement.124 
 
“A people who grant a woman authority to rule them will not succeed.” is neither a 
command nor a prohibition. It is statement, an observation. Furthermore, the context 
does not indicate that any command or prohibition was intended by it.125 As a result, 
                                                 
122 Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, 136. 
123 The vast majority of legal theorists form all four schools of law hold that the imperative literally 
indicates obligation and the negative imperative literally indicates a prohibition. Their use of these verb 
tenses for other purposes, like encouragement or discouragement, is regarded as metaphorical. See al-
Juwaynī, al-Burhān 1:159 and 1:199.  
124 When a statement is intended by the speaker to be a command or prohibition, it is understood by 
legal theorists to do so metaphorically, so evidence is needed to justify interpreting it in that way. The 
Shāfiʿī legal theorist Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī discusses this at length in al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ and gives the 
following textual examples: “A woman does not marry off another woman”, “A journey [of 
pilgrimage] is not made to other than three mosques”, and the Qur’anic verse: “None touch it save 
those who are purified.” Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allah al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ. ed. 
ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAbd Allah al-ʿĀnī. (Kuwait: Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, 1992) 2:371. 
125 A general prohibition would be understood from a statement negating success where its context 
clearly relates to the Hereafter. This means God’s punishment and therefore indicates that the activity 
causing it is sinful and prohibited by God. This is the case with many verses of the Qur’an, like 10:69: 
“Say: indeed those who forge a lie against God will not succeed. They have some enjoyment in this 
world, then to Us is their return and then We will make them taste the severe punishment on account of 
their unbelief.” and Qur’an 23:117: “And whoever invokes besides God another god for whom he has 
no proof, then his account is only with his Lord. The unbelievers will not succeed.” In his work on the 
sciences of the Qur’an, Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī presents a list of dozens of textual forms, among which 
are “negating success” and “making avoidance of something the cause of success”, and then says: “The 
likes of these indicate forbidding the activity, and their indication of prohibition is greater than their 
indication of dislike.” Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān. ed. Muḥammad Abū al-
Faḍl Ibrāhīm. (Egypt: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyyah, 1957), 2:10-12. Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām also 
mentions these form and then lists a number of the Qur’an’s verses that negate success, along with the 
ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah. In this way, he fails to make a distinction between the way the phrase is used in 
the Qur’anic context with reference to the Hereafter and its use in the ḥadīth for worldly concerns. See:  
ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd al-Salām, al-Imām fī Bayān Adillah al-Aḥkām. ed. Riḍwān Mukhtār 
b. Gharbiyyah. (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Iislāmiyyah, 1987), 105 and 111.  
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the act of deriving a categorical prohibition from the statement is a highly subjective 
interpretive move. 
 
Nevertheless, we see that the jurists uniformly cite the ḥadīth as if it were a general 
prohibition. This begs the question as to whom the prohibition is addressed. The 
Ḥanafī jurist Ibn al-Humām  is the only one to discuss this point, arguing that the 
ḥadīth is addressing those who would grant a woman authority, informing them that 
they will be unsuccessful if they do so. This obliges him to make a broad appeal to the 
“innate deficiency” of women’s intellects to show why this lack of success should be 
expected most of the time. However, the Prophet was commenting directly on the 
news from Persia, and the news itself was not about Persia’s downfall, but only about 
a woman taking the throne. It is far from obvious how the Prophet’s statement here 
can be construed as advice to those who would grant people authority. The context 
indicates a prediction about Persia’s political situation, not advice about what not to 
do. Ibn al-Humām is redirecting and restricting the ḥadīth’s intended addressees to 
those who would appoint women to authority, and this highlights the contrived nature 
of the prohibition. 
 
It also highlights the fact that, in spite of the statement’s general wording, its general 
application to all women at all times cannot be taken for granted. Had the Prophet 
been quoted as issuing a generally-worded prohibition like: “Do not grant a woman 
authority to rule you,” two widely held theoretical principles would have made a 
presumption of generality the default assumption. The first is the principle that 
“consideration is given to the generality of the wording, not the specificity of the 
occasion in which it was uttered”, though there are some qualifications to this rule.126 
The second is the principle that “the generality of individuals requires the generality 
of circumstances, times, and places.”127 These principles are upheld by a good number 
                                                 
126 For a discussion of this principle, the circumstances where it applies,and the disagreements 
surrounding it, see : Taqī al-Dīn ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Kāfī al-Subkī and Tāj al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-
Subkī, al-Ibhāj fī Sharh al-Minhāj. ed. Shaʿbān Muḥammad Ismāʿīl. (Mecca: al-Maktabah al-
Makkiyyah, 2004), 2:1002.  
127 Zakariyyā b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, Ghāyah al-Wuṣūl Sharḥ Lubb al-Uṣūl (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-
ʿArabiyyah al-Kubrā, no date) 74. Al-Qarāfī offers a someone nuanced variation of this principle where 
he argues that when a statement is general in the individuals it refers to, it is assumed to be unqualified 
(muṭlaq) in time, place, and circumstances, and not general in these factors. Aḥmad b. Idrīs Shihāb al-
Dīn al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl. ed. Muḥammad  ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Shāghūl. (Cairo: al-
Maktabah al-Azhariyyah lil-Turāth, 2005)  186. 
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jurists and legal theorists of all four schools of law. However, these rules are not 
absolutes, neither in theory nor in practice, and it is common in all four schools of law 
for jurists to specify a text’s general meaning on the strength of its context.  
 
In this case, there is no general prohibition to begin with, so the jurists would have to 
appeal to the ḥadīth’s context, at least implicitly, to argue that the Prophet intended a 
prohibition when he spoke. This means the specific circumstances of the ḥadīth 
cannot be bypassed by appealing to the principles mentioned above. Since the ḥadīth 
speaks about Persia’s immediate situation, this indicates a restricted intent, so the 
statement’s general wording would be understood in the first instance to refer to the 
scope of circumstances relevant to the political critique, and not to the inevitability of 
an unsuccessful outcome for every woman in every time and place.  
 
However, this inevitability is what the jurists rely upon in their use of the ḥadīth. 
Likewise, to prohibit women from being judges, jurists have to see an unsuccessful 
outcome as inevitable not only in political leadership, but whenever women exercise 
authority of any kind. This means that for their interpretation of the ḥadīth to hold, 
they have to already be convinced that women are unsuited for such roles. Indeed, as 
we shall see, many of them make broad appeals to women’s deficient intellects and 
weakness when mentioning this ḥadīth.128 This shows that the ḥadīth is being 
recruited as a convenient piece of textual evidence to support the rulings and is not the 
real reason behind them. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that before Ibn 
al-Humām, Ḥanafī scholars did not refer to the ḥādīth, since it did not suit their 
purposes to do so. Even then, Ibn al-Humām advances counter-arguments to uphold 
the unique Ḥanafī position that a woman’s judicial verdicts are valid, and in doing so, 
provides a glimpse into how other equally plausible legal conclusions could have been 
derived from the ḥadīth.  
  
4. Its Use to Prohibit Prayer Leadership 
If the use of the ḥadīth is problematic for establishing rulings about political and 
judicial authority, these problems are exacerbated when trying to apply it to prayer 
                                                 
128 The relationship between this ḥadīth and the perceived deficiency of women is discussed again in 
the section on qiyās, with reference to comparing judicial authority to political leadership. See pp. 111-
112. 
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leadership. Nevertheless, it is mentioned by some Mālikī scholars, and it is the 
argument that the Shāfīʿī school of law ultimately settled upon. 
 
There are good reasons why the majority of legal scholars avoided using the ḥadīth to 
prohibit women from leading men in prayer. It entails subsuming an act of worship 
under a ruling for civil procedure. These two domains of law are generally kept 
distinct from one another. Even making juristic analogies between the two is 
problematic, and the extent of this problem will be taken up in the section on qiyās. 
Nevertheless, those among the Mālikī and Shāfī`ī jurists who cite it go further and 
suggest it is directly relevant to prayer, implying that prayer leadership is a species of 
the same authority which encompasses political and judicial leadership. 
 
The way the ḥadīth is used in the Shāfiʿī school of law to prohibit prayer leadership 
shows a particularly interesting pattern. The ḥadīth is hinted at by al-Shāfiʿī in al-
Umm, where he says: “God has appointed men to be responsible (qawwāmūn) for 
women and restricted them [women] from being people in authority, among other 
things.” This is not a citation of the ḥadīth, but a general appeal to women being 
restricted in their access to positions of authority. Moreover, he does not give this 
reason alone, but groups it together with men’s responsibility (qawwāmah) of women, 
and ends by referring vaguely to other similar rulings. This is a general appeal to 
women’s subordinate status and not to any particular textual evidence or rulings. The 
two texts he alludes to here are not related to matters of worship. It is significant that 
this is a very early work by the school’s founder that straddles the boundary between 
the formative and post-formative periods. This indicates how a strong perception 
about the status and role of women may have influenced the interpretation of these 
texts from a time before the principles of legal theory came into play. Al-Shāfi`ī is not 
referring to legal principles nor to direct textual evidence, but rather to a general sense 
of a woman’s place in society. At the same time, al-Shāfi`ī, being an astute legal 
theorist, is well aware that the texts do not relate to prayer, and therefore refrains from 
citing them as evidence or suggesting an analogy on their basis. 
 
Al-Māwardī goes further, like he does with verse 4:34, and cites Abū Bakrah’s ḥadīth 
explicitly in his discussion. He mentions it in a long list of suggested evidence 
without any further explanation. He is not followed by this by the Shāfiʿi scholars 
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who come after him, nor by the scholars of the middle period. This is probably due to 
their awareness of the awkward analogy that is implicit in using the ḥadīth. Instead, 
they turn to other lines of evidence, particularly a very weak ḥadīth which is later 
dismissed by the revisionist scholar al-Nawawī in al-Majmūʿ, who provides no other 
evidence to support the ruling. Then, when we get to the three commentaries on the 
Minhāj, the final Shāfi`ī works in the survey, the ḥadīth reappears as the primary 
justification for the ruling in two of them. Why did they return to this ḥadīth? It is 
probably due to the emphasis that the Shāfi`ī school places on sound ḥadīth 
transmission. The ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah is the only ḥadīth with an acceptable chain of 
transmission that can be used to prohibit women from holding leadership positions. 
The alternatives would be to rely on extremely weak ḥadīth narrations, like some 
middle period jurists do, or to assert the ruling without any evidence to support it, as 
al-Juwaynī and al-Nawawī do. The Shāfi`ī school ultimately settled upon using Abū 
Bakrah’s ḥadīth, opting for the only available authentically narrated textual support to 
prohibit women from leading men, in spite of its not being related to prayer. 
 
 
C. Deficient in Intellect and Religion 
 
ʿAbd Allah b. ʿUmar relates: 
 
God’s Messenger said: “O assembly of women! Give charity and seek 
forgiveness often, for I have seen that you form the majority of the denizens of 
Hell.”  
 
A well-spoken and perceptive woman from among them asked: “Why, O 
Messenger of God, are we the majority of the denizens of Hell?’  
 
He replied: “You curse frequently and are ungrateful to your husbands. And I 
have not seen from among those who are deficient in intellect and religion 
anyone so capable as you are of overwhelming a sensible man.” 
 
She then asked: “O Messenger of God, what is the deficiency in intellect and 
religion?” 
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He said, ‘As for the deficiency in intellect, the testimony of two women equals 
the testimony of one man. This, then, is the deficiency in intellect. She spends 
many a night without offering prayers, and she abstains from fasts during 
Ramaḍān. This, then, is the deficiency in religion.”   
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works 
The ḥadīth is cited by the Mālikī jurist al-Rajrājī in Manāhij al-Taḥṣīl while 
discussing women leading men in prayer. Al-Māzirī does not cite the ḥadīth outright, 
but alludes to it, saying: “The woman is attributed with a deficiency of intellect and 
religion, while a slave is not attributed with these qualities.” 
 
While discussing judicial authority, the Ḥanbalī jurist al-Zarkashī says: “A woman is 
deficient in intellect, which is established by textual [evidence],” though he does not 
identify the ḥadīth itself. 
 
The ḥadīth is cited by the Ḥanafī jurists al-Bābartī, al-ʿAynī and al-Zaylaʿī, in their 
discussions about women being witnesses. However, they bring up the topic of 
political authority in the course of of their discussions and explain how the ḥadīth 
shows women are not qualified for that authority.  
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
The ḥadīth is authentic. It is narrated from various Companions with sound chains of 
transmission in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim.129 There is no reason why jurists 
of any of the four schools of law would have reason to object to this ḥādith on the 
basis of its chain of transmission. 
 
3. Its Use as Evidence  
Al-Rajrājī cites the ḥadīth to follow up his contention that: “prayer leadership is a 
degree of honour and a lofty station, so only someone who is complete in religion and 
in essence should assume it.” He cites the ḥadīth to prove that women are deficient on 
both counts, so they cannot be allowed to lead prayers. He does not explain how he 
                                                 
129 In Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, it is related from Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī (304, 1462, 1951, and 2658). In Ṣaḥīḥ 
Muslim, it is narrated from ʿAbd Allah b. ʿUmar (79) and Abū Hurayrah (80). 
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jumps from the deficiency in intellect mentioned in the ḥadith to the deficiency in 
“essence” which he asserts. 
 
The ḥadīth is conspicuously absent from most discussions. This is significant for two 
reasons. First, the ḥadīth is authentic and well-known. Second, the idea of women’s 
deficiency is central to many of the jurists’ arguments. Why, then, do they refrain 
from using it?  
 
It could be argued that since the ḥadīth is famous, and since it is often cited in the 
same works under the topics of menstruation and testimony,  the authors did not feel a 
need to remind their reader about it when they invoke “deficiency” in their 
discussions of judicial appointments and prayer leadership. However, this is not the 
style of these jurists in presenting their arguments. They will quote a ḥadīth they want 
to use as evidence, or at least refer to it, even if they have quoted it elsewhere for 
other legal questions.   
 
The best illustration for this is al-Māwardī. He does not even hint at the ḥadīth, 
though he invokes the “deficiency of being female” to prohibit women from being 
judges and from leading men in prayer.130 Deficiency is central to both his arguments, 
and he recruits a lot of textual evidence to prove it, including Qur’an 4:34 as we have 
seen. None of the texts he cites provides straightforward evidence for women’s 
deficiency. However, here is a ḥadīth that directly states women are deficient in 
intellect and religion, so why does he ignore it? 
 
We can also ask why later Mālikī scholars refrain from follow al-Rajrājī’s precedent 
in citing the ḥadīth. They continue with the argument that women are too deficient to 
lead prayers but recruit other evidence to show it. Al-Qarāfī contends that a woman is 
worse off than a child, but cites “Send them to the back...” as his evidence for it. Al-
Nafrāwī follows al-Rajrājī closely in arguing that “leadership in prayer is a position of 
honour in religion and in the rites of the Muslims”, but he enlists the ḥadīth of Abū 
Bakrah to show how women fall short of this honour.  
 
                                                 
130 Al-Māwardī is aware of the ḥadīth. He cites it in full while discussing the rulings of menstruation in 
al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 1:384. 
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Ironically, it is the centrality of deficiency to the jurists arguments that prevents them 
from citing the ḥadīth. Many of their argument hinge on the innate and categorical 
deficiency of women, and this ḥadīth has the potential to place limits on it, which 
would be detrimental to their case. We have already seen the reluctance of Ḥanbalī 
jurists after Ibn Qudāmah to quote Qur’an 2:282 for similar reasons, and it is 
significant that this ḥadīth makes direct reference to that verse.  
 
In the ḥadīth, the Prophet is asked to explain what the deficiency in intellect and 
religion refer to, and he answers with specific examples.131 He relates the deficiency 
in intellect to the ruling that women need corroboration when acting as witnesses, 
which in Qur’an 2:282 refers to forgetting details of commercial transactions. It is 
difficult to generalize from the deficiency depicted here to diqualify women from 
political leadership and judicial posts. A woman’s deficiency in religion, as depicted 
in the ḥadīth, is equally restricted in scope. It does not follow from her being unable to 
pray during menstruation that her prayers at other times are less than those of men.  
 
Another pertinent fact about the ḥadīth is that it comes in the context of exhortation. 
The Prophet was encouraging the women to give in charity, and instilling fear in them 
by reminding them of their negative qualities. This is not to suggest that jurists would 
have understood the ḥadīth to be misrepresenting the truth or making an 
exaggeration132, but it would encourage a narrow understanding of what is meant by 
deficiency, since the style of the delivery would naturally be stronger and harsher than 
in other contexts. Therefore, by defining the two aspects of deficiency the way it does, 
the ḥadīth could be seen as clarifying the full extent of its meaning. 
 
Due to the ḥadīth’s potential to place a narrow limit on the nature and scope of the 
deficiency that can be attributed to women, it is understandable why the majority of 
                                                 
131 In some, but not all, of the narrations in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, the ḥadīth is narrated from Abū Saʿīd al-
Khudrī with the variant wording: “that, then, is from the deficiency in her intellect” and: “that, then, is 
from the deficiency in her religion.” The preposition “from” opens up the possibility that there might 
be other examples of deficiency. Nevertheless, only one example is given for each type of deficiency, 
and this is presented as a satisfactory answer to the woman’s question. In Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (1951), the 
ḥadith is attributed to Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī without the added preposition. 
132On the other hand, Gibril F. Haddad identifies two rhetorical devices in operation in this ḥadīth: 
hyperbole (mubālaghah) and synecdoche (majāz mursal). The former is in the Prophet’s description of 
the “sensible” type of man being led astray, and the latter in using “reason” to mean a specific form of 
legal testimony and “religion” to refer to prayer and fasting. Gibril F. Haddad, “Women’s Intelligence 
Hadith Again”. Living Islam. http://www.livingislam.org/k/wiha_e.html. 2006 (December 3 2009). 
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jurists would avoid referring to it outright in their arguments about prayer leadership, 
political positions, and judicial posts. They are on firmer ground simply declaring 
women to be deficient, or co-opting the phrase “deficient in intellect and religion” as 
a universal maxim, or supporting their claim with indirect evidence like “Send them 
to the back...” or the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah. In this way, they imply that women’s 
deficiency is common knowledge, and they can conceptualise it in the broadest 
possible terms. As we will see in the next chapter, this is important for them, because 
the alleged deficiency of women is the most ubiquitous and pervasive argument the 
jurists give for preventing women from assuming leadership roles. 
 
4. al-Bābirti’s Discussion 
Interestingly, al-Bābirtī and the Ḥanafī jurists who follow him bring up political 
authority in an attempt to place limits on the rulings that the ḥadīth applies to. His 
discussion comes in the context of women being witnesses, where quoting the ḥadīth 
is commonplace in the legal literature. However, al-Bābirtī’s argument is atypical. He 
is trying to justify why the Ḥanafī school accepts many forms of testimony from 
women that the other schools of law reject. He does so by presenting an elaborate 
philosophical categorisation of mental abilities based on an Aristotelian distinction 
between the active and passive intellects. He then reads this back into the ḥadīth by 
saying: “The Prophet’s statement ‘They are deficient in intellect’ refers to the active 
intellect...” In this way, he invokes the ḥadīth’s authority to conclude that women are 
deficient in abstract reasoning, one of the consequences of which is they cannot be 
political leaders. However, they can still be witnesses in the majority of cases, which 
presumably only demands from them basic reasoning skills. Needless to say, there is 
nothing in the ḥadīth’s wording that alludes to this complex argument. 
 
 
D. Judges are Three: One in Heaven and Two in Hell 
 
Buraydah relates that God’s Messenger said:  
 
Judges are three: one in Heaven and two in Hell. As for the one in heaven, he is 
a man who knows the truth and judges accordingly. A man who knows the truth 
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and strays from ruling accordingly, he is in Hell. A man who judges upon 
ignorance, he is in Hell.  
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works 
This ḥadīth appears only in the Ḥanbalī work Sharḥ al-Zarkashī with reference to 
women being judges. 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
This ḥadīth is found in Sunan al-Tirmidhī (1322), Sunan al-Nasā’ī al-Kubrā (5891),  
Sunan Abī Dāwūd (3573) and Sunan Ibn Mājah (2315). It has a number of mutually 
supporting connected lines of transmission going back to Buraydah through his father, 
and there is no reason why a jurist of any of the four schools of law would consider it 
its chain of transmission unacceptable. 
 
3. Its Use as Evidence 
It is clear that this ḥadīth is not speaking about women being judges. However, al-
Zarkashī argues that the Prophet is limiting the types of judges possible to the three 
types that are enumerated in the ḥadīth. Since the Prophet explicitly used the word 
man (rajul) when doing so, then the judge cannot be anything other than male.  
 
In Ḥanbalī jurisprudence, words which specifically refer to men, even their plural 
forms like “men” and “males”, are not assumed to include women implicitly in their 
meanings.133 This is in contrast to the masculine plural forms of words which can 
possibly include women, words like “Muslims” and “believers”, for these are 
implicitly assumed to include women in their general meaning.134  
 
Therefore, al-Zarkashī is conforming to the Ḥanbalī schools’ broad theoretical 
assumptions in stating that the apparent meaning of the word “man” excludes women. 
However, this word’s indication that it refers to males to the exclusion of women is 
not absolute, but open to interpretation. This is why al-Zarkashī refers to it as being 
                                                 
133 Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:702. 
134 See Abū Ya`lā, al-ʿUddah, 2:351-355 and Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:703-704. 
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the word’s “apparent” (ẓāhir) meaning135, indicating he is aware it could be 
interpreted otherwise. There are many cases in the ḥadith literature where the Prophet 
uses the word “man” where clearly the issue being discussed applies to women as 
well. The Ḥanbalī legal literature is replete with such examples.136 This is because 
contextual indicators are a valid basis in Ḥanbalī legal theory for reinterpreting the 
apparent meaning of a word.137  
 
In this instance, it is clear from the context that the issue of the judge’s gender has 
nothing to do with the statement’s intent, but rather the honesty and integrity of the 
judge. Moreover, it is talking about the fate of people in the Hereafter, which is itself 
universal in meaning. In such a context, it is easy for the word “man” to be spoken 
casually without any gender restriction being intended by it.138 This makes the 
ḥadīth’s evidence for excluding women from being judges tenuous at best, and it is 
not surprising that we do not find this argument being taken up by other Ḥanbalī 
jurists.  
 
 
                                                 
135 Ibn Qudāmah defines zāhir as: “what comes readily to mind from a word when it is mentioned in 
isolation, though other meanings are also possible.” He also defines a term as being zāhir when “it has 
two possible meanings, one of which is more apparent than the other.” Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 
2:563. 
136 For instance, to prove their position that owing a debt makes a person exempt from paying the  
Zakāh tax, they cite the following ḥadīth on the authority of Mālik’s students: “If a man has a thousand 
dirhams and owes someone a thousand dirhams, then he does not have to pay Zakāh.” Also, to prove 
that there are no legal consequences when a person swears an oath merely as a figure of speech, they 
cite the ḥadīth from Sunan Abī Dāwūd (3254): “It is when a man in his home says ‘No, by God’ or 
‘Nay, by God’.”. See: ʿAbd Allah b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī, al-Mughnī Sharḥ 
Mukhtaṣar al-Khiraqī. ed. ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattāh Muḥammad al-
Ḥilū. (Riyādh: Dār ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1997), 4:264 and 13:450. These are but two of numerous examples 
in the Ḥanbalī law books where they cite a ḥadīth using the term “man” but understand it to establish 
rulings applicable to men and women alike.  
137 See: Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:564. 
138 By contrast, when a noun or adjective is clearly intended in the text to specify the ruling attributed 
to it, then Ḥanbalī jurisprudence excludes from the ruling everything that is not included in the word. 
This is called dalīl al-khiṭab (the indication of the statement) in the terminology of Ḥanbalī legal 
theory. The classic example cited in the works of jurisprudence is the ḥadīth: “In free grazing sheep, 
the Zakāh tax is levied.” The indication here is that sheep which are not free-grazing are exempted 
from the tax. See Abū Ya`lā, al-ʿUddah, 2:448-452 and Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:775-776. 
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E. Send Them to the Back 
 
The statement is found in Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-Razzāq attributed to Ibn Masʿūd as 
follows:  
 
From Sufyān al-Thawrī from Aʿmash from Ibrāhīm from Abū Maʿmar from Ibn 
Masʿūd that he said: “The men and women of the Children of Israel used to pray 
together, and a woman who had a boyfriend used to would wear high wooden 
blocks to stand level with her boyfriend. So menstruation was thrust upon them 
(the women).”  Ibn Masʿūd did say: “Send them to the back whence God has 
sent them to the back.” 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works  
It is mentioned by al-Māwardī as evidence that a woman cannot lead men in prayer. It 
is not taken up by any of the other Shāfiʿi scholars in the survey139 and can be 
attributed to al-Māwardī’s practice of indiscriminately including every possible line of 
evidence in his exposition. It is also cited in the Mālikī works Manāhij al-Taḥṣīl, 
Bidāyah al-Mujtahid, and al-Dhakhīrah, in discussing prayer leadership.140   
 
It cited in all the Ḥanafī texts about prayer. Indeed, it is the primary evidence the 
Ḥanafī school relies upon to prohibit women from leading men in prayer. It is the only 
proof given in al-Mabsūṭ, which frames its entire argument around it. In Badā’iʿ al-
Ṣanā’iʿ, it is again the primary basis for argument, in conjunction with another ḥadīth, 
“The best ranks for women are the last ones and the worst are the first ones.” which is 
briefly mentioned in a clarifying role, and probelmatically treated as if it were part of 
the same hadith. 
 
Ibn al-Human rejects the statement and searches for other evidence and arguments to 
support the Ḥanafī position, specifically the ḥadīth of Anas. 
                                                 
139 As will shortly be made clear, it is safe to assume that most Shāfi`ī scholars avoided this text due to 
the extreme weakness of its narration. It is not even attributed to the Prophet in any of the primary 
ḥadīth sources wherein it is found.  
140 It is also mentioned in the context of judicial authority by al-Qarāfī of the Mālikī school (as well as 
by al-Māwardī of the Shāfiʿī school), but as the basis for a juristic analogy on prayer leadership and not 
as direct evidence to prohibit a woman from being a judge. This will be discussed in the section on 
qiyās.   
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The ḥadīth persists in the Ḥanafī literature however. It is cited in al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq, 
though he briefly acknowledges Ibn al-Humām’s objections. However, he also takes 
up the other ḥadīth argument introduced by Ibn Humām. 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
The statement is related from Ibn Masʿūd in Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-Razzāq (5115), Ṣahīh 
Ibn Khuzaymah (1700), and Muʿjam al-Ṭabarānī al-Kabīr (9484 and 9485). In every 
instance, it is a statement of Ibn Masʿūd that discusses the origin of menstruation. Its 
chain of transmission going back to Ibn Masʿūd would generally be regarded as 
authentic141, but there is no basis for the claim that it is a prophetic ḥadīth, and Ḥanafī 
scholars were aware of this. In Naṣb al-Rāyah, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Zaylaʿī142 says: “Its 
attribution to the Prophet is strange. It is found as a statement of Ibn Masʿūd in 
Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-Razzāq.”143 
 
The statement in Tabyīn al-Ḥaqā’iq that the ḥadīth is well-known (mashhur) is clearly 
mistaken, since this requires that the ḥadīth was narrated in its early stages with at 
least an acceptable chain of transmission. Ibn al-Humām sees to be addressing this 
point directly when he declares: “This is not even attributable to [the Prophet], let 
alone it being a well-known narration.” 
 
However, since it  provides a ruling that is additional to what is found in the Qur’ān, it 
needs to be a well-known (mashhūr) prophetic ḥadīth. This is why the author of 
Tabyīn al-Ḥaqā’iq goes to such pains in arguing that it is. Al-ʿAynī points out that 
even if it is not a well-known ḥadīth, it clarifies an ambiguity in verse of the Qur’an 
“And men have a degree above them.” However, he adds that this is a moot point, 
unless it can be established that the report is a prophetic ḥadīth.  
 
                                                 
141 Al-Albānī says: “As a statement that stops [with Ibn Masʿūd], its chain of transmission is authentic, 
but it cannot be cited as evidence because it stops with him, and it appears to be a story from the 
Isrā’īliyyāt.” Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, Silsilah al-Aḥādīth al-Ḍaʿīfah wa al-Mawḍūʿah. (Riyadh: Dār al-
Maʿrifah, 1992), 2:319. 
142 Not to be confused with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Zaylaʿī, author of Tabyīn al-Ḥaqā’iq. 
143 Jamāl al-Dīn `Abd Allah  b. Yūsuf al-Zaylaʿī, Naṣb al-Rāyah li-Aḥādīth al-Hidāyah. ed. ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz al-Diyubandī al-Finjānī. (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Rayyān, 1997), 2:36. 
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In al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq, Ibn Nujaym abandons the argument that it is a well-known 
ḥadīth, probably because he recognises the futility of doing so after al-ʿAynī’s and Ibn 
al-Humām’s objections to the report. Instead, he accepts that it is individual-narrator 
report, but then argues in favour of al-ʿAynī’s assertion that it clarifies an ambiguity 
in a verse of the Qur’an. Of course, this does not answer the objection that the report 
is not a ḥadīth in the first place, but it is still necessary for Ibn Nujaym to assert why it 
can be used, assuming it is a individual-narrator ḥadīth. Since it could at best be 
described as a statement of a Companion, it does not even reach that level of 
authoritativeness.144 
 
In any case, the argument that it clarifies an ambiguity in the Qur’an is a tenuous one. 
The clarification of an ambiguity assumes that the ruling propounded by the verse 
needs something to be clarified before the ruling can be carried out. What “Send them 
to the back...” clarifies has nothing to do with the rulings addressed by the verse. The 
verse discusses marital relationships, and the rulings it elaborates can be applied 
without recourse to “Send them to the back”, which pertains to an entirely different 
set of legal questions. The reasoning of al-ʿAynī and Ibn Nujaym stretches the 
implications of ambiguity too far. The implication of this hermeneutical move would 
be that any individual-narratorreport that presents a ruling disadvantageous to a 
woman in any way is to be accepted and understood to clarify this verse’s ambiguity. 
It also contradicts Ibn Nujaym’s assertion that the legal rationale for preventing a 
woman from coming in line with men is merely the compulsory place in prayer, and 
nothing else. The way he relates it to the verse necessitates that “Send them to the 
                                                 
144 Indeed, al-Sarakhsī mentions some disagreement among Ḥanafī jurists whether qiyās or a 
Companion’s statement is a stronger form of evidence. He  favours the opinion that the Companion’s 
statement is stronger, saying that: “the most correct view is that the legal verdict of a Companion might 
possibly be a narration from the one who received revelation [i.e. the Prophet]. It has been shown to be 
their habit that if one of them possessed a [ḥadīth] text, he  might relate it or he might just issue a legal 
verdict in accordance with the text without relating it. There can be no doubt that what might 
possibility have been heard from the possessor of revelation takes precedence over the mere exercise of 
opinion. In this way, giving preference to the Companion’s statement over an opinion is effectively the 
same as giving preference to a individual-narratorreport over the exercise of analogous reasoning 
(qiyās). And even if what they said stemmed from their opinion, their opinion is stronger thsn the 
opinions of others, because they witnessed the Prophet’s way of explicating the rulings for new 
situations and witnessed the circumstances in which the sacred texts were revealed...” al-Sarakhsī, 
Uṣūl, 2:108. Even though it is possible that a Companion’s statement reflects something heard directly 
from the Prophet, it cannot be certain that this is the case, so it is more uncertain (ẓannī) and can never 
fulfil the function of authoritative eveidence in the way a well-known (mashhur) prophetic ḥadīth can. 
In the case of “Send them to the back...” the Companion is commenting on a story from the Isrā’īliyyāt 
that contains a strange claim about menstruation, so its context weakens it all the more.  
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back” is an example of how men are superior to women. This would require making 
the woman’s inferior status the reason for the ruling. 
 
This is precisely the case made by Burhān al-Dīn al-Bukhārī, who, about two hundred 
and fifty years before al-ʿAynī, seems to be the first Ḥanafī jurist to suggest this 
verse’s relevance to the question of the report’s acceptability. He writes:145 
 
The obligation of the man sending [the women] back is not restricted to the 
[individual-narrator] report. This is because sending the women back is only 
obligatory [for one of two reasons]146, either to give men a preferential status 
over women, since sending the women back provides a visible manifestation of 
the completeness of men and the deficiency of what they [the women] have, 
except that this preferentiality is being enacted by sending the woman back in a 
single place during a single sacred rite. The preferential status of men over 
women is established by an unequivocal text, which is where God says: “and 
men have a degree above them”.  
 
Since the argument linking “Send them to the back” to the verse for support appears 
nowhere else in the earlier Ḥanafī literature, it would seem that this is what al-ʿAynī 
and Ibn al-Nujāym are referring to when they say that “Send them to the back” 
clarifies an ambiguity in Qur’an 2:228.  
 
3. Its Use as Evidence 
This is the only text that Ḥanafī scholars cite to prove it is is prohibited for women to 
lead men in prayer, because this entails sending them to the front while they are 
supposed to be sent to the back. They also use this text to support the separate ruling 
that if a woman is following the imām but stands before or beside other men in 
congregational prayer, then the prayers of those men are nullified. They argue that the 
men are commanded to send the women to the back and their failure to fulfil this 
obligation negates the validity of their prayers.  
                                                 
145 Burhān al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad al-Bukhārī, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī fī al-Fiqh al-Nuʿmānī. ed. ʿAbd 
al-Karīm Sāmī al-Jundī. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyāh, 2004), 1:425. 
146 He then goes on to discuss the other possibility, which is that sending the women back protects the 
men’s prayers from being ruined by the sexual distraction caused by their presence, and concludes that 
safeguarding the principle of safeguarding prayer is also established by decisive textual evidence. 
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The persistence with which this text is misrepresented as a prophetic ḥadīth in Ḥanafī 
legal literature – and a well-known one at that – shows how indispensible it is to 
establishing their particular ruling about women nullifying the prayers of the men in 
line with them while their own prayers remain intact. Due to the counterintuitive 
nature of this ruling, they could only support it through the use of juristic preference 
(istiḥsān) with the support of this ḥadīth. This will become clear from the discussions 
on the next two ḥadīth below, and the discussion on istiḥsān further on. 
 
The Mālikī works that cite the text also represent it as if it were a prophetic ḥadīth. 
Ibn Rushd presents it as the only textual evidence to prohibit women from leading 
men in prayer. Al-Rajrājī also cites it as evidence to prohibit women from leading 
men, for he does not regard women-only congregations as being unlawful. Both of 
these scholars give the straightforward argument that being an imām entails standing 
in front of the congregation, and since the woman must go behind the men, it is 
impossible for her to be their imām. Al-Qarāfī, on the other hand, cites it in the 
general context of prohibiting women from leading prayers for either men or women. 
He argues that the command to send her to the back makes her situation worse than 
that of a child, who is not commanded to be sent to the back. This means that he 
understands her being sent to the back as an indication of her deficiency which is so 
severe as to preclude her from leading prayer, even when it does not necessitate her 
standing in front of men. 
 
Would it still function as evidence for those Mālikī scholars who recognise a 
Companion’s statement as a source of law? In this particular case it would be 
problematic, since the text has Ibn Masʿud commenting on a story from the 
Isrā’īliyyat147 about the misconduct of women in the temple, a story that makes a 
strange claim about the origins of menstruation.148 This compromises its possible 
                                                 
147 This is a term for the stories that Muslims narrated from the traditions of the Jews and Christians 
that they came in contact with. The Isrā’īliyyāt are not necessarily from Jewish or Christian scriptural 
sources. 
148 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī discusses the difficulties this poses in light of other texts indicating that 
menstruation already existed, particularly the authentic ḥadīth where the Prophet tells `Ā’ishah: “This 
is something that God has decreed for the daughters of Adam.” [Sahīh al-Bukhārī (294)] Ibn Ḥajar 
initially dismisses the statement of Ibn Masʿūd as being a narration from the Isrā’īliyyāt, but then 
suggests some tentative ways it can be reconciled with the ḥadīth. However, he then goes on to cite 
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legal ramifications. The only way that it could have legal weight were if the statement 
“Send them to the back” was not a vague comment on a Judeo-Christian story, but 
was actually given as a direct legal verdict about women in the mosque. Of course, in 
the Mālikī texts that cite it, this is exactly how it is represented, without the back 
story, and moreover, with Prophet Muhammad as its source. 
 
It is also worth noting that a number of Ḥanbalī jurists cite “Send them to the back...” 
while discussing certain rulings about how men and women should be positioned in 
congregational prayer, and they also always attribute it to the Prophet.149 None of 
them, however, cite it with reference to prayer leadership.150  
 
The way these various rulings about women’s participation in congregational prayers 
can be connected with a story from the Judeo-Christian tradition, and particularly one 
which presents women in a negative light, reveals something important about the 
relationship between specific Islamic rulings and the broader cultural milieu. In the 
story, a woman brings sexually flirtatious behaviour into the temple and thereby earns 
God’s wrath upon women through menstruation and their marginalization in the 
temple where they used to be equal participants. This gives clues about the social and 
cultural attitudes that might have influenced the development of Islamic legal rulings 
during the formative period regarding women’s participation in congregational 
prayers.  Since the statement “Send them to the back…” is presented in the legal texts 
as a prophetic ḥadīth divorced from the context of the original story, it provides an 
example how pre-existing attitudes and concepts about women can influence Islamic 
legislation while appearing as if that legislation has an Islamic, textual origin. 
 
It is clear that most if not all the jurist who relied on this tradition were unaware of its 
full text and knew only the phrase: “Send them to the back whence God has sent them 
                                                                                                                                            
other narrations which confirm the presence of menstruation with Eve and with Abrāhām’s wife Sarah. 
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 1:472-473. 
149 Ibn Qudāmah mentions it in three places in al-Mughnī, twice when discussing where a woman 
stands when praying alone behind male imām (3:39 and 3:53), and to establish that it is disliked for a 
woman to stand ahead of a male when the two of them are in congregation behind another imām (3:89). 
It is also cited in al-Mubdiʿ (2:92) Kashshāf al-Qunnāʿ (1:442 and 3:7-8), and Maṭālib Ūlī al-Nuhā 
(1:302). 
150 This seems to be the case for all pre-twentieth century Ḥanbalī legal texts and is probably because 
they regard the ḥadīth as insuficently direct to establish a ruling of prohibition, while it is clear in 
establishing the positions of preference for people praying in congregation. However, their willingness 
to cite the tradition shows that its extreme weakness was not an issue for them. 
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to the back”. We see this clearly in the pains al-Bābirtī and al-ʿAynī take to show that 
the tradition relates to the question at hand, though the phrase itself makes no mention 
of prayer. They refer to an argument from Abū Zayd’s Asrār that the adverbial 
preposition “whence” indicates the place of prayer. They mention how other jurists 
regard “whence” as being indicative of a general reason, with the women’s being sent 
back a description of their comprehensive subordination in every way. Al-ʿAynī finds 
it necessary to downplay this second interpretation because of how it can obscure the 
tradition’s relevance to the question at hand, and appeals to a supposed ijmāʿ that it is 
not obligatory to send women to the back outside of prayer. None of this would have 
been necessary had thes jurists known the full text of the tradition, since it is about the 
conduct of the Jews praying in the temple. Mālikī and Ḥanbalī references to the 
tradition show that they were equally unaware of the full text. This means that these 
jurists had only second-hand knowledge of the tradition. Ibn al-Humām, of course, 
changes this situation in the legal literature by quoting the tradition in full from 
Muṣannif ʿAbd al-Razzāq. 
 
 
F. Anas and the Old Lady 
 
Anas relates that his grandmother Mulaykah invited God’s Messenger [to her home] 
to eat food she had prepared for him. He ate from it, then said: “Get ready and I will 
lead you in prayer.” Anas said: 
 
So I got up and readied a mat which had grown dark due to its lying out on the 
floor for so long. I freshened it with some water. Then the Prophet stood, and I 
and an orphan boy formed a row behind him, and the elderly lady stood behind 
us. The Prophet led us in two units of prayer then took his leave. 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works  
This is taken up by al-Bābirtī and Ibn al-Humām as proof that a woman cannot stand 
beside or in front of a man in prayer, and that his prayer would be nullified if she does 
so. Al-Bābirtī is unique in identifying this as the essential textual evidence for the 
ruling, claiming that this was what al-Mārginānī intended. Ibn al-Humām suggests it 
as an alternative line of evidence after he discredits “Send them to the back..” as the 
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primary ḥadīth evidence. He is followed in this line of thinking by Ibn Nujaym in al-
Baḥr al-Rā’iq.  
 
The Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Mufliḥ cites the ḥadīth of Anas in al-Mubdiʿ as possible 
evidence that a woman can stand alone behind a female imām. 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
The ḥadīth is found in Sahīh al-Bukhārī (380, 727, 860, 874) and Sahīh Muslim (658) 
and its chain of transmission would be deemed authentic by any jurist.  
 
3. Its Use as Evidence 
Al-Bābirtī identifies the ḥadīth of Anas as the narration alluded to in al-Mārginānī’s 
statement: “The argument for [our] juristic preference is what we have narrated and 
that it is a well-known narration. [The man] is the one addressed by it, so he is the one 
who is abandoning the compulsory place and his prayer is nullified and not hers.” 
This is strange of him, since al-Marghīnānī is clearly referring to “Send them to the 
back...” because he speaks about it being addressed to the man. Furthermore, al-
Bābirtī does not follow through by discussing how the ḥadīth of Anas indicates the 
ruling. His entire discussion on juristic preference focuses on “Send them to the 
back...” It is unclear why he introduces the ḥadith of Anas. 
 
It is clear, however, why Ibn al-Humām does so. He sees it as a possible substitute for 
“Send them to the back...”, which he has already discredited. Therefore, it is 
important for him to show how this ḥadith can support the ruling. He argues that since 
it is disliked for a worshipper to stand alone behind the row, the woman would not 
have done so unless her standing in line with the men would nullify their prayers. He 
further presses his case by mentioning that according to the Ḥanbalī school of law, a 
person’s prayer is nullified if they stand alone behind the row.  It is therefore 
interesting that the Ḥanbalī work al-Mubdiʿ cites this very ḥadīth as possible evidence 
that a woman can stand alone behind a female imām. 
 
It does not seem that Ibn al-Humām’s argument can salvage the Ḥanafī position in the 
absence of “Send them to the back...”. The argument there depends heavily on the 
idea that there is a command addressed directly to the men, so that the prayer of the 
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men is nullified because they failed to carry out a command directed at them. It is not 
possible to discern in the ḥadīth of Anas a command directed exclusively at the men.  
This ḥadīth is at best an action of the Prophet, or simply a tacit approval, depending 
on whether the placement of the woman happened upon the Prophet’s explicit 
arrangement of the rows, or just without his objecting to it. The text of the ḥadīth does 
not make this clear. As an action of the Prophet pertaining to prayer, it would be 
regarded in the Ḥanafī school of law as a clarification of a general ruling related to 
prayer, but would not on its indicate whether the matter is one of preferability or 
obligation.151 This would depend on what aspect of prayer the scholars understood the 
ḥadīth to explain.152 The same can be said for it being a tacit approval.153 
Nevertheless, even if it is determined to indicate an obligation in this case, as Ibn al-
Humām argues, it would still not be a command directed at the men to the exclusion 
of the women. Consequently, there does not seem to be any way to connect it with a 
situation where the man’s prayer becomes invalid and the woman’s prayer remains 
intact, which is what Ibn al-Humām needs to prove with this ḥadīth. The possibility 
that the woman’s prayer becomes invalid, or both of their prayers become invalid – or 
simply that the degree of dislike for her being next to the man is greater than that of 
her being in a row by herself – are just as likely as the interpretation Ibn al-Humām 
suggests.  
 
If this ḥadīth fails to establish the ruling, it means that Ibn al-Humām leaves the ruling 
without a textual basis after he decisively rejects the authenticity of “Send them to the 
back...” In light of this fact, it is important to note that Ibn al-Humām is not convinced 
                                                 
151 Al-Sarakhsī writes: “Our scholars say that whenever the Prophet’s action comes as an explanation 
of what is in the Qur’an, regardless of what place or time it happens, the explanation occurs by his 
action  and by what he is described as with respect to the action.” al-Sarakhsī Uṣūl, 2:97. 
152 Al-Jaṣṣās says: “The ruling that his action indicates when it comes as an explanation of an 
undefined ruling could be that of obligation, preferability, or permissibility, depending on the ruling of 
the undefined matter . If the undefined matter  pertains to an obligation, then  his action indicates an 
obligation, if it pertains to something preferable, then his action is something preferable, and likewise if 
it pertains to something permissible, then his action in that case is permissible.” Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-
Jaṣṣās,  al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl. (Kuwait: Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, 1994), 3:231. 
153 Al-Jaṣṣās writes: “By refraining from condemning an action that he witnesses someone carry out in 
a certain context,  it is as if he made a statement affirming that action within that context. If he sees that 
person carrying out an action within the context of an obligation, then his tacit approval of it provides 
an obligation. If he sees him carrying out an action within the context of something preferable, then his 
tacit approval of it provides for preferability. The same goes for permissibility. This is because it is not 
possible for him to tacitly agree with someone in something contrary to God’s ruling.” al-Jaṣṣās, al-
Fuṣūl, 3:235. 
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of the ḥadīth’s ability to establish the ruling, since he admits that it is just “possible” 
evidence for it. 
 
 
G.  The Best Ranks for Women are the Last Ones 
 
Abū Hurayrah relates that God’s Messenger said: 
 
The best ranks for men are the first ones and the worst are the last ones. The 
best ranks for women are the last ones and the worst are the first ones.” 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works  
This is cited by the two earliest Mālikī works in the survey, Sharḥ al-Talqīn and 
Manāhij al-Taḥṣīl as evidence that a woman cannot lead men in prayer. It is also cited 
Ḥanafī work Badā’iʿ al-Ṣanā’iʿ as further support for the rulings derived from “Send 
them to the back.” 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
The ḥadīth is cited in Sahīh Muslim (440) with two chains of transmission to Abū 
Hurayrah. Its chain of transmission would be deemed acceptable by any jurist.  
 
3. Its Use as Evidence 
It is unclear how the ḥadīth could be used in Mālikī law to argue that a woman cannot 
lead men in prayer, and that the prayer of a man following a woman is invalid. It 
merely states what row is preferable for her. A ruling that it is disliked for her to lead 
the prayer, since it requires her to be in a less preferred position, would seem a more 
likely conclusion to deduce from the ḥadīth. It is even less obvious how this ḥadīth 
could support the Mālikī position that a woman cannot lead another woman in prayer 
and that the prayers of the women who follow her are nullified. Nevertheless, al-
Māzirī makes it clear in Sharḥ al-Talqīn that the ḥadīth is evidence for her 
“categorical” prohibition of leading prayer. The difficulty here is that even when 
women are following a man in prayer, some of them will be in the front row of the 
women, and it is not being claimed that their prayers or those behind them are any 
less valid for it. Consequently, it would follow that a woman leading other women in 
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prayer would not invalidate her prayer or theirs simply because she is in the first row 
of the women. Indeed, the Mālikī school declares her own prayer to be valid even if 
she is leading men in prayer, let alone other women, though she is the one at front in 
the less preferable position. 
 
In Badā’iʿ al-Ṣanā’iʿ, the Ḥanafī jurist al-Kāsānī brings up this ḥadīth in conjunction 
with “Send them to the back…”, while explaining why a woman coming in line with a 
man nullifies his prayer and not hers. It is interesting that he phrases the argument as 
if the two statement were made together, implying that the ḥadīth about the preferred 
place for women is the explicit reason for the command to send them to the back. He 
may be simply trying to prove that “Send them to the back...” applies to prayer and 
not to some other topic. It is easy to discern why this argument is not taken up again 
in the surveyed Ḥanafī works. The two texts are completely independent of each 
other, and the command to send women to the back has its own context. Secondly, if 
the connection were to hold, it would make the matter of sending the women to the 
back equally relevant to the women, since they are also outside of their place of 
preference. This weakens al-Kāsānī’s argument, which focuses on the man being out 
of his proper place, the same as if he has moved ahead of the imām. This is one of the 
reasons al-Kāsānī gives for why only the man’s prayer and not the woman’s is 
nullified by her coming in line with him. 
 
 
H. If One of You Finds [a Mistake] in Someone’s Prayer 
 
Sahl b. Saʿd relates that the Prophet said: 
 
If one of you finds [a mistake] in someone’s prayer, he should say ‘Glory be to 
God’. Saying ‘Glory be to God’ is for men and clapping hands is for women. 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works  
The ḥadīth is mentioned by the Mālikī scholar al-Qarāfī in the context judicial 
authority and paraphrased by al-Māwardī, in al-Ḥawī al-Kabīr in the context of 
women leading men in prayer. This ḥadīth is not cited as evidence for prohibiting 
women from leadership positions, but rather to established other rulings which are 
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then applied to women’s leadership by way of qiyās. Therefore, discussion of this 
ḥadīth’s legal implications will be deferred to the section on qiyās.  
 
 
I. A Woman Does Not Lead a Man in Prayer 
 
 Jābir b. ʿAbd Allah relates that the Prophet said in the course of giving a sermon:  
 
A woman does not lead a man in prayer, nor an desert-dweller an emigrant, nor 
a flagrant sinner a believer, unless he is compelled by the ruler and fears his 
sword and whip.  
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works  
This ḥadīth is mentioned in al-`Azīz and in al-Muhadhdhab of the Shafī` school of 
law, but is dismissed as weak by al-Nawawī in his commentary of al-Muhadhdhab. It 
nevertheless comes up again in Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, but not in the other two more 
authoritative commentaries of al-Minhāj. It is relied upon by the Hanbalī school as the 
sole textual evidence for prohibiting women from leading men in prayer. It is cited by 
every Ḥanbalī book in the survey. 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
It is cited in Sunan Ibn Mājah (1081) with the following chain of transmission: from 
Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allah b. Numayr from al-Walīd b. Bukayr Abū Khabbāb from 
ʿAbd Allah b. Muḥammad al-ʿAdawī from ʿAlī b. Zayd from Saʿīd b. al-Musayyib 
from Jābir b. ʿAbd Allah. 
 
This ḥadīth suffers from numerous defects in its chain of transmission. Al-Walīd b. 
Bukayr Abū Khabbāb is a weak narrator,154 as is ʿAlī  b. Zayd al-Jadʿan.155 This alone 
makes the ḥadīth less than authoritative and inadmissible for most scholars. 
Moreover, the ḥadīth of ʿAbd Allah b. Muḥammad al-ʿAdawī are rejected outright 
                                                 
154 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī refers to him with the term layyin al-ḥadīth, which means that the narrator’s 
weakness makes him less than acceptable. Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb. ed. 
Muḥammad ʿAwwāmah. (Aleppo: Dār al-Rashīd, 1986), 581. 
155 The general consensus on ʿAlī  b. Zayd al-Jadʿan is that he is “not a strong narratior.” ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Abī Hātim, al-Jarḥ wa al-Taʿdīl (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabi, 
1952), 6:186-187. 
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due to suspicions of fabrication.156 This makes the ḥadīth unacceptable to any jurist, 
even those willing to accomodate certain weak narrations. 
 
3. Its Use as Evidence 
It is obvious how this ḥadīth relates to the question of women and prayer leadership. It 
is the only direct and explicit statement prohibiting women’s leadership of any kind 
found in the ḥadīth corpus. The reason why it is not seized upon by the majority of 
scholars is because they recognize its inauthenticity. This problem is no less relevant 
to the Ḥanbalī school which relies upon it, so it begs the question of what they do so. 
The answer might be that this ḥadīth is more amicable to the strong literalist character 
of Ḥanbalī jurisprudence, which favours weak but direct textual evidence over any 
form of rational deduction. The other possible ḥadīth evidence is simply not 
straightforward enough for them. Ḥanbalī jurists would be acutely aware of the 
hermeneutical problems we have been discussing about the other ḥadīth, as 
exemplified by Ibn al-Qayyim’s harsh criticism of those who use Abū Bakrah’s ḥadīth 
for questions relating to prayer.157  
 
The lack of other suitable textual evidence may have compelled them to overlook the 
problems with this ḥadīth’s chain of transmission. In essence, they were confronted 
with three choices. They could use circuitous reasoning in conjunction with other, less 
direct ḥadīth evidence and deviate from the relatively literalist character of their 
school of thought. Alternatively, they could assert the ruling without providing any 
textual evidence for it, which would be equally out of character. Finally, they could 
resort to citing an extremely weak but directly relevant ḥadīth which should otherwise 
not be admissible as evidence. They chose the final option. 
 
 
                                                 
156 Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī says about him: “He has false narrations (manākīr).” Muḥammad 
b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī, al-Tārīkh al-Awsaṭ. ed. Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm Zāyid. (Cairo: Maktabah Dār al-
Turāth, 1977). 2:103. Al-Bayhaqī said after relating the ḥadīth: “His ḥadīth are false (huwa munkar al-
ḥadīth) and cannot be used as supporting narrations. This has been asserted by Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl 
al-Bukhārī.” Sunan-al-Bayhaqī (5780). Ibn Abī Hātim also describes him with “His ḥadīth are false 
(huwa munkar al-ḥadīth)”. al-Jarḥ wa al-Taʿdīl, 5:156 “Ibn Ḥajar says: “He is a rejected narrator 
(matrūk). Wakīʿ accused him of fabrication.” Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb, 322. 
157 Ibn al-Qayyim’s criticism is quoted in full in Chapter Three, pp.200-201. 
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J.  The Most Well-Versed among the People Should Lead Them in Prayer 
 
Abū Masʿūd al-Anṣārī relates that he heard God’s Messenger say: 
 
The most well-versed in God’s Book from among the people (qawm) should 
lead them in prayer. If they are equally well-versed, then the most knowlegable 
of them in the Sunnah. If they equal in [their knowledge of] the Sunnah, then 
the earliest of them to have emigrated... 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works  
This hadith is not cited in support of any of the jurists’ arguments. Rather, al-Māwardī 
suggests it as possible evidence for those who permit women to lead men in prayer. 
He identifies Abū Thawr as being an advocate for this argument, so it is 
understandable why he would feel a need to supply a counter-argument  and explain 
why the ḥadīth’s meaning should not be understood to include women. The Mālikī 
jurist al-Māzirī repeats these arguments in Sharḥ al-Talqīn, practically verbatim, from 
al-Māwardī. This ḥadīth and the line of argument against it are not seen again in any 
of the later legal texts. 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
This ḥadīth is narrated in Saḥiḥ Muslim (673) and other sources with sound chains of 
transmission. No jurist would have reason to object to this ḥadīth on the basis of its 
chain of transmission. 
 
3. Māwardī’s Refutation of Its Possible Use as Evidence 
The hadith is general in its wording, and therefore its ruling would be general, that the 
most well-versed in the Qur’an should lead the prayers, be that person male or female, 
rich or poor, or any other distinction that might be advanced.  
 
Al-Māwardī argues against this generality by positing that the Arabic word for “a 
people” (qawm) applies only to men. He cites a verse of the Qur’an and a verse of 
classical Arabic poetry as linguistic evidence. The verse is: “O you who believe, let 
not a people (qawm) ridicule another people (qawm), perhaps they might be better 
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than them. Nor let women [ridicule] other women, perhaps they might be better than 
them.” [Sūrah al-Ḥujurāt:1]  
 
This argument paralels the Shāfiʿi interpretive rule that masculine plural terms do not 
linguistically include women in their meaning, and require contextual indicators to 
show that their inclusion is intended.158 Shāfiʿī legal theorists support this position 
with verses similar to the one al-Māwardī cites above, where a male plural noun is 
followed by mention of the corresponding female plural noun. However, this rule only 
applies to sound plurals and other plurals that have distinct masculine and feminine 
forms. Shāfiʿī legal theorists make it clear that plural nouns which do not have 
different masculine and feminine forms are assumed by default to include men and 
women equally in their meanings. Al-Juwaynī specifically identifies qawm as one of 
these words.159  
 
Al-Māwardī’s argument, then, rests solely on his claim that the word “qawm” itself 
refers only to men. This is why he proffers the linguistic precedents he does. 
However, even if he can succeed in asserting, contrary to the prevailing Shāfiʿī view, 
the masculine meaning of the word qawm, it does not rule out the inclusion of women 
in the ḥadīth’s meaning. This is because the Shāfī`ī principle that masculine plurals do 
not automatically include females in their meanings is regarded as no more than the 
default assumption, and a weak one at that. 160  Arguments to exclude women on this 
basis are always very tenuous, since Shāfi`ī legal theorists admit that context is the 
                                                 
158 See al-Juwayni, al-Burhān 1:244-245,  al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā 2:44, and Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Abī 
ʿAlī al-Āmidī,  al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām. ed. Ibrāhīm al-ʿAjūz. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, no 
date), 2:473-476. 
159 He writes: “There is no doubt that what we have mentioned is restricted to the sound plural forms. 
As for words which were set down to include both genders, there is no doubt that their meanings 
include her, like al-nās (humanity) and al-qawm, and others like them. ” al-Juwayni, al-Burhān 1:245. 
Al-Āmidī declares this to be a point of agreement among all Muslim legal scholars, regardless of their 
school of law. He writes: “Scholars are agreed that the male and female do not enter into the meaning 
of a plural word that is exclusive for the other gender, like al-rijāl  (men) and al-nisā’ (women), and 
[they are also agreed]  that they both enter into plural words in which male and female affixes do not 
appear, like al-nās (humanity).” al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām, 2:473. 
160 Al-Juwaynī writes: “What they mention that the masculine affix is used when trying to speak about 
the two genders together, this is basically correct, but they do not understand the way in which this 
comes about.” al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 1:245. Likewise, al-Amidī writes: “We do no dispute that when 
an Arabic speaker wishes to  speak about a group including males and females, that the masculine form 
is given predominance and is used for the expression, but this is a form of metaphorical usage.” al-
Āmidī, al-Iḥkām, 2:475.  
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ultimate determining factor, and more often than not, the context shows that women 
are either included, or at least are not excluded by the speaker’s intent. 
 
In the case of this ḥadīth, there is a clear textual indicator that would suggest women 
are meant to be included in the statement. The term (qawm) refers to all the people in 
the congregation to be led in prayer. Since a congregation, in principle, is comprised 
of both men and women, the context indicates that women are included in what the 
word refers to. Therefore, the general meaning of the phrase “most well-versed among 
the people” cannot be limited to men even on the presumption that word qawm is 
masculine in meaning by default, as al-Māwardī argues. Therefore, the ḥadīth could 
still be understood the way al-Māwardī claims Abū Thawr understood it. At best, al-
Māwardī casts a doubt on the necessity of including women in the generality of its 
meaning, which would weaken the strength of Abū Thawr’s alleged argument, but not 
overturn it. 
 
This line of reasoning is even more strained for al-Māzirī, since Mālikī legal theorists 
hold the view that masculine plural words include women by default, unless there is 
an indication that the intent is restricted to men, and they apply this inclusivity to all 
plural forms.161 This makes the argument irrelevant for the Mālikī school, since even 
if al-Māzirī can show that the word qawm is masculine, the burden of proof remains 
on him to demonstrate in this particular instance that women are excluded from its 
meaning. In adopting al-Māwardī’s argument, al-Māzirī gives no consideration for 
Mālikī theoretical principles. This is an example of how tenuous the relationship 
between legal theory and the arguments presented in works of positive law can 
sometimes be. 
 
It is therefore understandable that we do not find this line of argument being pursued 
by any of the later Shāfiʿī or Mālikī jurists in the survey, especially since it would be 
                                                 
161 Ibn al-ʿArabī is most emphatic: “The position adopted by us is that the feminine plural is specific for  
them [women] and males do not enter into its meaning under any circumstance. The masculine plural 
in inclusive of females, as long as the address can reasonably include them. This is a fact in language 
and Islamic Law that is established with decicive examples for both situations [i.e. the male and female 
plurals] with a certainty that is absolute.” Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allah b. al-ʿArabi. al-Maḥṣūl fī Uṣūl al-
Fiqh. ed. Ḥusayn ʿAlī al-Yadarī nad Saʿīd Fūdah. (Amman: Dār al-Bayāriq, 1999), 77-78. Likewise, al-
Qarāfī makes the categorical assertion: “The correct position is that women are included in what is 
addressed in the masculine form.” al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 184. 
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much simpler for them to dismiss the hadith by claiming that its generality is specified 
by other evidence. In the rest of the surveyed works, the ḥadīth is simply ignored. 
 
 
K. The Ḥadith of Umm Waraqah 
 
Three variant narrations of this ḥadīth are cited in the surveyed works. The first is 
cited from Sunan Abī Dāwūd, the second from Abū Bakr al-Marūdhī, and the third 
from Sunan al-Dāraqūṭnī. The version in Sunan Abī Dāwūd, which represents the 
most commonly narrated version of the ḥadīth, is from al-Walīd b. ʿAbd Allah b. 
Jumayʿ from his grandmother and from ʿAbd al-Raḥman b. Khallād al-Anṣārī about 
Umm Waraqāh:162 
 
She used to read the Qur’ān and sought the Prophet’s permission to take a 
prayer caller for her locality (dār). He permitted her [to do so].  
 
ʿAbd al-Raḥman b. Khallād al-Anṣārī adds:163 
 
God’s Messenger used to visit her at her home (bayt), and he appointed for her a 
prayer caller to make the call to prayer for her and ordered her to lead the prayer 
for the people of her locality (dār). I say her prayer caller. He was a very old 
man. 
 
The version narrated from Abū Bakr al-Marrūdhī is quoted as follows: 
 
Umm Waraqah inquired with God’s Messenger, saying: “I pray, and the people 
of my locality (dār) and my wards pray following my prayer, and among them 
are men and women praying to my recitation. They do not possess any Qur’ān.” 
 
So he said: “Have the men in front of you and then stand with the women while 
they pray following your prayer.” 
                                                 
162 Sunan Abī Dāwūd (591), quoted in brief. This is part of a longer ḥadith that recounts other events of 
her life, including how she died. 
163 Sunan Abī Dāwūd (592). 
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There are two versions in Sunan al-Dāraquṭnī. One is similar to the common version 
in Sunan Abī Dāwūd and simply reads that the Prophet “permitted her to lead the 
people of her locality (ta’umm ahl dārihā) in prayer.”164 The other version reads as 
follows:165 
 
God’s Messenger permitted her to have someone make the call to prayer for her 
and for her to lead her womenfolk (ta’umm nisā’aha) in prayer. 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works 
The common version of this ḥadīth, as represented by the narration in Sunan Abī 
Dāwūd, is the primary evidence cited in support of the early Ḥanbalī view that women 
can lead men in Tarāwīḥ and possibly other voluntary prayers. Ibn Qudāmah, al-
Zarkashī and Ibn Mufliḥ all cite Sunan Abī Dāwūd in this context. Al-Zarkashī and 
Ibn Mufliḥ also cite the second version from al-Marrūdhī for the opinion that she 
stands in the back when she leads men in prayer. Ibn Qudamah and Ibn Mufliḥ bring 
up the alternate narration in Sunan al-Dāraqūṭnī as possible evidence to restrict its 
meaning to women-only congregations. The two final Ḥanbalī works, which 
completely dismiss the possibility of women leading men in prayer, do not discuss it 
at all in that context, though al-Bahūṭi continues to make reference to the Sunan al-
Dāraquṭnī version as evidence for women-only congregations. 
 
It is mentioned in earlier Mālikī works with respect to women leading women in 
prayer. Al-Māzirī, who upholds the Mālikī ruling that women cannot lead other 
women in prayer, mentions the general version and the version in Sunan al-Dāraquṭnī 
and then dismisses them both as unreliable. By contrast, the general version from 
Sunan Abī Dāwūd is enlisted by al-Rajrājī in Manāhij al-Tahsil to support the validity 
of women-only congregations. Ibn Rushd also mentions it, identifying it as the 
evidence for those who permit women to lead prayers, but he does not discuss it. 
 
The general version of the hadīth from Sunan Abī Dāwūd is cited to support women-
only congregations by all of the Shāfīʿī works except for al-Umm and the final three 
                                                 
164 Sunan al-Dāraqūṭnī (1506). 
165 Sunan al-Dāraqūṭnī (1084). 
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commentaries on the Minhāj. It is also cited by the Ḥanafī jurists al-ʿAynī and Ibn al-
Humām in  their dissenting view that women-only congregations are not disliked. 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
The most prevalent narration of this ḥadīth is the general wording found in Sunan Abī 
Dāwūd. Nevertheless, its validity is a matter of disagreement. 
 
Its weakness is relatively slight, much less than the weakness of the ḥadīth which the 
Ḥanbalī school relies upon for prohibiting women to lead men in prayer. There is little 
reason for Ḥanbalī scholars to reject the ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah in its general form, 
though they could find grounds for rejecting it if they had wanted to, due to the 
controversy surrounding the reliability of al-Walīd b. ʿAbd Allah al-Jumayʿ and the 
unknown quality of his grandmother as a narrator.166 The defence given to the ḥadīth 
by al-ʿAynī is in response to the criticisms some Ḥanafī jurists raised against the 
ḥadīth’s acceptability. Shāfiʿī jurists are consistent in citing the ḥadīth, though they 
could have dismissed it had they wished to. Their accepting it means that the 
discussion about the Shafiʿī use of the ḥadīth must focus on how they interpret it. For 
                                                 
166 Ibn al-Jawzī, for instance, considers the ḥadīth’s defects to make it inadmissible. He says: “Al-
Walīd b. Jumayʿ is weak, and his (grand)mother is unknown. Ibn Ḥibbān said: ‘The ḥadīth of al-Walīd 
Jumayʿ are not to be used as evidence’.” Abū al-Faraj b. al-Jawzī. al-Taḥqīq fī Aḥādīth al-Khilāf. ed. 
Musʿad ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Saʿdanī. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1994), 2:114. Ibn 
Ḥibbān faults him for narrating ḥadīth with wordings at variance to those of narrators of established 
reliability, and says: “When this became blatant about him, it negated the viability of citing him as 
evidence.” Muḥammad b. Ḥibbān,  Kitāb al-Majrūḥīn min al-Muḥaddithīn wa al-Ḍuʿafā’ wa al-
Matrūkīn. ed. Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm Zāyid. (Alleppo: Dār al-Waʿī, 1976) 3:78-79. At the same time, a 
number of authorities in ḥadīth narration considered him to be an acceptable narrator. Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn 
considered him reliable (thiqah), and significantly, Aḥmad b, Ḥanbal approved of him. See: Ibn Abī 
Ḥātim, al-Jarḥ wa al-Taʿdīl, 9:8.  
The contemporary Shafi`i scholar Tauha Karaan, while responding to Amina Wadud’s use of the 
hadith, identifies another potential weakness in its narration, that there may be missing links between 
Umm Waraqah and the narrators who come immediately before her in the chain of transmission. He 
writes: “Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani points out that the form in which the chain of the hadith appears in the 
common sources hides another issue that impugns its authenticity. Neither Walid ibn ‘Abdillah’s 
grandmother (or grandfather), nor ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Khallad have received this hadith from Umm 
Waraqah directly. Ibn al-Sakan and Ibn Mandah have recorded the hadith via Layla bint Malik (who is 
Walid’s grandmother), from her father, from Umm Waraqah; while Abu Nu’aym records it via Walid, 
from his grandmother, from her mother, from Umm Waraqah. ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Khallad too, is on 
record as having received the hadith, not from Umm Waraqah directly, but though an unknown 
intermediary.” Tauha Karaan, “The Pretensions of Postmodernism and the Hadith of Umm Waraqah” 
Cape Town: Dar Al-`Ulum Al-`Arabiyyah Al-Islamiyyah. No date.  
http://duai.co.za/Site/?page_id=589 (31 July 2013). The defect that Karaan identifies is not certain. It is 
possible that these irregularities are errors in the narrations of Ibn al-Sakān and Ibn Mandah, while the 
more common narrations represent the correct chains of transmission. 
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Mālikī scholars, the criticisms that can be levied against the ḥadīth’s chain of 
transmission make it a simple matter for them to dismiss it.  
 
As for the narration of al-Marrūdhī which states unequivocally that Umm Waraqah 
was ordered to lead men in prayer, and to do so from the ranks of the women, its 
chain of transmission has not reached us. Al-Marrūdhī was a student of Aḥmad b. 
Ḥanbal and a leading foundational scholar in the Ḥanbalī school of law, so to the 
extent that the chain of transmission was preserved, it would have been in earlier 
Ḥanbalī legal texts. This gives weight to the assertion of Muḥammad b. Mufliḥ in al-
Furūʿ that al-Marrudhī’s chain of transmission is not authentic.167 Equally significant 
is the fact that the Ḥanbalī ḥadīth scholar Ibn al-Jawzī does not mention it in his book 
al-Taḥqīq wherein he compiles the ḥadīth in support of legal rulings, though he 
mentions and discusses the narration of al-Dāraquṭnī.168 Therefore, it is reasonably 
safe to assume that the al-Marrūdhī narration is unauthentic. It is possibly a case 
where the transmission of a particular Ḥanbalī legal opinion was accidently 
interpolated into the text the ḥadīth.169 Moreover, due to the nature of its transmission, 
it would have been unknown by anyone outside a small circle of scholars and students 
of Ḥanbalī Law, so scholars from the other schools of law would have been unaware 
of it. 
 
As for the alternative narration in Sunan al-Dāraquṭnī, it is also narrated from is from 
Walīd b. al-Jumayʿ from his grandmother170, and therefore shares the same potential 
weaknesses in its chain of transmission. The particular narrators who are unique to 
this chain do not introduce any new problems. The mention of “her womenfolk” as 
opposed to “people of her locality” is actually a variant wording, though a few of the 
Ḥanbalī scholars cited below refer to it as an additional clause, which would make 
accepting it easier on the basis that the additional clauses of a trustworthy narrator are 
                                                 
167 Muḥammad b. Mufliḥ, al-Furūʿ. ed. ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. (Beirut: Mu’assasah 
al-Risālah, 2003), 3:25. His specific words are that it is “prohibitively unauthentic.” 
168 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Taḥqīq, 2:114 and 3:271. 
169 One of the views of the Ḥanbalī school is that the woman imām leads the men in prayer from the 
ranks of the women. This opinion is the one al-Marrūdhī narrates from his teacher Aḥmad b.  Ḥanbal, 
so some later Ḥanbalī scholars could easily have confused it with the ḥadīth text itself. Something else 
that lends supported to the possibility of interpolation is that Ibn Qudāmah says her leading from the 
back is an “arbitrary” condition. This shows he is unaware of anyone narrating it as part of the ḥadīth. 
170 In the chain of transmission, the word “mother” is used instead of “grandmother”, but this usage is 
not problematic, since it is common to refer to a grandmother in this way. 
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acceptable.171 However, since it is actually an entirely different wording which 
introduces a meaning that conflicts with the ḥadīth’s context, it could also be regarded 
as a strange narration, defined in this case as a variant that contradicts how the ḥadīth 
is generally related in numerous other instances. This would make acceptance of the 
variant less likely. This explains the hesitancy we can observe in the use of the al-
Dāraquṭnī narration in most of the legal works that cite Umm Waraqah’s ḥadīth. 
 
3. Its Use as Evidence for Women Leading Men in Prayer 
The Ḥanbalī school of law is the only one of the four schools that ever permitted a 
woman to lead men in prayer, though there were many different opinions on the 
matter early in the school’s history.172 It must be noted that the possibility of a woman 
leading men in prayer was almost completely ruled out by the time of the works in the 
survey. The first encyclopaedic Ḥanbalī works were written late in that legal school’s 
development, and Ibn Qudāmah is clearly opposed to the idea, and most of the later 
works in the survey follow him in this opposition. 
 
The ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah is the identified by the works in the survey as the basis 
for the earlier Ḥanbalī opinions that permit women to lead men in prayer. The most 
widely narrated version of the ḥadīth is general in its wording, and it is this generality 
that is cited as evidence. Of course, not only does the ḥadīth’s general wording 
include congregations of men and women, but also compulsory prayers. Ibn Mufliḥ 
answers this by arguing that the ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah is restricted to voluntary 
prayers to reconcile it with the ḥadīth “A woman does not lead a man in prayer.” This 
accords with a principle in Ḥanbalī jurisprudence that if two general texts contradict 
one another and one of them can be reinterpreted to reconcile them, then this should 
be done to prevent either of the texts from being discarded. The text which is left on 
its apparent meaning is seen as indicating the true intent of the reinterpreted text.173 
Here, Umm Waraqah’s ḥadīth is the one regarded as open for interpretation. 
                                                 
171 The Ḥanbalī school accepts an additional meaning that a reliable narrator is alone in asserting when 
relating a ḥadīth. Ibn Qudāmah explains: “If a relaible narrator is alone in relating an addition in a 
ḥadīth, it is accepted, whether it comes [merely] in its wording or in its meaning, because had he been 
alone in relating the ḥadīth, it would have been accepted from him. Therefore, it is the same if he 
relates something additional. It is also not impossible that he is the only one who commited the 
additional content to memory, since it is possible that the Prophet mentioned it on two occasions, only 
once with the additional content.” Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:419. 
172 This matter will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
173 Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:740. 
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Ibn Qudāmah objects to this line of reasoning. He points out that the Umm Waraqah’s 
ḥadīth makes explicit reference to a prayer caller, which shows she was leading 
compulsory prayers. This means it cannot be reinterpreted in light of the other ḥadīth 
to refer to voluntary prayers. He provides two alternative interpretations, both of 
which categorically negate the possibility of women leading men. His first suggestion 
is to understand the ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah as referring to women-only 
congregations, for which he cites the alternate wording from Sunan al-Dāraquṭnī. He 
insists that even without al-Dāraquṭnī’s narration, it would have to be understood in 
this way, because he claims “there is no disagreement about her not leading men in 
compulsory prayers.” 
 
Ibn Qudāmah realises this solution is not ideal, since it begs the question of why the 
Prophet would go to the trouble of appointing a prayer caller for her if she is not 
formally heading the congregation for all the people of the locality. He then uses the 
appointment of the prayer caller as a basis for his second argument, that the 
permission to lead men in prayer was exclusive for her and can never be applied to 
any other woman. A claim of a exclusivity is one of the most difficult to make in 
textual interpretation. Most cases of exclusivity refer to the Prophet174, sometimes to 
his wives, and rarely to anyone else.175 In Ḥanbalī legal theory, it requires some clear 
indication that the ruling is unique for that person. Otherwise, any command directed 
at one of the Companions is assumed to be directed to everyone. Ibn Qudāmah is 
explicit on this point in Rawḍah al-Nāẓir.176 Yet, the only argument Ibn Qudāmah 
                                                 
174 For instance, the Qur’an states: “ [Lawful in marriage] is any woman believer, if she gives herself to 
the Prophet and if the Prophet desire to take her in marriage. This is for you exclusively, apart from the 
believers.” [Sūrah al-Aḥzāb: 50)] 
175 The example of Khuzaymah is commonly cited. The Ḥanbalī legal theorist al-Ṭūfī writes: “It is 
established that the Prophet made Khuzaymah’s testimony equal to the testimony of two people. This 
cannot be taken generally.” Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī, Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Rawḍah. ed. ʿAbd 
Allah b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. (Beirut: Mu`assasah al-Risālah, 1987), 2: 511. He cites this as an 
example of a command directed at an individual which cannot be generalised to include everyone else. 
He then discusses the opinion of some legal theorists who believe that whenever a command is directed 
at an individual, it cannot be taken generally. He goes on to refute them and assert the Ḥanbalī position 
that it must be assumed general for everyone in the absence of evidence to indicate otherwise.  
176 Ibn Qudāmah writes: “If God commands His Prophet with words that do not indicate specificity – 
like “O You who are wrapped up in garments, stand (in prayer) at night” – or asserts a ruling for him, 
then His followers are included with him in that command as long as there is no evidence to show it is 
specifically for him. Likewise, if a command is directed at one of the Companions, everyone else is 
included in it, even the Prophet.” He also says: “The Companions used to refer for their own legal 
rulings to the judgments that the Prophet made for specific individuals.” He then presents five 
examples of this. Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:637 and 2:642. This is the view of the majority of 
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brings to restrict this command to Umm Waraqah is that she was the only woman to 
be appointed a prayer caller. This is a circular argument, because even if the 
permissibility of leading men in prayer was not exclusively for her, she would still 
have been appointed a prayer caller to summon the people of her locality to her 
congregation. Since she happened to be the only woman actually charged with leading 
prayer, it follows logically that she would have been the only woman known to have 
her own prayer caller. Therefore, Ibn Qudāmah’s argument about the prayer caller 
brings nothing new to bear upon the issue. It is understandable that the later works in 
the survey do not repeat this argument. However, they also do not provide an answer 
as to why she would need a designated prayer caller if she was not leading a general 
congregation. 
 
4. Non-Ḥanbalī Use as Evidence for Women Leading Women-Only Congregations 
It is interesting that, apart from the Ḥanbalī works discussed above, only Imām al-
Ḥaramayn seems to rely on the version from Sunan al-Dāraquṭnī to support women-
only congregations. He does not cite his source for the ḥadīth, but mentions “it is 
narrated” that Umm Waraqah led the women of her locality in prayer. All of the 
others refer to the generally worded ḥadīth, most of them specifically citing Sunan Abī 
Dāwūd as the source. However, only al-Rajrājī points out that the ḥadīth’s wording is 
general for men and women, for which he argues that it is specified by the evidence 
he has already presented for prohibiting women from leading men in prayer. Though 
al-Rajrājī, al-Māwardī, al-ʿAynī and Ibn Humām all mention she was appointed a 
prayer caller, none of them question why she would need one if she is not leading the 
general congregation for her locality. Apart from al-Rajrājī, however, none of them 
rely exclusively upon the ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah for evidence of women-only 
congregations. They cite the practice of ʿA’ishah and Umm Salamah as well.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Ḥanbalī theorists. Abū Yaʿlā says: “If a ruling is directed to an individual, then the ruling includes 
everyone, like the stoning of Māʿiz and cutting off the hand of the person who stole Ṣafwān’s cloak.” 
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUddah, 1:318-319. 
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L. A Woman’s Prayer in Her House is Better 
 
ʿAbd Allah b. Masʿūd relates that the Prophet said: 
 
A woman’s prayer in her house is better than her prayer in her foyer, and her 
prayer in her private chamber is better than her prayer [elsewhere] in her house. 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works  
The ḥadiṭh is cited by al-Zaylaʿī in Tabyīn al-Ḥaqā’iq to justify the Ḥanafī position 
that women praying together in congregation is disliked. It is subsequently dismissed 
by Ibn al-Humām as a weak argument and is not taken up again. 
 
2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
This ḥadīth is related in Sunan Abī Dāwūd (570), Sunan al-Bayhaqī (5361), 
Mustadrak al-Ḥākim (757), and Ṣahīh Ibn Khuzaymah (1688). Their chains of 
transmission all come fromʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣim form Hammām from Qatādah, from 
Muwarraq from Abū al-Aḥwaṣ from ʿAbd Allah b. Masʿūd. Though some ḥadīth 
scholars, including Ibn Khuzaymah, expressed concerns whether all of the narrators 
actually heard from one another, the general concensus is that the ḥadīth is 
authentic.177 
 
3. Its Use as Evidence 
Al-Zaylaʿī cites it to show that women’s congregations are disliked. He does not 
elaborate on how it does so, or why it would still be disliked for two or more women 
to pray together in congregation in the privacy of their home.  
 
Ibn al-Hūmam explains that the ḥadīth is being suggested as proof that women’s 
congregations have been abrogated, and though he disagrees with the argument, he 
takes the trouble to explain the reasoning behind it. He says that the private chamber 
refers to a storage closet which would not be large enough to accommodate more than 
                                                 
177 Shu’ayb al-Arna’ūṭ writes: “Its chain of transmission is good. Ibn Māʿīn said that ʿAmr b.  `Āṣim 
(Ibn ʿUbayd Allah  Abū ʿUthmān al-Baṣrī) is ‘sound’. Al-Nasā’ī said: ‘There is nothing wrong with 
him.’ Ibn Saʿd declared him reliable and Ibn Ḥibbān lists him in al-Thiqāt.... All the other narrators are 
reliable and are used by al-Bukhārī and Muslim, except for Abū al-Aḥwaṣ ( ʿAwf b. Mālik al-Jashmī) 
who is a narrator accepted by Muslim.” Shu’ayb al-Arna’ūṭ (ed.), Musnad Aḥmad (Beirut: Mu’assasah 
al-Risālah,  1997), 9:337 – editorial note. 
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one person. In other words, this is the place the ḥadīth mentions as bringing a woman 
the greatest level of blessings in her prayer. Therefore, if praying in congregation 
forces her out of her private chamber in order to accommodate other worshippers, 
then congregating becomes disliked to the extent that it is “contrary to what is best”. 
In this way, he explains how the ḥadīth can be seen to abrogate the preferrablility 
indicated by the practice of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah leading women in prayer.  
 
This argument is obviously strained, but we must keep in mind that Ibn al-Human is 
presenting it as one he disagrees with, a rhetorical concession to illustrate the 
strongest legitimate argument his critics can mobilise in opposition to women-only 
congregations. He makes this clear, saying: “We cannot fail to notice how much is 
[lacking] in this [argument]. Even were we to hypothetically concede it, it would 
mean no more than the abrogation of the preferentiality [of the women’s 
congregation].” 
 
 
M. The Woman Does not Stand Forward 
 
Asmā’178 said: I heard God’s Messenger say: 
 
It is not upon women to offer the first and second calls to prayer, the Friday 
prayer, and the [ritual] bath for the Friday prayer, and the woman does not stand 
forward, but stands in their midst. 
 
1. Its Citation in the Surveyed Works  
The ḥadiṭh is cited by the Ḥanbalī jurist al-Zarkashī as proof that the woman can lead 
other women in prayer. It is also mentioned by the Ḥanafī jurist al-ʿAynī in al-
Bināyah, but for the purpose of dismissing it as a spurious narration. 
 
                                                 
178 ʿAbd Allah al-Jibrīn, in his critical notes on Sharḥ al-Zarkashī, identifies her as Asmā’ bint Abī 
Bakr. See: ʿAbd Allah al-Jibrīn (ed.), Sharḥ al-Zarkhashī ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-Khiraqī. (Riyadh: 
Maktabah al-ʿUbaykān, 1993), 2:98; footnote 3. This is also asserted by ʿAbd Allah al-Turkī in his 
critical notes to al-Furūʿ. Abd Allah al-Turkī (ed.), al-Furūʿ, 2:48, footnote 1. Al-Albānī is of the 
opinion that it is Asmā’ bint Yazīd. al-Albānī, Silsilah al-Aḥādīth al-Ḍaʿīfah, 2:269. 
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2. Validity of the Ḥadīth 
This ḥadīth is related in Sunan al-Bayhaqī (1921), though al-Bayhaqī declares it to be 
weak. Ibn ʿAdī also relates it in his book of weak narrators, where he declares its 
narrator al-Ḥakam b. ʿAbd Allah b. Saʿd b. ʿAbd Allah al-Ayalī to be a fabricator of 
ḥadīth and demonstrates the widespread condemnation of his narrations among the 
authorities in ḥadīth transmission.179 This ḥadīth is unacceptable according to the 
conditions of all ḥadīth scholars and jurists. 
 
3. Its Use as Evidence 
It provides direct evidence that a woman imām stands in the line with the worshippers 
when she leads them in prayer. It is also the only ḥadīth that attributes this ruling to 
the Prophet’s words. Its unacceptability as a narration explains why it is not more 
frequently invoked by the legal scholars who allow women-only congregations.180 
Since there is a considerable amount of evidence for this practice from the Prophet’s 
female Companions, the jurists have no need to cite this extremely weak ḥadīth. 
 
 
– Āthār – 
 
N. ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah 
 
Al-Shāfiʿī narrates in al-Umm: 
 
Sufyān [b. `ʿUyaynah] informs us that ʿAmmar al-Dhahabī on the authority of a 
woman from his people named Ḥujayrah that Umm Salamah led them [the 
women] and stood in their midst. 
 
Al-Layth narrates from ʿAtā’ from ʿĀ’ishah that she prayed the afternoon prayer 
with the women and stood in their midst.  
 
                                                 
He aslo enumerates the scathing criticism this narrator received from a long list of ḥadīth scholars.  
Abū Aḥmad b. ʿAdī al-Jurjānī, al-Kāmil fī Ḍuʿafā’ al-Rijāl. ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī 
Muḥammad Muʿawwad. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1997), 2:478-483. 
180 I have only located this ḥadīth in two other legal works from a broad survey of works in all four 
schools of thought. The Ḥanbalī jurist Muḥammad b. Mufliḥ mentions it in al-Furūʿ, 3:48, and al-
Māwarī cites it while discussing the call to prayer in al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 2:51. 
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Ibrāhīm informs us form Ṣafwān that he said: “It is the Sunnah if a woman 
offers prayers with the women that she stands in their midst.” 
 
Rayṭah narrates:  
 
We used to be a congregation of women with ʿĀ’ishah. She would lead us in 
prayer, standing in our midst, and she prayed with neither the first nor second 
call to prayer. 
 
Muḥammad al-Shaybānī relates in Kitāb al-Āthār:  
 
Abu Ḥanīfah informs us by way of Ḥamād b. Abū Sulaymān from Ibrāhīm al-
Nakhaʿī that ʿĀ’ishah used to lead women in prayer in the month of Ramaḍān 
and stand in their midst. 
 
1. Citation in the Surveyed Works 
The practice of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah is cited in every Shāfiʿī work as the 
primary evidence for allowing women to lead men in prayer. It is cited in the Ḥanbalī 
works al-Mughnī, Sharḥ al-Zarkashī, and al-Muqniʿ, but not in the final two Ḥanbalī 
works.  
 
The ḥadīth of Rayṭah is cited in the early Ḥanafī work al-Mabsūṭ to indicate that the 
calls to prayer are not made for women in congregation.  It is cited in Badā’iʿ al-
Ṣanā’iʿ and Tabyīn and al-Baḥr to establish that a women can lead other women in 
prayer, though it is disliked, and that she should stand in their midst. Al-ʿAynī cites 
the practice of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah in support of women-only congregations, 
and Ibn al-Humām follows suit by mentioning ʿĀ’ishah’s practice. They specifically 
cites the narration of Ibrāhīm al-Nakha’ī to establish that the practice of doing so was 
not abrogated. Al-ʿAynī goes further to explicitly state that her practice shows that it 
is preferable. Ibn ʿĀbidīn in Radd al-Muḥtār does not discuss the ḥadīth at all. 
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2. Validity of the Tradition 
The tradition about Umm Salamah leading prayer is narrated with two chains of 
transmission. Al-Shāfiʿī’s narration cited above suffers from Ḥujayrah being a 
narrator of unknown quality.181  
 
The other narration is cited in Muṣannaf Ibn Abī Shaybah (4953) from ʿAlī b. Mus-hir 
from Saʿīd b. Abī ʿUrwah from Qatādah from Umm al-Ḥasan b. Abī al-Ḥasan al-
Baṣrī.  This is a solid chain of transmission with reliable narrators. Ibn Ḥazm asserts: 
“Khayrah182 is the most trustworthy of trustworthy narrators (thiqah al-thiqāt) and 
this chain of transmission is like gold.”183 Moreover, the two narrations, being 
completely independent, corroborate one another. 184 There is no reason for any jurists 
to object to the validity of this tradition on the basis of its chain of transmission. 
 
The practice of ʿĀ’ishah leading women in prayer is narrated with a large number of 
independent chains of transmission. The strongest is the narration of Rayṭah al-
Ḥanafiyyah185 in Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-Razzāq (5086) from Sufyān al-Thawrī from 
                                                 
181 Her name is given as as Ḥujayrah bint Ḥuṣayn in the chains of transmission in Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-
Razzāq (5082) and Sunan al-Dāraquṭnī (1508). She is mentioned in Tabaqāt Ibn Saʿd, and associated 
exclusively with this narration from Ā’ishah. It does not appear that any other tradition has been 
narrated from her. Muḥammad b. Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr. ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar. (Cairo: 
Maktabah al-Khānjī, 2001), 10:448 
182 Khayrah is the given name of  Umm al-Ḥasan b. Abī al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (Umm al-Ḥasan being her 
kunyah), who narrates this ḥadīth from her personal experience with Umm Salamah. She had been 
Umm Salamah’s servant. Ibn Ḥazm also says about her: “She is a well-known reliable narrator (thiqah 
mashhūrah).” ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd b. Ḥazm al-Andalusī, al-Muḥallā. ed. Ḥassān ʿAbd al-Mannān. 
(Amman: Bayt al-Afkār al-Dawliyyah, no date), 277. She is one of the narrators Muslim relies upon in 
his Saḥīh (2005 and 2916), and she is listed by Ibn Ḥibbān in his book of reliable narrators. 
Muḥammad b. Ḥibbān, Kitāb al-Thiqāt (Hyderabad: Dā’irah al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyyah, 1973), 
5:593-594. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī takes a somewhat more modest view, classifying her as an 
acceptable narrator (maqbūlah). Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb, 746. Wakīʿ mentions some minor confusion 
among early biographers about her personal name. Muḥammad b. Khakaf  Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-Quḍāt. ed. 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī. (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1947), 2:5. However this was soon 
resolved with the vast majority of her biographers asserting that it was Khayrah. Al-Ṭabarī and 
Dāraquṭnī relate this on the authority of Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn, and al-Dāraqutnī also establishes it from ʿAmr 
b. ʿAlī. See Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, al-Muntakhab. (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-Aʿlamī lil-
Maṭbūʿāt, no date), 125; and ʿAlī b. ʿUmar al-Dāraquṭnī, al-Mu’talaf wa al-Mukhtalaf. ed. Muwaffaq b. 
ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Qādir. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1986), 385. All later biographers are 
consistent in identifying her given name as Khayrah.  
183 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 410. 
184 For a detailed discussion of both chains of transmission, refer to Nāṣīr al-Dīn al-Albānī, Tamām al-
Minnah fī al-Taʿlīq ʿalā Fiqh al-Sunnah (Riyadh: Dār al-Rāyah, no date), 154.  
185 Her name appears alternatively as Rayṭah al-Ḥanafiyyah and Raī’iṭah al-Ḥanafiyyah in various 
ḥadīth texts. She is positively identified as Rayṭah in the catalogues of ḥadīth narrators and identified 
with this tradition of ʿĀ’ishah. See: Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt, 10:447. She is classified by al-ʿAjlī as a 
reliable narrator from among the Successors. See: Abū al-Ḥasan Aḥmad al-ʿAjlī, Maʿrifah al-Thiqāt 
min Rijāl Ahl al-ʿIlm wa al-Ḥadīth. ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Bastawī. (Madinah: Maktabah 
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Maysarah b. Ḥabīb al-Hindī186 from Rayṭah. This is a sound, connected chain of 
transmission with reliable narrators. 
 
Each of the other chains suffer from a degree of weakness, either a narrator having a 
degree of imprecision or a narrator of unknown quality. These are the kinds of defects 
which are ameliorated by corroborating chains of transmission. For instance, the 
narration of the Successor ʿĀṭa from ʿĀ’ishah comes with two independent and 
unbroken lines of transmission. The first is in Muṣannaf Ibn Abī Shaybah (4954) from 
Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Laylā, who is identified as having a weak 
memory,187 and the second from Layth b. Abī Sulaym, who is identified as confusing 
his narrations.188 Otherwise, these two chains are sound and corroborate one another 
to confirm the accuracy of what both narrators say they heard from ʿĀṭā.189  
 
The narrations from Abū Ḥanīfah suffer from the fact that his teacher Ḥammād b. Abī 
Sulaymān, in spite of his eminence as a jurist, is graded as “a very honest narrator, but 
with some errors” (ṣadūq lahu awhām).190 This is also valid as a corroborating 
narration. 
 
The practice of ʿĀishah is therefore well established.  There is no reason that any 
jurist would have to reject it on the basis of its narration. The practice of ʿA’ishah and 
Umm Salamah are both accepted as fact by the jurists of the Shāfiʿī, Ḥanbalī, and 
Ḥanafī schools of law, though Ḥanafī jurists differ about its legal implications. 
 
As for the Mālikī jurists’ dismissal of these traditions, there are two possible grounds 
for it, neither of which have to do with the strength or weakness of the chains of 
transmission.  One reason might be that they are individual-narrator narrations at 
variance with established practice. The second possibility is that they are dismissed as 
                                                                                                                                            
al-Dār, 1985).  Al-Albānī seems unaware of this identification and declares that Rā’iṭah is an unknown 
narrator.  See: Tamām al-Minnah 153-154. 
186 He is a reliable narrator from whom Sufyān al-Thawrī narrated ḥadīth. See: Ibn Abī Ḥātim, al-Jarḥ 
wa al-Taʿdīl, 8:253 and Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thiqāt, 7:484. 
187 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Tahdhib al-Tahdib (9:301-302). 
188 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb, 464. 
189 Al-Albānī, Tamām al-Minnah: 1:154. 
190 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb, 178. 
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being the equivalent of a statement of a Companion in a matter wherein the 
Companions disagreed.191 
 
3. Use as Evidence 
It may seem obvious how these traditions relate to the question of women leading 
other women in prayer. Yet, it must be acknowledged that these traditions indicate the 
actions of two Companions and not a statement of the Prophet. Furthermore, no tacit 
approval from the Prophet can be assumed from them, because it cannot be firmly 
established that these events took place during the Prophet’s lifetime.192 Shāfi`ī and 
Ḥanbalī scholars use these traditions as evidence for permissibility. Ḥanafī scholars 
acknowledge their proving the validity of the prayer, though the majority regard the 
congregation of women to be disliked, with later scholars declaring it disliked to the 
point of being prohibited.  
 
The Shāfī`ī school of law goes further than permissibility to assert that the practice of 
ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah proves it is preferable for women to participate together 
in congregational prayer. Shāfiʿī jurists do not regard the opinions of Companions to 
be valid evidence. It seems they treat their practice to have the evidentiary force of a 
prophetic ḥadīth, since it is a positive action on a matter central to the performance of 
an act of worship, and something which could not take place contrary to textual 
evidence as merely the opinion of the women involved.193 Therefore, it indicates the 
permissibility of the act and the validity of the prayer. The preferability of women-
only congregations is evident in the language of al-Māwardī, Imām al-Ḥaramain, and 
al-Nawawī, who all cite the practice of the Prophet’s wives along with the ḥadīth of 
Umm Waraqah. The discussion of preferentiality is not taken up by the later 
commentaries, where the practice of the Prophet’s wives is only cited to show where 
                                                 
191 This second possibility will be discussed shortly in conjunction with the statement of ʿAlī. The first 
possibility will be clarified in the section on the practice of the people of Madinah. 
192 For those Ḥanafī jurists who suggest the congregation of women had been abrogated, they have to 
assume this practice did indeed take place during the Prophet’s lifetime. 
193 The theoretical works on ḥadīth methodology speak about statements of the Companions that have 
the evidentiary force of prophetic ḥadīth (fī ḥukm al-rafʿ) and give a number of criteria for determining 
when this is the case. Unfortunately, the criteria they discuss focus on the words used in the narration 
and not on the actions related from the Companions. However, al-Suyūṭī explores this issue and asserts: 
“One of these [criteria] is his action wherein there is no room for juristic discretion, so it is taken as if 
he has that on the Prophet’s authority. This is like what al-Shāfīʿī said about ʿAlī [b. Abī Ṭālib] 
offering the eclipse prayer with more than two bows in every prayer unit.” Jalāl a-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Tadrīb 
al-Rāwī ʿalā Sharḥ Taqrīb al-Nawawī. ed. Abū Qutaybah Naẓar Muḥammad al-Fārayābī. (Riyadh: Dār 
Ṭaybah, 2001), 213.  
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the female imām should stand. Ḥanbalī scholars are less committed to the idea that 
women congregating together is preferable, but at least al-Zarkashī cites the practice 
of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah as being directly indicative of preferentiality.  
 
They do not explain how the practice of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah supports the 
ruling that congregation is preferred. It might reasonably be argued that had it not 
been preferred, those two Companions would not have gone to the trouble of holding 
congregational prayer. 
 
It is interesting to note in this regard how al-Māzirī discusses ʿĀ’ishah’s practice in 
Sharḥ al-Talqīn. He is the only Mālikī jurist to take the trouble to address this 
tradition, and his discussion of it indicates his awareness of its potential evidentiary 
force. He suggests that if the narration is authentic, the practice was either abrogated 
or was an act of teaching and not a genuine congregation. This is the way he is able to 
dismiss it. He does not suggest that her action might have been based on her juristic 
opinion. Nevertheless, he illustrates the greater ambiguity ingerent in a practice, as 
opposed to a statement,  by suggesting the possibility that she was merely teaching the 
other women how to pray. 
 
4. Its Use by al-ʿAynī and Ibn al-Humām 
Like the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī scholars, they cite this ḥadīth as evidence to permit 
women-only congregations. They are contradicting the prevailing opinion of their 
school of thought in doing so, which results in their having to present a more 
elaborate discussion. They argue that the reference to Ramaḍān in the narration of 
Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī refers to the Tarāwīḥ prayer, which was not practiced until after 
the Prophet’s death, to show that women-only congregations were not abrogated. 
They also point out ʿA’ishah’s very young age when she arrived in Madīnah, and that 
she would not have been leading any prayers except after becoming mature. Since she 
was only teenager when the Prophet died, her leading prayers could only have taken 
place near the end of his life at the earliest.  
 
These arguments are critical, because in order to assert that women-only 
congregations are prohibited or disliked, Ḥanafī scholars need to explain away 
ʿA’ishah’s practice, and they do so by declaring that it abrogated. This could only 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
have taken place during the Prophet’s lifetime. Al-ʿAynī goes further to assert that if 
her practice was not abrogated, then Hanafī Law would have to take it as proof that 
women-only congregations are not only permissible, but preferable. Ibn al-Humām 
does not go so far in his assertions, contenting himself to neutralise the claim of 
abrogation. His position seems more inclined to one of mere permissibility. 
 
Ibn al-Human concedes that the prayers in Ramaḍān may not have been Tarāwīḥ, so 
they could have taken place in the early years of Islam. He likewise conceded that 
maybe her age was wrongly determined or that she may have only led prayers for a 
brief period of time before abrogation, though he does not appear himself too 
convinced by the likelihood of this possibility. He then rests his case on the absence 
of any evidence for abrogation. The response of later Ḥanafī jurists to these arguments 
is to ignore them. 
 
 
O. Ibn ʿAbbās on Women-Only Congregations 
 
ʿIkrimah relates that Ibn ʿAbbās said: 
 
A woman leads the women in prayer, standing in their midst. 
 
1. Citation in the Surveyed Works 
The opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās is cited by the Ḥanafī jurist alʿAynī in al-Bināyah to 
support his minority view in the school supporting women-only congregations. 
 
2. Validity of the Tradition 
It is found in Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-Razzāq (5085) related from Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad 
from Dāwūd b. al-Ḥuṣayn from ʿIkrimah. 
 
Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Abī Yaḥyā (also: Ibn Abī ʿĀṭā) al-Aslamī is accused of 
lying194 and is rejected as a narrator.195 This chain of transmission would not be 
                                                 
194 Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb.  (India: Dā’irah al-Maʿārif al-
Niẓāmiyyah, 1908), 1:158. 
195 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb, 93. 
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regarded as suitable as evidence. A further  problem is that although Dāwūd b. al-
Ḥusayn is regarded as a reliable narrator, his reliability is called into question with 
respect to what he relates from ʿIkrimah.196  
 
3. Use as Evidence 
The opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās is cited by ʿAynī in a list of narrations recruited in support 
of women-only congregations. Even if its chain of transmission had been authentic, its 
mention would have unnecessary in the presence of stronger, more compelling 
traditions. Due to its invalid transmission, its mention becomes superfluous. It is not 
surprising that this tradition does not appear anywhere else in the legal literature.197 
Al-ʿAynī might have felt pressured to present a long list of evidence to support his 
view supporting women-only congregations because he was going against the 
prevailing view in his own school of thought.   
 
 
P. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib on Women Imāms 
 
Ibn Wahb and Wakīʿ both narrate:  
 
It is related from Ibn Abī Dh’ib that a ward of Banī Ḥāshim informed him that 
ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib said: “A woman does not lead prayers.” 
 
1. Citation in the Surveyed Works 
It is mentioned by in al-Mudawwanah, the earliest Mālikī legal source work, and is  
never cited again in the Mālikī texts. It is not even mentioned by al-Rajrājī in Manāhij 
al-Taḥṣīl, in spite of the fact that it is supposed to be a commentary of al-
Mudawwanah, and al-Rajrājī’s professed intention is to ground the legal rulings on a 
textual evidentiary basis.  
 
                                                 
196 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb, 198. 
197 The only other legal work I have found this tradition mentioned in is a twentieth-century 
commentary on the Ḥanbalī legal treatise Zād al-Mustaqniʿ. See: ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. 
Qāsim alʿĀṣimī al-Najdī,  Ḥāshiyah al-Rawḍ al-MurbiʿSharḥ Zād al-Mustaqniʿ. (Riyadh, no publisher, 
1977), 2:340. 
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The Ḥanbalī jurist al-Zarkashī suggests ʿAlī’s statement as evidence for an alternate 
opinion related from Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, that it is not preferable but merely permissible 
for a woman to lead other women in prayer.198 
 
2. Validity of the Tradition 
The tradition is related in Muṣannaf Ibn Abī Shaybah (4957). It has a connected, solid 
chain of transmission until it gets to the ward of Banī Ḥāshim, who is ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān b. Mahrān al-Madanī. Though Ibn Ḥibbān lists him as a reliable narrator199, 
Ibn Ḥajar identifies him as a narrator of unknown quality.200 Also, he is not known to 
have narrated anything from ʿAlī. Al-Zarkashī gives al-Najjād is his source for it, but 
his book is no longer in existence. Moreover, he attributes the text to Ibn ʿUmar and 
Ibn ʿAbbās, and cites it as part of a longer statement from ʿAlī.201 Nowhere is this 
attribution or this longer text found in the ḥadīth literature. 
 
3. Use as Evidence 
This statement is cited by Ibn al-Qāsim in support of categorically prohibiting women 
from leading prayers, for women as well as men. The appearance of the statement of 
ʿAlī in this earliest of Mālikī legal works is consistent with Umar Abd-Allah’s 
assertion that Mālik gave preference to the legal verdicts of older and more prominent 
companions to those of younger ones. Abd-Allah identifies ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib as a 
member of the former category and ʿĀ’ishah, due to her young age, as a member of 
the latter, in spite of her being the Prophet’s wife.202 Therefore Mālik could have 
given preference to ʿAlī’s legal opinion over the practice of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm 
Salamah. At the same time, Mālik may have simply been unaware of the practice of 
the Prophet’s wives. The Shāfiʿī scholar Abū `Abd Allah Muḥammad al-Marwazī 
attributes the following statement to Mālik:203 
                                                 
198 Al-Mudawwanah and Sharḥ al-Zarkashī seem to give the only citations for this tradition in the legal 
literature. I have not found it cited in any other legal work of any of the four schools of law. Moreover, 
the only citation I have found for it in the ḥadīth literature is in Muṣannaf Ibn Abī Shaybah. 
199 Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thiqāt, 5:93. Ibn Ḥibbān asserts that Ibn Abī Dhi’b heard narrations from ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān b. Mahrān. 
200 Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī, Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb: 351. 
201 He makes this claim about Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās while citing the ḥadīth in the context of 
discussing the call to prayer. al-Zarkashī, Sharḥ, 1:516. 
202 Abd-Allah, “Malik’s Concept”, 168. Abd-Allah takes pains to point out: “ʿĀ’ishah is regarded as 
the most knowledgeable of Muslim women.” 
203 Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī, Mukhṭaṣar Qiyām al-Layl wa Qiyām Ramadān wa Kitāb al-Witr li-Abū 
ʿAbd Allah al-Marwazī. (Fiasalabad: Hadith Academy, 1988), 228. 
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It is not appropriate for a woman to lead anyone in prayer. There were the wives 
of the Prophet and the emigrant women, and neither they nor any other [women] 
ever led prayers. 
 
As for the opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās, assuming Dāwūd b. al-Ḥusayn actually narrated it, 
Mālik might have been aware of it, since he narrated ḥadīth from Dāwūd b. al-
Ḥusayn. However, he never accepted any narrations of his from ʿIkrimah.204 
Therefore, Mālik might have been aware of ʿAlī’s verdict to the exclusion of any 
variant opinion from among the Companions. This would make it a possible point of 
evidence for him. However, it does not seem to be Mālik’s primary argument. 
Considering his statement quoted above, it appears that prevailing practice was his 
overwhelming concern.  
 
In any event, the disappearance of ʿAlī’s opinion from the Mālikī legal literature is 
probably due to the fact that, as a statement of a Companion in a matter wherein other 
Companions disagree, it does not have any evidentiary value in the fully-formed 
Mālikī legal theory of the post-formative period, though its rareness and questionable 
chain of transmission may also have been contributing factors. This could be a case 
where the actual evidentiary basis for the ruling was different than what legal theorist 
and jurists would later recognize.  
 
Its absence from the Ḥanbalī legal literature is understandable. Al-Zarkashī suggests it 
as evidence to show that women-only congregations are not preferable to their 
praying individually. Not only is this view, by his own admission, disfavoured by 
many scholars of the Ḥanbalī school including himself, the statement of ʿAlī is 
unwieldy evidence for it, since its apparent meaning negates the permissibility of 
women leading prayer. To the extent that it is understood to apply to women-only 
congregations, it would negate those as well; it would not merely indicate a lack of 
preferability. 
 
                                                 
204 Ibn Abī Ḥātim, al-Jarḥ wa al-Taʿdīl, 3:409. 
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Though not cited as evidence, the statement of ʿAlī, if accepted as authentic in its 
attribution to him, would have one very profound effect on all four schools of law. It 
would prevent any jurist form claiming that the permissibility of women-only 
congregations was the juristic consensus (ijmāʿ) of the Companions. Otherwise, with 
ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah’s prayer leadership being an ongoing practice of theirs, a 
case for a “silent” ijmāʿ might have been made if no objection was on record from any 
other Companion. 
 
 
Q. General Observations 
 
“A people will not succeed...” is the only textual evidence cited with any consistency 
to prohibit women from holding positions of political leadership and judicial 
authority. This is in spite of the fact that it is very context-specific and contains no 
command or prohibition that can be immediately generalised from the occasion of its 
utterance. This suggests that the ḥadīth is recruited for the purpose and is unlikely to 
be the reason instigating the ruling.  
 
Regarding women leading men in prayer, each school of thought favours different 
ḥadīth evidence, in spite of their all agreeing that women must not do so, and that the 
prayers of the men who follow them are invalid. None of the ḥadīth are satisfactory as 
evidence according to the requirements of the school which cites them. In every case, 
either the ḥadīth’s chain of transmission is too defective to be acceptable, or its 
wording does not provide a sound enough textual basis to establish the ruling.  
 
Nevertheless, it is interesting how a pattern of correspondence can be discerned 
between each school’s specific theoretical approach to ḥadīth and the particular texts 
they favour. The Shāfīʿī school ultimately settles upon the only clearly authentic 
ḥadīth text available, in spite of its dubious relevance to prayer. The Ḥanbalī school, 
by contrast, consistently cites the ḥadīth that most literally states the ruling, ignoring 
the fact that it is inauthentic, in line with their tendency towards favouring a weak but 
literal text over any kind of analogous reasoning. The Ḥanafī school chooses the only 
text that can provide a rationale for the basis of their counter-intuitive ruling that a 
woman being in line with a man nullifies his prayer and not hers, which they establish 
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using the text in conjunction with their theoretical principle of juristic preference 
(istiḥsān) which will be discussed below.  
 
By contrast, the Mālikī school is inconsistent in its ḥadīth use, with different ḥadīth 
evidence being suggested by different jurists. With respect to women-only 
congregations, they ignore or dismiss the ḥādīth evidence and traditions which 
indicate permissibility. (Manāhij al-Taḥsīl is atypical in supporting women-only 
congregations, and cites the ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah in its favour.) Their uneven use 
of ḥadīth to prohibit women’s prayer leadership may be attributed to the Mālikī 
emphasis on normative practice over specific ḥadīth, even in the post-formative 
period.  Likewise, their very easy dismissal of the ḥadīth evidence and the traditions 
of the Prophet’s wives supporting women-only congregations might be partially 
explained by the Mālikī principle of rejecting individual-narrator ḥadīth that go 
against established practice.  
 
 
R. Summary 
 
Many of the arguments in the legal literature under survey are phrased as if one or 
another ḥadīth is the basis for prohibiting women from leading prayers, but it is clear 
that these ḥadīth are being recruited to defend the rulings, and not the source for them. 
This can be seen in the inconsistency in how jurists within certain schools choose 
ḥadīth to defend their arguments, with later ones recruiting different ḥadīth than their 
predecessors and discarding others. Also, in spite of the fact that all four schools agree 
women cannot lead men in prayer, each school cites different texts in doing so. 
Nevertheless, a pattern ultimately emerges with jurists choosing texts to deny 
womern’s leadership which most closely conform to their particular schools’ 
theoretical demands, yet none of the ḥadīth cited for that purpose actually live up to 
those demands. Therefore, the rulings disallowing women’s leadership were not 
significantly determined by the ḥadīth literature, nor by the use of juristic principles in 
combination with the ḥadīth, since those principles are repeatedly violated in the 
jurists’ attempt to recruit ḥadīth to bolster their arguments. 
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IV. CONSENSUS (IJMAʿ) 
 
Consensus, as discussed herein, refers to the formal concept of ʿijmā’ as defined in 
post-formative legal theory and not to the more casual use of the term meanimg 
“widespread agreement”. Both usages of the word ijmāʿ are found in the legal texts, 
but only the formal, terminological usage refers to a primary and authoritative source 
of law.  
 
A standard definition of ijmāʿ would be: the unanimous agreement of all qualified 
people in a given era on a particular ruling.205 Specific definitions vary, due to 
disagreements among legal theorists as to whose agreement counts, whether they must 
constitute all Muslims, all Islamic legal scholars, or all specialists in a relevant field of 
knowledge. In any event, legal theorists concur that for questions of Islamic Law, all 
the competent legal scholars must be unanimously agreed.206 Whenever this is 
established, the ruling becomes a matter of binding legal certainty and disagreement 
about it is henceforth forbidden.207 
 
The evidence cited for the principle of consensus is Qur’an 4:115: “And whoever 
contends with the Messenger after guidance has become clear to him and follows 
other than the way of the believers - We will leave him to the path he has chosen and 
consign him to Hell, and it is an evil destination.” They also cite the ḥadīth: “My 
community will not agree upon a falsehood.”208 Consensus is thereby seen as a sign 
                                                 
205 See: ʿAbd al-Malik b. `Abd Allah al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīs fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh. ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan b. 
Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2003), 366; ʿAbd al-Malik b. `Abd 
Allah al-Juwaynī al-Waraqāt fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh. published with Jalāl a-Dīn al-Maḥallī, Sharḥ al-Waraqāt, 
(Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿAṣriyyah, 2002), 9; al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 299;  and Muḥammad 
b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. al-Humām, al-Taḥrīr Fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh. (Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1932), 
399. 
206 Mālikī jurists consider the concensus of the people of Madinah to be evidence in their school of law. 
al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 309. However, they do not confuse it with the type of binding 
consensus which every Muslim is obliged to accept, which is what we are discussing at this point. The 
value of Madinite concensus is that it takes recedence over an individual-narrator ḥadīth in Mālikī law. 
207 Al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 436-437 and al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 301. 
208 Sunan Ibn Mājah (3950). We should notice that this ḥadīth does not define the scope of the term 
community nor the temporal scope of the consensus that will be binding, nor does it rule out that the 
matter of agreement might simply be that which is correct for the immediate community at the time or 
occasion of agreement, rather than binding for the entire Muslim world for all time. Likewise, it does 
not specify that the matter at hand must be a matter of Islamic belief or Law. It also does not rule out 
that alternative opinions might also be acceptable, since it only states that what is agreed upon is not 
something false, without making mention of the status of any alternative or differing point of view. Be 
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from God indicating that the point whereupon agreement is reached is the indisputable 
truth and that no other possibility is allowed. In this way, consensus becomes an 
independent source of law. Consensus is therefore a powerful proof when it occurs, 
and classical scholars understood the conditions for this proof to be stringent. What is 
needed is absolute agreement.  
 
Scholars differ regarding whether a direct statement from all of the relevant 
individuals is needed to establish its occurrence, or whether once the statement of a 
few is clearly publicised and known by all, the silence of the rest is enough. 
Generally, those who uphold the validity of this “silent concensus” place conditions 
on it that the matter must be one of general relevance and the opinion of those who 
spoke is known to have been widely circulated.209 
 
Meeting the condition, in either case, is a tall order. There are tremendous practical 
difficulties in determining its occurrence for other than the most essential Islamic 
teachings, like the obligatory nature of the five daily prayers, the obligation of the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, the fact that Ramadan is the month of fasting, and the flesh of 
pork is unlawful to eat. It is even more difficult to prove in the face of claims to the 
contrary, and especially where there is a paucity or absence of statements about the 
ruling from among the Companions and Successors. Both of these problems exist for 
questions of women in leadership. 
 
As a consequence, consensus is rarely invoked in the works under survey. Indeed, the 
questions we are exploring are not usually considered by classical jurists to be matters 
of consensus, and many jurists freely admit to the disagreement by citing the opposing 
opinions that exist. Nonetheless, the temptation for a jurist to invoke consensus is a 
strong one, especially when well-cherished issues are at stake whose rulings enjoy 
widespread acceptance in the Muslim community, like the questions we are 
exploring.210  
                                                                                                                                            
this as it may, classical Islamic scholars have understood ijmāʿ, whenever it occurs, to be universal and 
binding. 
209 See: al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 1:447; al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 207, and Ibn al-Humām, al-
Taḥrīr, 407-408. 
210 It is telling how Muhammad Hasan Hītū, a contemporary Shāfiʿī legal scholar from Syria, explains 
the function of consensus: “[Consensus] is the unreachable fortress and insurmountable barrier of this 
religion. It confronts those with vain desires and passions and turns them on their heels, so they are 
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A. Leading Prayer 
 
The Ḥanafī scholars al-Zaylaʿī, al-Bābirtī and Ibn al-Human are the only ones in the 
surveyed texts who assert there is ijmāʿ on prohibiting women from leading men in 
prayer. They mention it as a basis to argue why a woman nullifies a man’s prayer 
when she stands in line with him.211 None of them try to justify or cite a source for the 
initial claim of ijmāʿ. They simply introduce it as a basis for a possible analogical 
argument and do not bother to elaborate upon the claim itself. For al-Zaylaʿī and al-
Bābirtī, this may be because it is merely a supporting argument. However, for Ibn al-
Humam, the stakes are higher because of his rejection of the primary ḥadīth evidence 
that Ḥanafī scholars rely upon. In fact, ijmāʿ is the only basis Ibn al-Humam gives for 
prohibiting women from leading men in prayer. 
 
Ibn al-Nujaym and al-ʿAynī also mention this claim of ijmāʿ and identify al-Zāhidī’s 
al-Mujtabā as being the source for the claim, but they do not say that they agree with 
him, nor do they relate from al-Zāhidī any possible evidence or justification for his 
assertion. Al-ʿAynī goes further to point out al-Ṭabarī’s differing opinion, and he 
asserts that al-Zāhidī did not intend ijmāʿ in an absolute sense, but only the agreement 
of the independent jurists who established the schools of thought. Be that as it may, 
al-Zāhidī is the likely source for al-Zaylaʿī, al-Bābirtī and Ibn al-Human. 
 
The most famous claim for ijmāʿ on the issue of men following women in prayer 
comes from the Zāhirī scholar Ibn Ḥazm in his work Marātib al-Ijmāʿ. He writes: 
“They agree that the woman does not lead men in prayer, their being aware that she is 
a woman. If they [the men] do so, their prayers are invalid by consensus (ijmāʿ).”212 
                                                                                                                                            
unable to plot against this religion and find no path to pursue their vanities. Many of the agreed-upon 
obligations are established by individual-narrator ḥadīth that are open to interpretation and which 
provide only uncertain evidence. Nevertheless, we find that the community of faith is agreed that it is 
disbelief to deny the obligatory nature [of those obligations] or to reinterpret them. This is because of 
consensus.” Muḥammad Ḥasan Hītū, al-Wajīz fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh. (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 2006) 
334. 
211 It is an argument by analogy (qiyās), and it will be discussed in detail in the next section on qiyas. 
212 Ibn Ḥazm, Marātib al-Ijmaʿ. (Cairo: Maktabah al-Qudsī, 1938) , 27. and cited from Ibn Ḥazm by 
ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik b. al-Qaṭṭān’ in al-Iqnāʿ fī Masā’il al-Ijmāʿ. ed. Zakariyyā 
ʿUmayrāt. (Beirut:Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah , 2005) 1:190. 
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Otherwise, the question is generally accepted by scholars to be a matter of legitimate 
disagreement – albeit very limited disagreement – due to what is related from al-
Ṭabarī, Abū Thawr, and al-Muzanī, all of whom are affiliated with the Shāfiʿī school 
of law, that women can lead men in all prayers, as well as the view found in the 
Ḥanbalī school that a woman can lead men in voluntary prayers, or at least the 
Tarāwīḥ prayer under certain conditions. 
 
We do find the word ijmāʿ being used in a qualified matter by the Shāfiʿi scholars al-
Ramlī and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, where they add the phrase “except for the rare 
disagreement…”, but this is not a claim of legally binding consensus, just an emphatic 
statement of how rare and exceptional they regard the disagreement that exists on the 
matter to be.  
 
The contemporary American scholar Zaid Shakir has challenged the attribution to al-
Ṭabarī, Abū Thawr, and al-Muzanī that they permitted women to lead men in prayer, 
and as a consequence he tentatively suggests that “the consensus claimed by Ibn 
Ḥazm concerning unrestricted female prayer-leadership, would not be impossible”.213 
He argues that there is no documented evidence from these scholars themselves that 
they believed women can lead men in prayer, nor have “any reports of unrestricted 
female prayer-leadership that are attributed to the Imams we have 
mentioned…reached us with unbroken chains” of transmission.214 
 
What is wrong with this argument is that most of the opinions of early legal scholars 
were not related like ḥadīth. Instead, they were preserved by the scholars who came 
after them in the early legal texts of their respective schools of law, which are often 
just collections of the jurists’ rulings. Such texts formed the basis for later 
encyclopaedic commentaries, like many of those surveyed by the present study. This 
is, indeed, the source for nearly all the essential rulings and opinions of the scholars 
from the four schools.  
 
                                                 
213 Shakir, Zaid “Female Prayer Leadership (Revisited)” New Islamic Directions, 1988. 
http://www.newislamicdirections.com/nid/articles/female_prayer_leadership_revisited. 
214 Shakir, “Female Prayer Leadership (Revisited)”. 
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The three scholars in question are all affiliated with the Shāfiʿī school of law. Al-
Ṭabarī is regarded by Shāfiʿī scholars as being an independent jurists affiliated with 
their school215 while Abū Thawr and al-Muzanī are both considered among al-
Shāfiʿī’s students and associates, with the possibility that one or both of them 
ultimately reached the level of independent jurist. What it means for the school of 
thought when a jurist reaches this level is that whenever they adopt a ruling at conflict 
with al-Shāfiʿī’s ruling, it is not recognized as a variant ruling within the school, but 
an independent ruling of theirs, because they were qualified to use independent 
reasoning and were known to have done so. Whereas Abū Thawr is generally 
regarded as having aspired to his own school of legal reasoning at the end, al-Muzanī 
remained one the most important of the first generation of of al-Shāfiʿī’s associates, 
and he is the author of the Mukhtaṣar that both al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr and Nihāyah al-
Maṭlab are based.216 
 
As a consequence of their positioning within with the Shāfiʿī school of law, the 
Shāfiʿī legal literature is the authoritative source for their legal opinions. Al-Māwardī 
attributes the opinion of permissibility to Abū Thawr and cites his arguments for it, 
which he then systematically attempts to refute. Al-Nawawī cites the authorities al-
Qāḍī Abū al-Ṭayyib and al-ʿAbdarī as sources for the attribution of this opinion to all 
three scholars, as well as Sheikh Abū Ḥāmid as another source for the attribution of 
the opinion to Abū Thawr. Furthermore, considering that this view is at variance with 
                                                 
215 Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī states about al-Ṭabarī: “The four Muḥammads: Muḥammad b. Naṣr, 
Muḥammad b. Jarīr, Ibn Khuzaymah, and Ibn al-Mundhir are from our associates who have reached 
the level of independent juristic reasoning (al-ijtihād al-muṭlaq). This does not stop them from being 
among al-Shāfi`ī’s associates who derive their [rulings] on his legal principles and who follow his 
school of law, because of the agreement of their juristic reasoning with his.” Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, 
Ṭabaqāt, 3:102. 
216 Al-Nawawī discusses this matter in depth, explaining that both of them became independed jurists 
affiliated with al-Shāfi`ī;s school, with al-Muzanī’s views remaining part of the school whenever they 
do not conflict with those of al-Sḥāfiʿī. He writes: “Al-Muzanī, Abū Thawr, and Abū Bakr b. al-
Mundhir are independent legal jurists affiliated with al-Shāfiʿī. As for al-Muzanī and Abū Thawr, they 
are his true associates, while Ibn al-Mundhir came later on. [Al-Shīrāzī] makes it clear in al-
Muhadhdhab in a number of places that the three of them are associates whose views hold (aṣḥāb al-
wujūh) and he makes their opinions alternate views in the school. Sometimes he makes their views as if 
they are not alternative opinions within the school, but the first stance is clearer because he presents 
their views and his habit in al-Muhadhdhab is not to mention the imams of other than our own school... 
In al-Nihāyah, Imām al-Ḥaramayn [al-Juwaynī] says: ‘Where al-Muzanī comes with his own unique 
opinion, then it is his own school of thought, and where he derives it from al-Shāfiʿī, then the ruling he 
derives is preferable to that of anyone else. He is part of the school without question.’ What al-Imām 
[al-Juwaynī] said is good, and no doubt it is what should be adopted.” Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā b. Sharaf 
al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab. ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd et al. (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2002), 1:713. 
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the one actually adopted by the Shāfiʿī school of law, there is no motivation for 
Shāfiʿī scholars to attribute this view to three of their most respected and pre-eminent 
scholars, except out of a genuine desire to preserve an historical record of their 
opinions. 
 
 
B. Women-Only Congregations 
 
The Ḥanafī scholar al-Bābirtī asserts that there is ijmāʿ on the validity women-only 
congregations regardless of whether the female imām stands in the midst of the 
worshippers or stands ahead. This claim of ijmāʿ in untenable in the face of the Mālikī 
position that women-only congregations are categorically invalid, as well as the 
opinion of a number of Successors to that effect. Al-Bābirtī is compelled to make this 
assertion to explain why women-only congregations are still regarded as valid after he 
claims that the practice of women leading other women in prayer was abrogated. He 
concludes that the Sunnah nature of their congregating was abrogated but the 
permissibility of doing so remains on the strength of ijmāʿ. He is clearly trying to 
maneuver out of a difficult legal predicament. This is a good example of how ijmāʿ is 
sometimes invoked as an argument of last resort when other arguments fail to provide 
satisfactory answers.  
 
 
C. Political Leadership 
 
We find equally tentative claims for ijmāʿ in the question of political leadership. In 
the works under survey, the Mālikī scholars Ibn Rushd and al-Rajrājī assert consensus 
on the matter. It is also asserted by the Shāfiʿī scholar al-Juwaynī in some of his 
works. The argument given for this claim is very weak, simply that no woman is 
known to have been appointed to a position of political leadership. This is not a case 
of silent consensus, since that requires a positive statement or action to be carried out 
which the other jurists learn about and subsequently refrain from criticising. The mere 
absence of a woman political appointee does not require the jurists to even think on 
the matter, let alone object to it. The most it could indicate is that it is permissible for 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
women to be entirely absent from the high echelons of political authority at a given 
time and place. 
 
In contrast to these assertions, al-Juwaynī’s contemporary al-Māwardī does not make 
a claim of ijmāʿ, though he mentions the prohibition of women’s political leadership 
in al-Ḥawī al-Kabīr as well as in al-Aḥkām al-Sūlṭaniyyah, where he goes so far to 
say that a woman cannot even serve as a junior minister.217 His not suggesting ijmāʿ 
here is telling, since we have seen that al-Māwardī’s approach in al-Ḥawī al-Kabīr is 
to mention everything that he considers to be a possible line of argument or evidence, 
no matter how tentative. 
 
 
D. Judicial Appointments 
 
This issue would not be a candidate for ijmāʿ, partly because of the established Ḥanafī 
position that a woman can give judgements in other than capitol crimes, and partly 
because of the well-known position of al-Ṭabarī allowing a woman to serve as a judge 
in an unlimited capacity. Al-Qarāfī does suggest that a tacit consensus of a practical 
nature can be deduced from the lack of any example in Islamic history of a woman 
being appointed judge. However, since he is framing this argument as a rebuttal of al-
Ṭabarī’s view as well as the Ḥanafī position on the matter, he is clearly not suggesting 
ijmāʿ in the juristic sense that constitutes a binding authority.  
 
Al-ʿAynī suggests there is ijmāʿ that women cannot give judgments on capitol crimes. 
He does not mention al-Ṭabarī’s view, and it is unclear whether he means ijmāʿ in the 
full sense of the word, or merely the consensus of the independent jurists who 
established the schools of law. He granted the latter to al-Zāhidī’s claim of consensus 
regarding prayer while acknowledging al-Ṭabarī’s dissenting view. The former 
possibility is also tenable, since al-ʿAynī misrepresents al-Ṭabarī’s position on prayer 
as being the same as that of the early Ḥanbalīs, so he could likewise misidentify his 
position on a woman being a judge as being the same as the Ḥanafī view. The 
                                                 
217 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb al-Māwardī. al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah. ed. Aḥmad 
Mubārak al-Baghdādī. (Kuwait: Maktabah Dār Ibn Qutaybah, 1989), 36. 
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misidentification of al-Ṭabarī’s opinion is somewhat common in non-Shāfiʿī legal 
works. 
 
Outside the surveyed works, we find the Mālikī exegete Ibn al-ʿArabī in his 
commentary of the Qur’ān, followed by al-Qurṭubī, in his somewhat later and 
lengthier commentary, questions the veracity of the claim that al-Ṭabarī permits a 
woman to serve as a judge, and speculates that al-Ṭabarī might have shared Abū 
Ḥanīfah’s view that a woman can judge only in cases wherein her testimony is 
valid.218 
 
These doubts are as problematic as Zaid Shakir’s doubts concerning al-Ṭabarī’s 
opinion on prayer leadership. Since al-Ṭabarī is affiliated with the Shāfīʿī school of 
law, his legal opinions would be preserved and related by the Shāfiʿī scholars. We can 
see that al-Māwardī not only asserts it is al-Tābarī’s view that a woman can serve as a 
judge in all cases, but he even cites what he claims is al-Ṭabarī’s rationale for it. Since 
the Shāfiʿī jurists have no reservations about asserting this as al-Ṭabarī’s opinion, 
though it is not the opinion they themselves advocate, there is little reason to give 
credence to the suspicions expressed by Mālikī scholars centuries later. 
 
 
E. Summary 
 
In spite of ijmāʿ being a powerful argument when asserted successfully, most of the 
jurists under survey refrain from invoking it. This is sufficient to conclude that the 
rulings pertaining to women’s in various questions of leadership are not matters of 
ijmāʿ, at least not the binding form of consensus conceived in the works of post-
formative legal theory. 
 
 
                                                 
218 Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allah Ibn al-ʿĀrabī, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān. ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajjāwī. 
(Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2001) 3:409, and al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, 
13:165. 
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V. JURISTIC ANALOGY (QIYĀS) 
 
Juristic analogy (qiyās) is most commonly represented in Islamic legal theory as the 
extension of a legal ruling from one case to another case on the basis of a similarity 
that justifies the presence of the ruling in both cases.219 Though the four schools of 
law differ on some matters, a general description of the process can be given. 
 
There are two widely recognised types of qiyās. The first is qiyās al-ʿillah based on 
determining the ruling’s effective cause (ʿillah). This is the most common and widely-
accepted form of qiyās. It has four elements: an original case, its original ruling, the 
new case, and the effective cause, which is legal rationale for the extention of the 
ruling to the new case. The effective cause should be a meaning that is appropriate for 
the presence of the ruling to the original case. When this same meaning is found in a 
new case whose ruling is unknown, the ruling can be applied to it due to the shared 
presence of the effective cause. 
 
The standard example for this is wine, which is prohibited by the Qur’an. The 
effective cause for this prohibition is intoxication. This ruling is extended by way of 
qiyās to other intoxicating substances, which are the new cases. In this way, the ruling 
established by the text of the Qur’an can be applied to many cases the Qur’an does not 
directly address. 
 
Determining the effective cause is regarded as the most difficult and uncertain part of 
the process. When the sacred texts do not specify the rationale for the ruling in the 
original case, it needs to be determined by exercise of juristic discretion. Such 
approaches are referred to as extracting the point on which the ruling is hinged 
                                                 
219 Al-Ghāzālī defines qiyās as: “Applying one known matter to another by establishing or negating a 
ruling for them both by way of something that brings them together through the assertion or negation of 
a ruling or attribute… and every qiyās  must have a new case, an original case, a n effective cause and a 
ruling.” al-Mustaṣfā, 2:96. Al-Qarāfī defines qiyās as: “Establishing a ruling like that [which exists] for 
one known matter in another known matter due to their resembling each other in the effective cause of 
the ruling according to the opinion of the one who engages in it.” Shārḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 357. Ibn 
Qudāmah defines it as: “Applying to a new case the ruling of an original case due to something that 
brings them together.” Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 3:797. Al-Sarakhsī describes it as: “…exercising opinion to 
analogize from original cases whose rulings are known by textual evidence to extend the textual ruling 
to new cases.” Uṣūl, 2:118. 
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(takhrīj al-manāṭ).220 Sometimes the effective cause can be identified from the textual 
evidence through a process of elimination to isolate the factor that, due to its 
appropriateness for the ruling, must be the effective cause. This is called clarifying the 
point on which the ruling is hinged (tanqīḥ al-manāṭ).221 Then there is the method 
called anaysis and partition (al-sabr wa al-taqsīm),222 where the jurists first determine 
through induction all the possible candidates they can identify for the effective cause 
and then systematically eliminate them one by one until they are left with only the 
strongest possibility.223 It is a contentious, uncertain process, because if one 
possibility is left out, that unthought-of candidate may very well be the true effective 
cause.224 
 
Once the effective cause is identified, the final task is to examine the new case to see 
if the meaning is present there as well. This is called verifying the point on which the 
ruling is hinged (taḥqīq al-manāṭ).225 The strongest analogies are where the meaning 
determined to be the effective cause is more prevalent in the new case than in the 
original. This is referred to as an analogy of greater appropriateness (qiyās al-awlā). 
 
The second widely recognised form of qiyās is an analogy of resemblance (qiyās al-
shabah). This is generally understood as being where the new case is compared to 
other existing cases to determine which of these it most closely resembles.226 The 
ruling of that original case is then applied to the new case. This is what jurists must 
                                                 
220 al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 2:98-99 and Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 3:805. 
221 The example usually cited for this is the ḥadīth where a desert dweller came to the Prophet 
confessing that he had sexual intercourse with his wife during the day while fasting  in Ramaḍān and 
was told how to expiate for it.  Factors that are eliminated as having no effect on the ruling  include the 
ethnicity of the perpetrator and the fact that the he was married to the woman he had intercourse with. 
See: al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 2:98 and Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 3:803-804. 
222 Al-Ghazālī identifies this with the conditional disjunctive syllogism (qiyās al-sharṭī al-munfaṣil) in 
formal logic. al-Mustaṣfā, 1:48. 
223 The candidate effective causes are usually eliminated by showing that the ruling persists in their 
absence or conversely, that the ruling is sometimes absent in their presence. See: al-Ghazālī, al-
Mustaṣfā, 2:135. 
224 Al-Juwaynī explains that this method can only provide certain knowledge if the choice is between 
negating or asserting a single meaning. Otherwise, it provides at best speculative (ẓannī) knowledge. 
al-Burhān, 2:535-536. Ibn al-Humām argues that Ḥanafī legal theory should reject this method, though 
he concedes that al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Marghīnānī accept it. He concludes that the method’s legitimacy is an 
enduring pint of disagreement within the Ḥanafī school. al-Taḥrīr, 468. 
225 al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 2:97 and Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 3:801. 
226 See: al-Juwaynī, al-Waraqāt, 10. Ibn Qudāmah qives this definition in Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 3:868, and 
then gives an  alternate definition of “bringing together the original case and the new case by way of an 
attribute that [merely] implies it contains some wisdom for the ruling that brings benefit or repels 
harm.” According to this definition, the appropriateness of the effective cause for the ruling is merely 
suspected, as opposed to qiyās al-ʿīllah where the appropriateness for the ruling is obvious.   
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resort to when they are unable to determine the effective cause by way of textual 
evidence, ijmāʿ, or identifying an appropriate factor.227   
 
Regardless of the form it takes, the purpose of qiyās is to reveal the intended scope of 
a ruling that is established by the Qur’an, the Sunnah, or ijmāʿ.  Its function is merely 
to extend the ruling established by that evidence to new cases. For the Ḥanbalī school, 
the scope of qiyās is further restricted by the greater range of textual evidence the 
school recognises.  Mursal ḥadīth, the reports of weak narrators, and the legal rulings 
of the Companions are all given priority to qiyās, which is looked upon as a method 
of last resort, when there is no admissible textual evidence that can directly address 
the question at hand.  
 
By contrast, qiyās enjoys a strength in Mālīkī law above that of isolated individual-
narrator ḥadīth.228 Likewise, since Mālikī jurists regard the generality of textual 
statements to be conjectural, the results of analogical reasoning can easily specify the 
meaning of general statements of the Qur’an.229 Furthermore, Abd-Allah argues that 
when Mālik himself engaged in qiyās, he did so primarily on the basis of established 
legal axioms, rather than particular rulings established by textual evidence. These 
axioms were derived through inductive reasoning from many individual instances of 
law. He claims that this remained the case for Mālikī law in practice, in spite of the 
formulation of post-formative legal theory which represented the process differently, 
                                                 
227 Al-Ghazālī defines qiyās al-shabah as: “Bringing together the new case and the original case on the 
basis of a quality while admitting that the quality is not the ruling’s effective cause.” al-Ghazālī, al-
Mustaṣfā, 2:142-143. He also states that it is a weaker form of evidence than qiyās al-ʿillah. See: al-
Mustaṣfā, 2:145. 
228 Refer to al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 361. He says: “The argument for giving preference to 
qiyās is that it concords with general axioms with respect to how it entails securing benefits and 
warding off harms, whereas the [individual-narrator] report that disagrees with it prevents this from 
being the case. Therefore, that which concords with the general axioms is given precedence over that 
which disagrees with them.”  He also says: “The texts that form the basis for the qiyās are other than 
the text that the qiyās is given precedence over, so no contradiction ensues where derivative evidence is 
given precedence  over its source, because [the contrary single-narrator ḥadīth] is not its source.” 
229 Al-Qarāfī explains: “Qiyās is legal evidence, and so is the generality [of a text]. In the event they 
contradict one another, if they are both applied, two contradictories are brought together, and if both 
are neglected, the two contradictories are negated. If the general statement is given precedence over the 
specific evidence, this is impossible, because its evidentiary strength over the specific case is weaker 
than the evidentiary strength of the specific evidence, since a [general statement] can be made without 
intending the specific case, while that which is specific cannot be applied without intending its specific 
case, and that which is weaker is not given precedence over that which is stronger.” al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ 
Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 189. 
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so that most instances of qiyās found in Mālikī legal works are actually based on 
general axioms and not specific legal rulings.230  
 
 
A. Comparing Judicial Authority to Political Leadership 
 
This analogy makes an appearance in works of the three schools of law that prohibit 
women from being judges. It appears in the Mālikī works Manāhij al-Taḥṣīl, Bidāyah 
al-Mujtahid, and al-Dhakhīrah. It is also cited by al-Māwardī in al-Hāwī al-Kabīr for 
the Shāfiʿī school, and by Ibn al-Qudāmah in al-Mughnī for the Ḥanbalī school, 
which are the earliest Shāfīʿī and Ḥanbalī works in the survey. It then disappears from 
the surveyed works. 
 
This qiyās is obvious enough. The ruling of being a judge is compared to that of being 
head of state because of the authority being exercised in both cases. Al-Rajrājī makes 
this connection explicit. He cites the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as the evidence for the 
original ruling, and then explains how the ruling is extended to being a judge because 
of the need to render judgments in both cases. Al-Māwardī explains its 
appropriateness as being due to the “deficiency of being female.” 
 
What is interesting, then, is that this qiyās is not taken up by any of the later texts of 
the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī schools, and ceases to be mentioned by the Mālikī school after 
al-Qarāfī.  The reason for this seems to be a desire to cite the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as 
direct evidence to prohibit women from being judges. The ḥadīth is used this way by 
both al-Māwardī and Ibn al-Qudāmah as primary evidence. They only mention the 
qiyās much later on in their discussions as an extra piece of evidence. This exact 
pattern is exhibited by al-Qarāfī, the last Mālikī scholar to suggest this qiyās.  
 
This presents a problem. The ḥadīth addresses political leadership. Consequently, if it 
is to be direct evidence against women being judges, it must first be direct evidence to 
prohibit political leadership. The argument from qiyās becomes redundant, because 
the same textual evidence is used to establish both the original and derived rulings. 
                                                 
230 Abd-Allah, “Malik’s Concept”, 124. 
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Jurist have to decide whether they want to apply the ḥadīth to both situations directly, 
or to use is to prohibit political leadership first and then extend the ruling to judicial 
authority by way of qiyās. They cannot have it both ways.231 If the original ruling in 
the analogy had a different argument as its basis, then the qiyās could at least be seen 
as supporting evidence, reinforcing the ruling derived from the ḥadīth. However, later 
jurists in all three schools of law are consistent in citing the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah to 
prohibit women from assuming political power as well as to prohibit them from being 
judges.232 Their doing so explains the disappearance of the qiyās from their works. 
 
The presence of this qiyās in the earlier works reveals the logic behind how jurists use 
Abū Bakrah’s ḥadīth for judicial questions. The responsibilities of a head of state and 
those of being a judge are different, so how are the jurists linking the rulings together 
in their minds? This qiyās, as explained by al-Rajrājī and al-Māwardī, shows that they 
perceive the woman to have an innate deficiency which prevents her from exercising 
proper judgment and disqualifies her from being a political leader or a judge. This is 
how they understand Abū Bakrah’s ḥadīth to apply to judicial authority, whether they 
use qiyās to extend the ruling to judges or apply the ḥadīth directly to the question. 
 
 
B. Comparing Judicial Authority to Prayer 
 
There are two isolated examples of this type of analogy in the surveyed works, both 
cited by the Mālikī jurist al-Qarāfī. The first is with reference to where a woman 
stands in prayer.  The second refers to the ḥadīth about clapping for women. 
 
In the first example, the original ruling is the prohibition of women standing with 
men in prayer, which al-Qarāfī compares to the question of women serving as judges. 
He mentions this analogy immediately after quoting “Send them to the back...” which 
he claims demonstrates “the utmost deficiency” of women. Al-Qarāfī is probably 
relying on this tradition as the textual basis for the original ruling. The effective cause 
                                                 
231 Al-Āmidī writes in al-Iḥkām 1:199: “The evidence indicating the ruling of the original case must not 
also indicate the ruling in the new case. Otherwise, there is no point in designating one of them as the 
original case and the other one as the new case, or the other way around.” 
232 Al-Māwardī does so as well. He does not address political leadership as a separate issue in al-Ḥāwī 
al-Kabīr. However, he discusses it in al-Aḥkām al-Ṣulṭāniyyah and cites the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as 
his sole textual evidence to prohibit women from assuming political leadership.  
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for the qiyās is the temptation that women pose for men.233 He claims that the 
prohibition involved is more appropriate for the courtroom than for prayer, since the 
risk of temptation is worse. However, when we turn to his separate discussion on 
prayer, we find him citing “Send them to the back...” again, but limiting his argument 
to the idea that the need to send her back prevents sending her to the front of the 
congregation to lead prayer. This implies a rationale based on formal ritual 
requirements that is not applicable to prohibiting her from being a judge. The rulings 
are incongruous and the analogy seems forced.  
 
The Shāfīʿī jurist al-Māwardī is possibly making the same analogy when he cites 
“Send them to the back...” in his discussion on judicial authority; however he simply 
tosses the alleged ḥadīth out there without any explanation. Since the text is 
apparently about where a woman is supposed to stand in prayer, it can be assumed he 
is implying some sort of qiyās is operating here, but we cannot be sure. This is 
another example of al-Māwardī’s strategy of suggesting all potential lines of 
evidence, no matter how unlikely. 
 
It could be that the analogy both jurists draw from “Send them to the back...” is based 
on a broader idea of women’s subordination. In the Ḥanafī discussions about women 
leading prayer, we find al-Bābirtī and al-ʿAynī quoting Abū Zayd where he says that 
some scholars understand the phrase “whence God has sent them to the back” to 
express the effective cause of the command, and they understand this cause to be that 
God has sent women backwards “in giving testimony, how much they inherit, 
political leadership, and every other matter entailing authority.”  These are Ḥanafī 
jurists, and they are not endorsing this interpretation, but simply mentioning it. It may 
not accurately represent al-Qarāfī’s and al-Māwardī’s use of it here. However, it does 
seem to accord well with al-Qarāfī’s assertion that it represents “the utmost 
deficiency” of women. Also, al-Māwardī enters into a discussion about “the 
deficiency of being female” immediately after citing “Send them to the back...” 
 
In the second example of a qiyās comparing judicial authority to prayer, al-Qarāfī 
argues that a woman cannot be judge because she must speak in the presence of men, 
                                                 
233 The deeper implications of this will be explored in the next chapter on gender perceptions. 
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and that it is prohibited in the same way that her saying “Glory be to God” is 
forbidden when she notices the imam make a mistake in prayer. For this purpose, he 
cites the ḥadīth “If one of you finds [a mistake] in someone’s prayer, he should say 
‘Glory be to God’. Saying ‘Glory be to God’ is for men and clapping hands is for 
women.”234 This requires that two things are understood from the ḥadīth: first, that the 
rationale of the ḥadīth is based on the woman’s voice being shameful; and second, 
that the ḥadīth directly prohibits her from saying “Glory be to God” out loud in 
prayer. Then, by way of analogy, he can apply this ruling of prohibition to the 
question of her being a judge, where she would also have to use her voice in public.  
 
As to the first point, it is unclear from the ḥadīth why clapping is prescribed for 
women. There could be many reasons ventured for it. It does not itself constitute 
evidence that a woman’s voice is shameful. Rather, al-Qarāfī explains the ḥadīth in 
this way because the Mālikī school of law already accepts that a woman’s voice is 
shameful.235 It could be argued that this general precept, and not the ḥadīth itself, is 
what is operating in the qiyās. 
 
However, it is not the Mālikī position to prohibit women from saying “Glory be to 
God” upon noticing a mistake from the imām. Instead, women are also supposed to 
glorify God.236 Al-Qarāfī states this ruling explicitly while discussing the conditions 
of prayer:237 
                                                 
234 This ḥadīth is authentic by the standards of all the jurists. Versions of it are found in Ṣaḥīḥ al-
Bukhārī from Abū Hurayrah and Sahl b. Saʿd (1203, 1204) and in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim from Abū Hurayrah 
(422). The wording cited by al-Qarāfī is found in the narration of Sahl b. Saʿd as narrated in Musnad 
Aḥmad (22863). 
235 Al-Qarāfī says, when defining what the shameful areas are for men and women: “The woman is 
shameful, because transgressions against faith and honour are expected from seeing her or hearing her 
speak. This being shameful does not mean anything ugly, for indeed the woman is beautiful, and 
people’s desires are drawn to her.” al-Qarāfī, Aḥmad b. Idrīs, al-Dhakhīrah. (Tunis: Dār al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 2008) 2:101.   
236 Ibn al-Qāsim says in al-Mudawwanah: “Mālik considered the opinion that women should clap to be 
a weak one, saying: ‘The ḥadīth of clapping has come to us, but  so has what indicates its weakness, 
which is [the Prophet’s] saying: If one of you finds [a mistake] in someone’s prayer, he should say 
‘Glory be to God’.’ He [Mālik] was of the view that saying ‘Glory be to God’ was for men and women 
alike.” Ibn Qāsim, ʿAbd al-Rahmān. al-Mudawwanah al-Kubrā. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, no 
date) , 1:163. Refer also to Mukhtaṣar Khalīl: “Saying ‘Glory be to God’ is for men and women when 
necessary, and they [women] do not clap.” ʿUlaysh explains in his commentary on Khalīl that the 
Prophet’s attribution of clapping to women “is to belittle [the practice of clapping], not to give them 
permission to do so. This is proven by their not acting upon it.” ʿUlaysh, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. Minaḥ 
al-Jalīl Sharḥ ʿalā Mukhtaṣar al-ʿAllāmah al-Khalīl. ed. ʿAbd al-Jalīl ʿAbd al-Salām. (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2003), 1:208. 
237 al-Qarāfī, al-Dhakhīrah, 2:146. 
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Al-Shāfiʿī prefers [a woman] to clap, because of what is related in the two 
Ṣaḥīḥs that [the Prophet] said: “Saying ‘Glory be to God’ is for men and 
clapping hands is for women.” This is at variance with actual practice. Also, it is 
problematic in meaning, since glorifying God is appropriate for prayer while 
clapping is not. 
 
It is not possible for any analogy to be made on either a text or a ruling that the school 
does not recognize or uphold in the first place. It is quite strange that al-Qarāfī brings 
up this argument. It should now have become clear that al-Qarāfī’s approach to 
presenting evidence in al-Dhakhīrah is similar to al-Māwardī’s approach in al-Ḥāwī. 
 
Al-Qarāfī is explicitly representing the matter as an analogy of greater 
appropriateness (qiyās awlā). This is problematic. A women can clap to call attention 
to a mistake in prayer, so there is no need for them to say “Glory be to God”. This is 
in stark contrast to a courtroom where there is always a need for women to stand 
forward and speak, since women have to give testimony, bring grievances and defend 
themselves. The differences between the two circumstances makes this qiyās not only 
superfluous, but unwieldy, not to mention directly opposed to the Mālikī school’s 
ruling that a woman says “Glory be to God” in prayer, a ruling which al-Qarrāfi 
himself affirms.  
 
What is more surprising in al-Qarāfī suggesting these two examples of qiyās is that he 
flatly rejects the possibility of qiyās between supreme political leadership and prayer 
in his magnum opus on legal theory,  Nafā’is al-Uṣūl, where he writes:238  
 
What does prayer have to do with political leadership? Indeed, there are heavy 
conditions imposed on political leadership that are not imposed on prayer 
leadership, and it is a matter of consensus (ijmāʿ) that qiyās is false whenever 
there are differences. 
 
                                                 
238 Aḥmad b. Idrīs Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, Nafā’is al-Uṣūl fī Sharḥ al-Maḥṣūl. ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd 
al-Qādir ʿAṭā. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2000), 3:441. 
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Here, al-Qarāfī is stating that there are unbridgeable differences between the nature of 
prayer leadership and political leadership, differences of such a degree that it becomes 
a matter of consensus that qiyās becomes inoperable between the two. This would 
apply just as well to qiyās between judicial authority and prayer leadership, since, as 
we have seen, al-Qarāfī makes a direct comparison between political leadership and 
judicial authority. This would make his attempt at qiyās here contradictory to his 
professed legal theory. One might argue that al-Qarāfī is only disagreeing with the 
possibility of a positive qiyās of political authority on prayer and not a negative one, 
since he says that the head of state has heavier conditions imposed upon him, and 
since the context of his statement is to refute the claim that Abū Bakr’s appointment 
as Caliph was indicated by his having been appointed to lead prayer. However, al-
Qarāfī’s initial rhetorical question and his final mention of “differences” would rule 
out a qiyās in either direction. 
 
 
C. Comparing Women to Sinners 
 
This is also a case of comparing judicial authority to prayer, but it is more 
circumspect. In a complex manoeuvre, al-Māwardi first makes a negative comparison  
between the ruling of women leading prayer and that of sinners leading prayer. He 
argues that women are worse off, since (male) sinners can lead prayers but women 
cannot. He attributes the disparity between them to “the deficiency of being female”. 
It is implicit in the argument that the effective cause is deficiency in both cases – 
being a female and being a sinner – but the deficiency of being female is more severe. 
We can safely assume this because what al-Māwardī is ultimately getting at is a qiyās 
awlā, which appears in the next phase of his argument. He begins this second phase 
by asserting that sinners cannot be judges, presumably for the deficiency in their 
character, and then argues that this ruling is “more appropriate” for women, which 
means that the effective cause is more apparent in the derived ruling. 
 
As a two-tiered qiyās, this reasoning is contrary to the way qiyās is supposed to be 
performed, which for Shāfiʿī scholars is clearly to take a ruling derived from a text for 
one situation and apply it to another situation by way of a shared effective cause. Here 
the presumed effective cause does not bring about the same ruling between women 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
and sinners in prayer, which violates the principle that sharing the effective cause is 
the basis for extending the ruling. He then tries to assert that this shared effective 
cause is the same for deriving a ruling about being a judge, but that since here it 
brings about a prohibition for sinners as well, it applies all the more forcefully to 
women. This qiyās collapses onto itself, since clearly the effective cause in prayer 
cannot be presumed to be the same for women and sinners, given that different rulings 
were produced.  
 
This problem becomes clearer when we refer to al-Māwardī’s discussion in al-Ḥāwī 
about appointing a sinner as a judge. There, he takes a completely different stance. He 
explains that the reason why a sinner cannot be a judge is because it violates the 
condition of being just and upright (ʿadālah), which is required for positions of 
authority and for giving testimony.239 He then defines this quality as entailing upright 
conduct, aloofness from licentious behaviour, honesty, and integrity. In other words, 
the person must be trustworthy in order to carry out these duties. This effective cause 
for prohibiting a sinner from judicial authority – a lack of ʿadālah – is not to be found 
in being a woman, since al-Māwardī accepts that a woman is capable of being a 
witness in certain circumstances if she possesses the quality of being just.240  
 
Furthermore, al-Māwardī demonstrates that the need for a judge to be incorruptible 
and trustworthy explains why a sinner can lead prayer but cannot be a judge. He says: 
“His leading prayer is permitted, because it relates to a matter wherein [people have a] 
choice, and there is no binding necessity.”241 Basically, people have a choice whether 
to follow the sinner in prayer; whereas in a court of law, the people would be legally 
bound by the sinful judge’s verdicts, and would therefore be subjected to injustice. 
Since a woman leading prayer would also be a matter of choice for the followers, the 
effective cause for prohibiting a woman from leading prayer must be something else, 
something which might not necessarily be transferrable to the question of being a 
judge. 
 
                                                 
239 al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 20:168. 
240 This is presented in detail by al-Māwardī in al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr , 21:5-40. 
241 al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 20:169. 
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Admittedly, al-Māwardi could have presented his argument as a straightforward qiyās 
of women judges on sinful judges without even bringing up prayer, but then the 
implications of his doing so would have be starker: that being a woman is worse than 
committing sin. This assertion would bring him in direct contradiction with essential 
theological principles, let alone legal ones like her competence to give testimony. He 
tries to avoid this by directing attention to the ruling on prayer first, but his insistence 
on arguing for a qiyās awlā makes his underlying legal reasoning unavoidably clear. 
 
 
D. Comparing a Woman Judge to a Blind Judge 
 
Al-Māwardī compares a woman to a blind man to argue that judging in prescribed 
punishments is no different than judging in other cases. He is trying to refute the 
Ḥanafī position which differentiates between various types of cases, allowing women 
to preside over some but not others. Al-Māwardī is trying to oblige the Ḥanafīs to 
accept that it is impossible to make such a distinction. He brings up the example of a 
blind man, whose judgments are not enforceable in any type of case. This is a qiyās 
on the basis of a lack of substantive difference. In other words, he is arguing that there 
is no difference between a blind man and a woman that would bear on their aptitude 
to carry out the judge’s duties.  
 
Ḥanafīs could easily answer this by asserting that the reason a blind man’s verdict 
cannot be accepted is that he is unable to see the litigants. Indeed, al-Māwardī cites 
this very reason in al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr when he says a blind man cannot be a judge: 
“because he cannot distinguish between the plaintiff (ṭālib) and defendant 
(maṭlūb).”242 Ironically, the terminology al-Māwardī uses here is specific to civil 
litigation, which justifies why Ḥanafī scholars would bar a blind man from presiding 
over civil cases as well as criminal ones. Since the problem of distinguishing the 
plaintiff and defendant is not present in being a woman, the effective cause is absent 
and the qiyās fails. Therefore, al-Māwardī cannot use this qiyās to prove his assertion 
that “where someone’s judgement is not carried out in prescribed punishments, his 
judgement is also not carried out in other cases”. 
                                                 
242 al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 20:166. 
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E. Comparing a Woman Judge to a Slave 
 
This is suggested by Ibn Rushd as evidence for those who prohibit women from being 
judges. As is typically the case for him where the Mālikī school of law agree with 
other schools in the ruling, he does not specific which school of law the argument 
comes from, but we can assume that he finds the line of reasoning agreeable at least to 
Mālikī jurists. He identifies the effective cause of the ruling as the deficiency of the 
ḥurmah that exists in both cases. Ibn Rushd does not elaborate further. The most 
likely interpretation of this word would be “reverence” or “respect”. In this case, the 
argument would have to be that the woman, like a slave, does not command the 
respect required for her to carry out the duties of a judge. Another possibility, though 
less likely, would be that it refers to a deficiency in autonomy. In this case, a woman 
is being compared to a slave in that both have other masters, so to speak, which would 
impair the judge’s ability to pass impartial judgments. In this case, it would have to be 
understood with reference to the position of the father or other male guardian for a 
single woman or the husband for a married woman. The first possibility is the more 
likely interpretation, though in both cases, it is really the perception of a woman’s 
status in society that is being used as the effective cause.   
 
 
F. Comparing Judicial Authority to Testimony  
 
Now we turn to analogies used to permit women to serve as judges. The comparison 
between judging and giving testimony is the primary Ḥanafī argument in favour of 
this ruling.243 
 
The crux of the Ḥanafī argument is authority, and their qiyās is very much dependent 
on how they conceive of authority. They argue that giving testimony entails the 
exercise of authority, and it is on the strength of the woman’s authority that her 
                                                 
243 This qiyās is also cited in the surveyed works by the Mālikī scholar al-Ḥaṭṭāb, but not to advocate 
the ruling itself. He uses it to speculate on the nature of Ibn al-Qāsim’s opinion. Ibn al-Qāsim was an 
early Mālikī scholar who may have held the view that women can be appointed judges categorically. 
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testimony is accepted in court. This authority derives necessarily from her legal 
capacity. Therefore, the same legal capacity that allows her to give testimony would 
permit her to exercise the authority to be a judge, provided she has sufficient 
knowledge. 
 
The scholars of the other schools of thought do not conceive of authority in the same 
way. By contrast, they regard the lack of authority in women to be the basis for 
prohibiting them from all positions requiring the exercise of authority. They take 
pains to argue how giving testimony is either of a much lower level of authority, or 
that it does not constitute the exercise of authority at all. 
 
Al-Qarāfī agues the former. He acknowledges that being a witness entails an exercise 
of authority, but of a lower level. He attempts to demonstrate this by appealing to the 
question of her being a political leader. Since a just woman can be a witness and not a 
political leader, though a just man can be both, this establishes that the exercise of 
authority involved in being a witness is of a lower level. He also takes pains to argue 
that Umm Sulaym’s appointment to supervise the markets is a case of “policing” and 
not like being a judge. Al-Qarāfī’s argument by counter-analogy can easily be turned 
against him using the very same logic. It could be argued that being a political leader 
entails much greater authority than being a judge, so the two are not comparable. 
Further, it could be argued that arbitrating justice in the marketplace is closer in its 
exercise of authority to being a judge than it is to being head of state. Here, the 
argument breaks down into a purely subjective opinion as to how much authority is 
too much. 
 
This reasoning is also implicit in Ibn Qudāmah’s argument that being male is part of 
what provides full legal capacity. This implies that a woman’s legal capacity is at best 
partial, so the legal authority she can exercise would be of a lesser degree. It seems 
that his declarations of the intellectual deficiency of women a little later on may be to 
some extent an explanation as to why only men have full legal capacity. 
 
Ibn al-Humām takes it upon himself to answer this particular point. He first concedes 
woman’s intellectual deficiency, but then argues that it is “relative and relational”  
and therefore cannot negate a woman’s authority, since some women can have 
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superior intellectual abilities, even surpassing those of men. He also points out that 
giving testimony and managing trusts and legacies both entail the exercise of 
authority where intellectual ability is needed, but women can engage in these 
practices. 
 
Al-Māwardī takes a different approach to refuting the Ḥanafī position. He does not 
compare the level of authority between the two matters, but denies that giving 
testimony entails the exercise of authority at all. He does not explain why this is the 
case. It would appear from how he uses the word authority (wilāyah), that he 
understands it to require a formal appointment, which being called as a witness does 
not entail. This argument has strength. It identifies a material difference between the 
original ruling and the derived ruling in a way that negates the existing of a unified 
effective cause. However, it would be possible for the Ḥanafīs to counter this 
argument by pointing out that a witness is summoned to appear in court and the 
witness’s testimony can lead to a binding decision which the judge has to uphold. 
 
Most of the surveyed Mālikī, Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī works do not try to rationalize how 
the authority present in giving verdicts is different from that of being a judge. They 
simply dismiss the Ḥanafī qiyās as contradicting the textual evidence of Abū Bakrah’s 
ḥadīth. However, this is not sufficient to negate the Ḥanafī qiyās, which first identifies 
a case they all agree is not prohibited by the ḥadīth, and then argues that being a judge 
is comparable to that case. 
 
 
G. Comparing Judicial Decisions to Issuing Legal Edicts 
 
Al-Māwardi identifies this analogy as al-Ṭabarī’s rationale for allowing women to be 
judges in all cases. Ibn Qudamah does so as well. Its attribution to al-Ṭabarī has more 
authority coming from al-Māwardī, a Shāfi`ī, as discussed in the previous section on 
consensus. This analogy is also mentioned by al-Qarāfī without attributing it to 
anyone. 
 
Though we do not have an elaboration on this qiyās in these sources, it is clear that 
the resultant ruling would be broader in scope than that of the Ḥanafī qiyās on giving 
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testimony.  All four schools of law agree that a woman’s capacity to issue legal edicts 
is not restricted to any particular branches of law. She can express her opinions on any 
subject that she has the requisite knowledge to address. If her authority to be a judge 
is derived from a comparison to her authority to issue legal edicts, then that authority 
would indeed be unrestricted. 
 
Al-Qarāfī argues against this qiyās by positing that knowing about something does not 
give a person the ability to assume a leadership role in that matter. He cites prayer as 
an example of this. He is not making a counter-analogy on prayer here. Rather, he is 
arguing that issuing legal edicts is wholly dependent on having the requisite 
knowledge, and has nothing to do with one’s ability or capacity to exercise authority. 
 
Al-Māwardī provides the same argument that he uses to refute the Ḥanafī qiyās on 
testimony, basically that no exercise of authority is implicated. His argument is much 
stronger here, since legal edicts are generally non-binding upon those who receive 
them. Also, historically, many scholars who issued legal edicts did so on the strength 
of their reputation in the Muslim community and not on the basis of being appointed 
as a muftī by the state.  
 
 
H. Comparing Prayer Leadership to Political Leadership 
 
We have already seen three examples of qiyās which compare being a judge to 
various aspects of prayer in order to disinvest women of judicial authority. In those 
examples, attempts were made to transfer a ruling established for prayer to the 
question of being a judge. The difficulties of making such comparisons were quite 
clear. Now we come to the reverse line of reasoning. Here we have the ruling of 
political leadership being transferred to prayer leadership. 
 
This argument is cited by the Mālikī scholars al-Māzirī and al-Rajrājī, who both 
explicitly assert that they are engaging in qiyās. It can also be seen implicitly in al-
Nafrāwī’s use of the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah to prohibit prayer leadership. Al-Māzirī 
attributes this qiyās to earlier Mālikī scholars. The original ruling is the prohibition of 
a woman assuming political leadership which al-Rajrājī claims is based on ijmāʿ. Al-
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Rajrājī identifies the effective cause as the woman being undeserving of “a position of 
honour and a lofty station” due to her deficiency as a human being. He is therefore 
asserting that both political leadership and prayer leadership share in being lofty 
positions that require someone who is “complete in religion and essence.”  He cites 
the ḥadīth about women being deficient in intellect and religion as proof for the 
effective cause, not as proof for the ruling itself, so he avoids committing the violation 
of using this text as direct evidence for the original and derivative rulings. Al-Māzirī 
seems to be saying the same thing, as evidenced by his first rejecting a positive 
comparison between a woman and a slave because “the deficiency of being female is 
more certain and more severe”, and then paraphrasing the ḥadīth.  
 
The problem here is that the ḥadīth does not provide full proof for the effective cause. 
They may be able to use it to argue for a woman’s deficiency and ineligibility to 
assume a “lofty station”, but it is unclear how the station of prayer is comparable to 
that of political authority in the nature of its loftiness and honour to warrant such a 
comparison. Perhaps, al-Rajrājī is trying to resolve this problem by invoking the 
“principle that everyone who is characterized by deficiency and lowliness has no 
share in positions of high status”, and making it a qiyās on a general precept. Yet, it 
still remains for him to assert how these two positions can be compared in the first 
place. 
 
Al-Rajrājī then cites the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as a separate piece of evidence to 
prohibit prayer leadership. His use of this ḥadīth tells us that the similarity between 
the two leadership positions, at least for him, has to do with the exercise of authority 
in both cases. This leaves the question unanswered as to how he understands the 
spiritual authority in leading prayer to be comparable to the political responsibilities 
of a head of state, so that the woman’s deficiency to assume political authority can be 
transferred to prayer leadership where the responsibilities are quite different both in 
nature and scale. This is precisely the issue al-Qarāfī was objecting two when he 
made the statement quoted above.244 It is telling that al-Qarāfī does not follow them in 
                                                 
244 This is his statement in Nafā’is al-Uṣūl, 3:441: “What does prayer have to do with political 
leadership? Indeed, there are heavy conditions imposed on political leadership that are not imposed on 
prayer leadership, and it is a matter of consensus (ijmāʿ) that qiyās is false whenever there are 
differences.” 
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suggesting this qiyās, and somewhat ironic that he attempts virtually the opposite by 
applying the ruling of prayer to that of being a judge.  
 
The later Mālikī jurist al-Nafrāwī also refers the matter back to the general precept. 
He quotes the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah, then says: “This is the case even if men are 
absent, since leadership in prayer is a position of honour in religion and in the rites of 
the Muslims.” This makes it clear how the qiyās cited above is operating on general 
precepts, since this is the only way that al-Nafrāwī can enlist Abū Bakrah’s ḥadīth for 
prayer leadership. Of course, this reasoning only holds if women are presumed 
categorically and universally unworthy of “positions of honour”. 
 
 
I. Comparing Clapping vs. Speaking to Leading Prayer 
 
Al-Māwardī argues that the woman is a shameful being, and the reason why clapping 
was prescribed for her was to avoid her voice tempting men, and that this applies to 
her leading prayers as well. Casting this as an analogy presents a lot of difficulties. 
The first of these regards the original ruling of clapping. In Shāfiʿī Law, as al-
Māwardī states elsewhere in al-Ḥāwī, it is permissible for women to say “Glory be to 
God” instead of clapping, just like it is permissible for men to clap. It does not nullify 
their prayers and does not require a prostration of forgetfulness. 245 It is just a Sunnah 
for them to do the specified act. The logic behind this is given by al-Shirāzī in al-
Muhadhdhdab that these two acts are prescribed when the imām makes a mistake and 
so both fall under what is commanded in that circumstance.246 Therefore, it is not 
possible to take a ruling of doing what is less than preferred, which is weaker even 
than a ruling of dislike, and derive for something else a ruling of prohibition. 
However, al-Māwardī seems to be saying that identical rulings are in operation in 
both cases when he asserts: “The same applies to following her in prayer.” 
 
                                                 
245 al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 2:164. He also says after enumerating the various ways in which a 
woman’s prayer is different from a man’s prayer: “If she violates these forms and follows what is for 
men, she is doing wrong, but her prayer is valid. As for what nullifies the prayer or requires a 
prostration of forgetfulness, they are the same for men and women, with no difference between them in 
any of these matters.” al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 2:163 
246 al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, 5:130-132.  
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Turning to the effective cause, al-Māwardī’s identifies it as the woman being 
shameful in her entirety. This is problematic for a couple of reasons. First, it is not the 
Shāfiʿī position that a woman in her entirety, including her voice, is shameful. Al-
Māwardī himself defends the Shafī`ī position that the woman’s whole body is not 
shameful, but that her face and hands can be shown, both in prayer247, and in the 
presence of men.248 He clearly states that the woman’s maximum shameful area (al-
ʿawrah al-kubrā) is what must be concealed in prayer and in the presence of unrelated 
men, and this maximum area is the body apart from the hands and face.249  
 
Even assuming the ḥadīth’s legal significance is exactly as al-Māwardī presents it, 
with a ruling of prohibition and the woman’s voice being shameful, the successful 
application of this juristic analogy would result in contradicting two other rulings in 
Shāfiʿī Law. The first is that of women leading other women in prayer. There is 
nothing in the ḥadīth to indicate that the ruling of clapping instead of speaking applies 
only when the women are praying in a congregation with men. The ruling is taken as 
being general for all prayers, whether men are present or not.250 Consequently, when 
the prohibition is carried over to prayer leadership, it follows that it would be 
prohibited for women to lead all prayers. It would not possible to assert that the 
original ruling is general for all prayers and then argue that since the effective cause is 
the woman’s voice being shameful, the analogy only applies to woman leading men in 
mixed congregations. This would violate a condition of a valid analogy, which is that 
the effective cause must result in the same ruling in both cases. Here the original 
ruling is that women should clap in all prayers, whether men are present or not, but 
the effective cause is used to prohibit women only from leading men in prayer. 
 
Even if it were to be granted that the original ruling only prohibits a woman to say 
“Glory be to God” when men are present,251 and does not apply to congregations of 
women, it would still contradict another ruling in Shāfiʿī Law, which is that the 
                                                 
247 al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 2:167. See also: ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī, Nihāyah al-Maṭlab fī 
Dirāyah al-Madhhab. ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Maḥmūd al-Dīb. (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2007), 2:190. 
248 al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 11:39. See also: al-Juwaynī, Nihāyah al-Maṭlab, 12:31. 
249 al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, 2:170. 
250 Aḥmad b. Ḥamzah al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muḥtāj fī Sharḥ al-Minhāj. ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī Bayḍūn. 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2003), 2:48. 
251 This opinion is, in fact, attributed to the Shāfīʿī scholar badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī in Nihāyah al-
Muḥtāj 2:48. 
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woman imām’s prayer is valid while the prayers of the men who follow her are 
invalid. Since the prohibition of saying “Glory be to God” is directed at the women in 
the original ruling, it must be directed at the woman herself in the new ruling and 
require her prayer to be invalid, with the prayer of the followers being invalidated 
only secondarily. This is an unavoidable consequence of this analogy. It cannot 
invalidate their prayers and not hers.  
 
All of these problems explain why this qiyās is not taken up by other Shāfīʿī jurists. It 
can therefore be attributed to al-Māwardī’s approach in al-Ḥawī of mentioning all 
possible lines of evidence for a particular ruling, even if it is incompatible with Shāfiʿi 
legal theory and violates other legal rulings of the school, and even if it contradicts his 
own statements elsewhere in al-Ḥawī. 
 
 
J. Comparing Women to the Insane 
 
The woman is compared to an insane person on the basis that neither can give the call 
to prayer. Consequently, since an insane person cannot lead the prayer, this ruling 
should apply to her as well. This qiyās is an analogy of resemblance (qiyās al-
shabah), and it is first argued by Ibn Qudāmah. He is followed in this by all but one of 
the later Ḥanbalī works in the survey. 
 
Ibn Qudāmah elaborates on the nature of the resemblance in al-Mughnī while 
discussing the call to prayer. He states that an insane person does not have the legal 
capacity to engage in acts of worship. He then says that a woman is not among those 
sanctioned (laysat mimman yushraʿ lahu) to give the call to prayer.252 In this way she 
resembles an insane person with respect to the call for prayer. He does not give any 
reason at this point why the call to prayer is not sanctioned for women. There are, or 
course, many matters that are not sanctioned for the insane, including other aspects of 
worship, commercial dealings, being witnesses and contracting marriages. However, 
we do not find Ibn Qudāmah arguing that where a woman is also restricted in some of 
these matters, she is like an insane person so that other somewhat related rulings 
                                                 
252 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, 3:68. 
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which are applied to an insane person can be applied to her as well. Why, then is he 
arguing this here? 
 
The three later works that reiterate this qiyās in their discussions on prayer leadership 
provide little to help in answering this question.  When we turn to their discussions on 
giving the call to prayer, we find nothing resembling Ibn Qudāmah’s discussion. Ibn 
Mufliḥ in al-Mubdiʿ gives reasons why a woman should not give the call to prayer, 
citing a ḥadīth to that effect and arguing that it entails here raising her voice, but he 
does not provide the comparison with the insane person or hint at any reason why her 
ruling of not giving the call for prayer should be compared to an insane person’s.253 
Al-Bahūtī favours the view that the call for prayer is disliked for women if they do not 
raise their voices and prohibited if they raise them in the presence of male non-
relatives.254 Al-Ruhaybānī also favours the ruling that it is disliked, but argues that 
this is because it is “the occupation of men, and therefore implies their imitating 
men.”255 
 
In spite of their varying arguments and opinions on women calling to prayer, none of 
them bring up the idea advanced by Ibn Qudāmah that she resembles an insane person 
in not having the call to prayer sanctioned for her. Nevertheless, all three of them, 
while discussing prayer leadership, repeat Ibn Qudāmah’s statement almost verbatim, 
that she should not lead prayer due to her resemblance to the insane man in this way. 
It seems they are merely reiterating the qiyās argument of their predecessor without 
subscribing to the rationale behind it. 
 
It is interesting that al-Zarkashī does not cite this qiyās, though he comes soon after 
Ibn Qudāmah. This might be due to his greater openness to the opinions of the earlier 
Ḥanbalī scholars who allowed women to lead men in certain voluntary prayers. He is 
the only one not to openly state his disagreement with that earlier opinion. Of course, 
accepting the qiyās of the woman on the insane man requires adopting Ibn Qudāmah’s 
stance that a woman should never lead men under any circumstances. Indeed, Ibn 
Qudāmah introduces the qiyās specifically to achieve this purpose.  
                                                 
253 Ibn Mufliḥ, al-Mubdiʿ, 1:274. 
254 al-Bahūtī, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, 1:322. 
255 al-Ruhaybānī, MatālibŪlī al-Nuhā, 1:208. 
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Yet, even for Ibn Qudāmah, this qiyās proves problematic. In a complete reversal, he 
rejects an almost identical analogy when discussing the question of women leading 
other women in prayer. He attributes to Mālik the argument that a woman cannot lead 
any prayer because she cannot make the call for it. He then dismisses this argument 
by saying it is only disliked for women to make the call to prayer since it entails their 
raising their voices, and women are not meant to do that. He then brings another qiyās 
of resemblance as a counter-argument where he asserts that women actually resemble 
(sane) men because prayer is equally incumbent upon them, so likewise their all-
female congregations are equally allowed. This is an effective way to refute a qiyās of 
resemblance, which depends on establishing the closest resemblance. Here, he is 
claiming that women resemble legally accountable men more than insane men with 
respect to prayer, consequently invalidating the qiyās he himself advocated a little 
earlier.  
 
 
K. Comparing Women to Slaves 
 
Al-Māwardī identifies this as Abū Thawr’s argument for permitting women to lead 
men in prayer.256 He claims that Abū Thawr regards the slave as being more deficient 
than a woman, and since a slave can lead free men in prayer, a woman can do so as 
well. He says that Abū Thawr belives a slave is more deficient than a woman since a 
slave can be killed in retribution for murdering a free woman whereas a free woman 
cannot be killed in retribution for murdering a slave. The Mālikī jurist al-Māzirī also 
identifies this qiyās as the argument for those who permit women to lead men in 
prayer, though he does not attribute it to anyone in particular, and does not suggest a 
rationale for it.  
 
                                                 
256 He also attributes to Abū Thawr another argument by qiyās in support of women leading men in 
prayer. This is to compare prayer followers to prayer leaders in that the capacity to follow is the same 
as the capacity to lead. I have not addressed this instance of qiyās above, because there is obviously 
something missing in the argument quoted by al-Māwardī, since this qiyās as he describes it has a 
number of extremely unreasonable consequences. For instance, it would mean that people who possess 
insufficient knowledge of how to perform prayers would be allowed to lead, since they are allowed to 
follow others.  
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A possible rebuttal to this qiyās would be that killing a slave is akin to destroying 
property and the owner’s loss is purely financial, whereas the surviving family 
members’ right to justice in the event their kinsperson is murdered is not financial in 
nature. This makes the difference in the ruling independent of questions of deficiency 
and human worth, but rather a matter of the affect the murder has on the surviving 
claimaints. However, neither al-Māwardī nor al-Māzirī choose to invoke this 
argument. Instead, they choose to show that a woman is more deficient than a slave. 
They give different reasons why. Al-Māwardī says it is because the slave can become 
free whereas a woman will always be a woman, and also that a male slave does not 
cause temptation with his voice. Interestingly, this echoes al-Māwardī’s argument 
above regarding a sinner. Though he does not state it explicitely there, it can be noted 
that a male sinner can repent and cease being a sinner. Al-Māzirī says that the woman 
is more deficient than a slave because she is attributed with being deficient in intellect 
and religion while a male slave is not.   
 
 
L. Comparing Women Coming in Line with Men to Women Leading Prayer  
 
The comparison between the two rulings is introduced by the Ḥanafī jurist al-
Margḥīnānī in the Hidāyah while discussing why a woman nullifies a man’s prayer by 
coming in line with him. It is consequently discussed in the commentaries on the 
Hidāyah by al-Bābirtī, al-ʿAynī and Ibn al-Humām. Al-ʿAynī only mentions the 
comparison in passing, while al-Bābirtī and Ibn al-Humām present it as a formal qiyās 
and discuss it at length. It appears that al-ʿAynī neglects it because it depends on 
establishing the original ruling by way of ijmāʿ, which he rightly dismisses. 
 
Al-Zaylaʿī presents the comparison formally as a qiyās in Tabyīn al-Ḥaqā’iq, which 
provides the first detailed discussion for it in the surveyed works. The ruling that a 
man’s prayer is nullified when she comes in line with him is the one he is trying to 
prove by way of qiyās. The ruling that the woman cannot lead men in prayer is the 
original ruling in this case, which he claims is established by ijmāʿ.  
 
Al-Zaylaʿī identifies four possible candidates for the original ruling’s effective cause. 
They are: [1] the inherent deficiency of the woman, [2] her being categorically 
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unqualified to lead prayer, [3] a condition of prayer being unfulfilled, or [4] the 
obligation of sending her back. He summarily dismisses the first three candidates. Al-
Bābirtī and Ibn al-Humām take this argument further and attempt to demonstrate by 
way of induction that these four candidates for the effective cause are the only ones 
possible, and then rule out the first three of them.257 This is the formal means of 
identifying the effective cause known as anaysis and partition (al-sabr wa al-taqsīm). 
They bring up all the possible reasons they can think of for why a woman would not 
be allowed to lead men in prayer and then systematically eliminate them one by one 
until they are left with only the strongest possibility. 
 
They eliminate the first by citing that it is valid to follow a sinner or a slave in prayer. 
They eliminate the second because a woman’s prayer is valid if she follows another 
woman in prayer. They dismiss the third because a woman can fulfill all the 
conditions to lead a valid prayer (apart from the condition of being male, which is the 
point of contention). This leaves the fourth, which is abandoning the compulsory 
place (in other words, the obligation of her being in the back). In this way, they arrive 
at the very same effective cause that is deduced from “Send them to the back…” 
without having to resort to the ḥadīth itself.   
 
It is critical for them to assert ijmāʿ to establish that she cannot lead men in prayer, 
because they need to avoid the problem of using the same text for the original ruling 
and the derived ruling. Moreover, ijmāʿ provides a stronger basis for the qiyās, and it 
is no accident that both the claim of ijmāʿ and the qiyās come at the time when “Send 
them to the back…” starts being challenged as suitable textual evidence. 
 
The stakes are higher for Ibn al-Humām, since he dismisses the narration’s legal 
validity altogether. Nevertheless, he admits this qiyās is only a possible line of 
evidence, acknowledging that this type of qiyās –  where the original ruling is based 
on ijmāʿ and the effective cause has to be deduced – is not accepted by most Ḥanafī 
scholars, and even if it were accepted, it is not enough to establish that only the man’s 
                                                 
257 Sadeghi points out that these are not the only possible candidates for the effective cause. He 
suggests two other possibilities: one beimg that that it puts women in a position of authority over men 
and the other being the conspicuousness of the female leader who would have to stand apart from the 
rest of the congregation. Sadeghi, Logic, 71. Sadeghi is demonstrating that other candidates for the 
effective cause may be conceived of; he is not suggesting that these two candidates are particularly 
viable. 
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prayer is nullified by her coming in line with him and not the woman’s. Even though 
the effective cause for the qiyās is the necessity of women being behind the men, they 
cannot show this to be a command directed at men to the exclusion of women. 
 
The weakest aspect of this qiyās is, of course, how they establish the original ruling 
that women cannot lead men in prayer. By their own admission, the sole basis of this 
ruling is ijmāʿ, but it is an ijmāʿ that does not exist. The early Ḥanbalī view that 
permits a woman to lead men in certain voluntary prayers is sufficient to disprove the 
consensus they need for their argument.  
 
 
M. Comparing Women to Naked Men 
 
Women praying together in congregation are compared to naked men praying in 
congregation. This is suggested by Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī jurists, but for different 
reasons. The Ḥanabali jurists ibn Qudāmah and Ibn Mufliḥ use it to argue that it is 
preferable for the woman imām to pray in line with the other women and not stand 
ahead of them. It is not an important piece of evidence for them, since they can cite 
the practice of ʿĀʿishah, though Ibn Qudāmah does not do so. 
 
Hanafī scholars bring a different qiyās of the woman’s congregation on the 
congregation of naked men to apply the ruling that it is disliked for women to pray in 
congregation, just like it is disliked for naked men to do so. The difference between 
the Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī uses of qiyās is significant. The Ḥanbalī scholars seek to 
derive the ruling of where the woman imām stands by comparing this to the ruling of 
where a naked man stands. For the Ḥanafī argument, it is essential that the ruling of 
where the imām stands is already established in both cases, and has the same effective 
cause in both cases. They wish to use the similarity between the two rulings to take 
the additional ruling that the congregation of naked men is disliked or even prohibited 
and apply it likewise to the women’s congregation. 
 
The qiyās argument developes in the literature. In the early Ḥanafī works, the 
similarity in the ruling for congregations of women and those of naked men is 
presented more as a descriptive comparison. The effective cause they give for the why 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
the naked male imām should stand in the row of men is that the other men’s gaze 
should not fall on his shameful areas. This specific situation would not apply to a 
congregation of clothed women, since the women followers can look at their imām 
without any problem.  
 
Al-Marghīnānī ties the comparison with naked men to the ruling of dislike for 
women’s congregations, bringing the dynamic of qiyās to the comparison. Al-Zaylaʿī 
elaborates on this qiyās to justify why the congregational prayer of women is disliked. 
The original ruling is that the congregation of naked men is disliked, and the effective 
cause is that it “necessitates one of two forbidden things”. The first of these is that the 
followers must avert their eyes from the imām if he stands ahead, but they are obliged 
to look at him and follow him. The alternative is for him to stand in their midst to 
shield them from seeing his shameful areas, but this is the wrong pace for the 
imām.258 This effective cause of “necessitat[ing] one of two forbidden things” is also 
found in the case of women-only congregations. For the women, however, the 
problem is either increased exposure to outsiders by her standing forward or her 
standing in their midst to minimise that exposure. In other words, both cases share in 
presenting a dilemma, though the specifics of the problem are different in each case. 
 
Since the problem for women is the need for concealment from men, he bolsters this 
argument by mentioning two other rulings that show concealment to be required for 
women in prayer, the first being that they are encouraged to pay at home, and the 
second being that they prostrate in a different manner than men to be less exposed.  
 
Ibn al-Nujaym in al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq states explicitly that the woman’s congregation is 
disliked as prohibited on the strength of this qiyās, but concedes that the degree of 
prohibition is greater for naked men. Interestingly, when Ibn ʿĀbidīn mentions the 
comparison, he does not really discuss the qiyās, but merely comments on the ways in 
which the comparison does not apply. 
 
                                                 
258 Al-Kāsānī describes this dilemma as follows: “[The follower] is commanded to look at a particular 
point for each circumstance [in prayer], so that the gaze will have a share in carrying out the acts of 
worship, just like the other limbs of the body. By averting his gaze, that aspect gets lost. This shows us 
there is no way for them to realize a congregation except by perpetrating something disliked; therefore, 
congregation is waived for them.” Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd al-Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-Ṣanā’iʿ fī Tartīb al-
Sharā’iʿ. ed. Muḥammad  Adnān Yāsīn Darwīsh. (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Tārīkh alʿArabī, 2000), 1:354. 
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The refutation of this qiyās is carried out by al-ʿAynī and Ibn al-Humām who disagree 
with the mainstream Ḥanafī ruling that it is disliked for women to pray in their own 
congregations. Al-ʿAynī points out that, though there are numerous similarities 
between the two situations, Ḥanafī scholars are inconsistent about which similarity 
matters, and even which situation is being compared to which. Moreover, the woman 
imām’s standing in line is an emulation of the Sunnah, and should not be regarded as 
a prohibited act itself. 
 
Ibn al-Humām identifies the only possible reason why the naked imām should stand 
in the line with the other worshippers is due to increased exposure of his nakedness to 
those following him. He then argues that this is nowhere apparent for women who are 
covered from head to toe. Finally, he asserts that the reason why the woman imām 
prays in the line with the other worshippers is due only to the ḥadīth of ʿĀ’ishah, and 
that the effective cause for her doing so cannot be determined. Consequently, there is 
no dilemma present in the women’s congregation. The known effective cause in the 
former case is clearly not present in fully clothed women praying among themselves, 
nor can any dilemma be shown in the case of the woman imām praying in line with 
the worshippers. The superficial resemblance between the two cases in their 
performance does not mean that other rulings – like the congregation being disliked or 
prohibited – can be transferred from the congregation of naked men to the 
congregation of women.  
 
 
N. Summary 
 
Only a few arguments from qiyās represent main lines of evidence for their schools of 
thought, and only one of these is used to completely divest women of a leadership 
role. This one instance is the Ḥanbalī qiyās of comparing women to the insane, which 
nevertheless seems for the later scholars who take it up to be a mere reiteration of Ibn 
Qudāmah’s argument without their having any real commitment to it. Moreover, Ibn 
Qudāmah himself seems to dismiss this qiyās elsewhere in al-Mughnī. 
 
The other two consistent uses of qiyās pertaining to female leadership appear in the 
Ḥanafī school, the first to prove that a woman can be a judge by comparing it to her 
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being a witness, and the second to argue why it is disliked for women to lead all-
female congregations. 
 
Mot of the other instances of qiyās used to prohibit women from various leadership 
positions are suggested by only one or two scholars, usually with an isolated instance 
in the early literature of a particular school of law. Some of these are mentioned by al-
Māwardī alone, while the Mālikī scholars al-Qarāfī and al-Rajrājī suggest one or two 
more. These constitute the bulk of the examples of qiyās discussed above, and are 
usually given as brief suggestions which their proponents do not elaborate on, and 
which we have seen are often contradictory to their school’s own rulings and 
inoperable in practice. Due to the weakness of these examples, it seems likely that 
they are not being cited in earnest, which would explain the offhanded manner in 
which they are presented. 
 
Analogy, therefore, cannot explain the presence of the rulings which divest women of 
leadership positions. Except for the consistently invoked but elusive Ḥanbalī analogy 
of women on the insane for prohibiting prayer leadership, its use in the literature is 
sporadic and not taken up by later works within the schools of thought where it makes 
its rare early appearance.  
 
Yet, an interesting pattern can be discerned in the Mālikī use of qiyās. In spite of the 
fact that in nearly all cases, the Mālikī works present their instances of qiyās as being 
based on another established ruling which is in turn supported by specific textual 
evidence, closer analysis shows that this reasoning quickly breaks down, and the qiyās 
becomes more coherent if it is understood in light of general precepts. In al-Qarāfī’s 
two instances of qiyās disallowing women judges, on the basis that they pray in the 
back and clap in prayer, the first is derived from the general deficiency of women and 
the general need to prevent temptation, while the second invokes the principle that her 
voice is shameful. Ibn Rushd’s comparison of a woman to a slave for judicial 
purposes also seems to be more akin to the general notion of a woman’s deficiency 
and her status in society. The qiyās attempted by al-Māzirī and al-Rajrājī to prevent 
women from leading prayer based on their not being qualified for political leadership 
works best when understood in the context of the “principle that everyone who is 
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characterized by deficiency and lowliness has no share in positions of high status”, 
which is explicitly stated in this context by al-Rajrājī.  
 
This supports the observation made by Umar Abd-Allah that most cases of Mālikī 
qiyās are, in actual practice, based on general precepts instead of specific established 
rulings. It must also be observed that the precepts identified for each of these 
examples are value judgments about women, so they will be taken up again in the 
next chapter. 
 
 
V. ḤANAFĪ JURISTIC PREFERENCE (ISTIḤSĀN) 
 
Juristic preference, or istiḥsān, is cited in the Ḥānafī works with reference to the 
question of women coming in line with men in prayer. The Ḥanafī conception259 of 
istiḥsān is essentially to abandon an obvious analogy on account of other evidence, 
which is usually a less obvious analogy, due to onsiderations that show the other 
evidence to be stronger.260  
 
The Ḥanafī ruling is that a woman coming in line with a man while following the 
same imām in congregational prayer nullifies the man’s prayer but not hers. This 
ruling is at variance with qiyās, which is that the man’s prayer would not be nullified. 
Al-Kāsānī discusses in detail why this is the case. He demonstrates that if nullification 
of the man’s prayer would come about due to the woman’s lowliness, then lowlier 
creatures – he cites the dog and pig – would also nullify his prayer, which they do not. 
He also argues that if the question was one of temptation, then the mere presence of 
the woman would cause the nullification of his prayer, even if she is not following the 
imām in congregation, and this is clearly not the case. Moreover, as most of the 
Ḥanafī jurists point out, if his prayer is nullified for a certain reason, hers should be as 
                                                 
259 Istiḥsān, conceived differently, is also a source of law in the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools of law. 
This will be elaborated upon in the following section. 
260 Al-Sarakhsī says: “It is evidence that goes against an obvious qiyās that comes immediately to mind 
before careful consideration, but after undertaking careful consideration of the new development’s 
ruling and the original cases it resembles, it becomes clear that the evidence that goes against [the 
obvious qiyās] is stronger and must be acted upon.” al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl, 2:190. 
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well according to qiyās, but this is also not the case here.261 Therefore, analogical 
reasoning consistently points to the conclusion that the man’s prayer should remain 
valid. 
 
The Ḥanafī jurists explicitly state that the nullification of the man’s prayer is a ruling 
established by istiḥsān. This istiḥsān is supported by the statement “Send them to the 
back, whence God has sent them to the back.” This ḥadīth is essential for their 
argument, which hinges on the fact that it is a command addressed to the men, so the 
presence of the woman in line with a man is a case where the man and only the man 
has failed to carry out his obligation, which he can realise by moving forward. This 
allows the Ḥanafī scholars to apply another, less evident analogy to the matter, that of 
a worshipper moving ahead of the imām. The statement “Send them to the back...” is 
the basis for giving preference to this less obvious analogy over the more direct one. 
 
Al-Kāsānī identifies a second problem with respect to this ruling, requiring an 
additional use of istiḥsān. This is the ruling’s applicability to cases involving 
preadolescent girls. He concedes that, according to qiyās, her praying alongside a man 
in congregation would have no affect on his prayer, since she is merely going through 
the motions. She has not yet attained legal accountability, so her prayer is not a 
legally accountable act. He then refers to the ruling that she is to be commanded to 
pray and beaten for not doing so, and therefore “made to share in the essence of 
prayer”. This is a more tenuous rationale than that of legal accountability, but it is 
adopted by way of istiḥsān. 
 
Of course, the most problematic aspect of the entire argument is its utter dependence 
on the idea that the Prophet specifically commanded men to send the women to the 
back. This is why only the prayers of the men are nullified and their situation can be 
compared to their moving ahead of the imām. The text which provides this command 
                                                 
261 It is interesting to note that the Ẓāhirī jurist Ibn Ḥazm agrees that a woman coming in line with a 
man nullifies his prayer. Ibn Ḥazm offers essentially the same rationale for it, that the woman 
“transgresses the place that she was commanded to stay and prayed in a place other than where she was 
commanded.” Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 410. For him, however, the woman has also violated the 
command, so her prayer is negated. Since he applies the ruling to the woman as well, he does not need 
to take recourse to istiḥsān, which is a form of legal reasoning his literalist school of thought 
categorically rejects. 
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is not a prophetic ḥadīth, but instead a comment that Ibn Masʿūd made about a story 
of the Israelites.  
 
Ibn al-Humām acknowledges this fact and attempts unsuccessfully to salvage the 
istiḥsān without reference to “Send them to the back”. He cites the ḥadīth of Anas and 
his grandmother, but as we have seen, his argument falls short because no command 
can be discerned from it that would be directed to the men and not to the women. Ibn 
al-Humām is aware of this weakness, and admits this ḥadīth is only possible evidence.  
 
Likewise, al-Zaylaʿī, al-Bābirtī and Ibn al-Humām suggest a qiyās of women coming 
in line with a man on the ruling that woman cannot lead men in prayer. This 
argument, which we have already presented, is extremely complex, and arrives at the 
effective cause that the woman has abandoned her proper place. However it also fails 
to support the istiḥsān, because it cannot assert a command directed at the men to the 
exclusion of the women. Also, the argument depends on a claim of ijmāʿ to prohibit 
women from leading men in prayer, which is unsustainable in light of the well-known 
disagreement that exists on the matter.  
 
Barring the weakness of the textual evidence underlying this application of istiḥsān, it 
is otherwise an eloquent argument. However, its complexity – involving two separate 
applications of istiḥsān to realise the ruling’s full legal implications – as well as the 
unsatisfactory evidentiary basis for it, points to the idea that the argument is 
specifically constructed to defend the particular ruling of the Ḥanafī school, and is not 
the true basis for the ruling itself. 
 
 
VI. PRACTICE OF THE PEOPLE OF MADINAH (ʿAMAL AHL AL-MADĪNAH) 
 
This is a uniquely Mālikī source of law. According to Abd-Allah, in its original 
conception it was a non-textual source of law of fundamental importance to the 
structure of Mālikī legal reasoning; the overarching authoritative source Mālik 
referred to for interpreting, evaluating, and applying the textual sources he subscribe 
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to.262 The acceptance and rejection of individual-narrator ḥadīth was carried out with 
reference to Madinite practice. It was also the basis for the general precepts upon 
which qiyās was carried out, as well as the other recognised sources of Mālikī legal 
reasoning that will be discussed in the next section, namely al-istiḥsān, sadd al-
dharā’iʿ, and al-maṣlahah al-mursalah, which functioned to make exceptions to the 
precepts established by Madinite practice or to give preference of one Madinite 
practice over another.263 
 
In the works of Mālikī legal theory, this source of law is perceived differently. It is 
still given precedence to individual-narrator ḥadīth; however, it is presented as a sub-
category of ijmāʿ. The question becomes one of giving precedence to the unanimous 
legal verdicts and practices of the people of Madinah when the verdicts and practices 
of Muslims in other areas differ. Many theorists, however, do not regard it as an 
actual form of ijmāʿ, but as a form of ḥadīth narration. The reason why it is given 
preference to individual-narrator ḥadīth is because it is seen as equivalent to a 
mutawātir ḥadīth. Those who see it as a form of ijmāʿ allow it to apply to question 
where juristic discretion (ijtihād) has a role to play.264 Those who see it only as a form 
of ḥadīth narration either require it to have a substantiated line of transmission265 or 
require the matter to be something that can only be known by way of revelation 
(tawqīf) and not open to the discretion of the jurists.266 This restricts it to questions 
like the wording of the call to prayer and the types of wealth that the Zakāh tax is 
levied on.  
 
                                                 
262 Abd-Allah, “Malik’s Concept”, 379. 
263 Abd-Allah, “Malik’s Concept”, 381-382. 
264 Al-Qarāfī attributes this view to Ibn al-ʿAdl, Ibn Bukayr, and the Mālikī scholars of Morocco. al-
Qarāfī, Nafā’is al-ʿUṣūl, 3:421. 
265 Ibn Rushd is of this view. He says: “The most discerning Mālikī scholars only see it as evidence by 
virtue of [textual] transmission. It appears to me that this is what it is based on if it is to be regarded as 
evidence. The transmission of the practice should be clearly expressed from one generation to the next 
up until it reaches the time of Allah’s Messenger. This becomes evidence of his tacit approval of it,  
like if they say: ‘This is what we found our forefathers practicing’ and [they continue doing like] that 
until it reaches the time of Allah’s Messenger.” Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. 
Rushd al-Ḥafīḍ, al-Ḍarūrī fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh. ed. Jamāl al-Dīn al-ʿAlawī. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
1994) 93. 
266 This restriction appears early on in Mālikī legal theory works, like al-Qaṣṣār, al-Muqaddimah, 75, 
al-Qāsim al-Jubayrī, Muqaddimah fī al-Uṣūl, 211-212; and  Muḥammad b. ʿUmar b. al-Fakhkhār, 
Muqaddimah Kitāb Intiṣār Ahl al-Madīnah, 223, all of which are published with al-Qaṣṣār’s al-
Muqaddimah. `Abd al-Wahhāb  b. ʿAlī b. Nasr al-Baghdādī holds that it is still a source of evidence 
when it is based on juristic discretion but it is not a binding ijmāʿ, al-Muʿawwanah, 242. 
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Madinīte practice is not formally invoked in the surveyed Malikī legal works. 
Nevertheless, it is discernible in some of the assertions made about women’s 
leadership. Al-Rajrājī cites al-Qāḍī Abū al-Walīd as saying: “It is enough for me that 
in the Muslims’ conduct since the era of the Prophet, it has never occurred in any era 
nor in any land that a woman has been put forward as as a judge or a head of state.” 
This includes Madinite practice by implication.  
 
We also find an implication of this in al-Qarāfī’s assertion of ijmāʿ for preventing 
women from being judges. He says: “This is why it is unheard of that a woman ever 
had authority as a judge in any era, and this [therefore] is a matter of consensus 
(ijmāʿ), since [such an appointment] is contrary to the way of the believers.” 
 
As an application of Madinite practice, this is not a strong indication of prohibition. 
As mentioned earlier with respect to ijmāʿ, there is no actual practice being cited.267 
The argument is entirely negative. The neglect of an act has its evidentiary strength, 
but only to indicate is that it is permissible for women to be entirely absent from 
political or judicial authority at any given point in time. In other words, the inclusion 
of women in the political and judicial arenas cannot be regarded as mandatory, since 
the practice of the Muslims confirms that their absence is acceptable. 
 
The role that Madinite practice has in the acceptance or rejection of individual-
narrator ḥadīth is evident in the comments that al-Māzirī makes about the ḥadīth of 
Umm Waraqah. He does not criticise its chain of transmission. He describes it as “a 
narration we regard as strange” and one that “some of our later associates have said... 
is not among those that must be relied upon.” This illustrates how reliance upon 
individual-narrator ḥadīth is contingent in Mālikī Law on established practice, since 
the “strangeness” here should not be understood in way ḥadīth scholars use the term, 
but rather that the meaning of the ḥadīth conflicts with well-known practice.  
 
The same can be said for Māzirī’s discussion of ʿĀ’ishah’s leading women in prayer. 
Elewa and Silvers argue that the Mālikī school rejected the ḥadīth which refer to her 
                                                 
267 Avoiding a practice can be evidence of the illegality of the practice in cases where the practice is an 
aspect of a formal act of worship whose inclusion would constitute an integral part of that worship. An 
example of this cited with respect to Madinite practice is lack of Zakāh on green leafy crops because 
that Zakāh was never paid by the people of Madinah. See: al-Qarāfī, Nafā’is al-ʿUṣūl, 3:421. 
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practice due to a combination of two factors: its weakness as a ḥadīth and its being 
contrary to Madinite practice.268 This would imply that variance with Madinite 
practice was not sufficient on its own for Mālikī scholars to reject a individual-
narrator ḥadīth. However, when we turn to the Mālikī legal literature, we find that the 
practice of ʿĀ’ishah (and Umm Salamah) is almost never brought up in their 
discussions. Al-Māzirī is the only one to do so in the surveyed works and he does not 
even judge its veracity. He just states that if it is authentic, then it needs to be 
explained away. Therefore, it appears that Mālikī jurists regarded the references to the 
practice of the the Prophet’s wives to be unfamiliar individual-narrator ḥadīth in 
contradiction with established practice and dismissed them without much concern for 
the strength or weakness of their transmission. Their variance with practice was 
sufficient grounds to disregard them or explain them away. 
 
What can be discerned with respect to questions of women’s leadership is the 
consideration of received practice in a general, non-formalised sense, which reflects 
how Madinite practice probably operated during the school’s earlest days. The ijmāʿ 
of the people of Madinah, in the sense that it is discussed in Mālikī legal theory 
works, is neither invoked by the jurists nor is it in evidence in their practice. 
 
 
VII. CIRCUMSTANCE-DEPENDENT SOURCES 
 
There are four sources of law that result in rulings that depend on the circumstances 
that surround them. The first three are recognized as sources of legislation in the 
Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools. These are juristic preference (istiḥsān) as conceived by 
the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools, preventing legal loopholes (sadd al-dharā’iʿ), and 
considerations of general welfare (al-māṣāliḥ al-mursalah). Local Customs (ʿurf) is 
recognized by all four schools, but in various limited capacities. 
 
 
                                                 
268 Elewa and Silvers, “I Am One of the People”, 156. 
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A. Juristic Preference (Istiḥsān) 
 
Istiḥsān, in the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools of law, is conceived of differently than in 
the Ḥanafī school. Istiḥsān means to make an exception to a general legal precept 
where applying that precept would be contrary to the welfare of those who are subject 
to the resultant ruling.269 Due to the stress Ḥanbalī scholars place on direct textual 
evidence, it has very limited use to them, since it can never contradict specific textual 
evidence. Indeed, Ibn Qudāmah argues that the ruling relied upon by way of istiḥsān 
must itself be established by the Qur’an and Sunnah.270 Abd-Allah argues that it is 
one of the least authoritative sources of evidence in the Ḥanbalī school. 271 This 
particular source of law is not cited for questions of women’s leadership by any of the 
Mālikī and Ḥanbalī texts in the survey. 
 
 
B. Preventing Legal Loopholes (Sadd al-Dharā’iʿ) 
 
This source of law provides for the prohibition of acts that are in and of themselves 
permissible under circumstances where it is feared that those acts are being used as 
means for illegitimate ends. It is used primarily to prevent legal loopholes that 
undermine the intent of Islamic laws. Al-Qarāfī says: “Whenever a practice that is 
free from harm becomes a means to harm, we forbid that practice, and this is Mālik’s 
school of thought.”272 Like istiḥsān, the purpose of sadd al-dharā’iʿ is to prevent 
harm and secure the welfare of the people. Its implementing requires a suspicion that 
the act is being engaged in for illicit reasons. It is not necessary to determine the true 
intention of the actor, which is impossible, but the circumstances surrounding the act 
itself must invoke suspicion.273  
 
                                                 
269 Al-Shāṭibī says: “Istiḥsān in Mālik’s school of thought is to adopt a particular consideration of 
welfare in contrast to evidence of a universal scope. It entails resorting to the evidence of such a 
consideration in preference to qiyās. The one who applies istiḥsān is not resorting to his mere personal 
tastes and preferences; but rather to what he knows to be the Lawgiver’s overall purpose.” Ibrāhīm b. 
Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt. ed. Abū ʿUbaydah Mash-hur b. Ḥasan Āl Salmān. (Cairo: Dār Ibn 
ʿAffān: 1997), 5:193.  
270 Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2, 531. 
271 Abd-Allah, “Mālik’s Concept”,  246. 
272 al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl,  436. 
273 Abd-Allah, “Mālik’s Concept”,  263. 
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An illustrative example of the application of sadd al-dharā’iʿ is where the Mālikī Law 
prohibits a father to revoke a gift to a child if that child has used that gift in a 
subsequent transaction. The normal ruling in Mālikī Law is that a father can demand 
his child return the gift at any time. However, if that child has used the gift as 
collateral for a debt, or has used the gift as an enticement to secure a marriage suit, 
then the revocation of the gift becomes unlawful. This is to prevent fathers and their 
children colluding to use the father’s option to revoke a child’s gift as a means to 
cheat other people.  
 
Al-Rajrājī makes reference to sadd al-dharā’iʿ as a formal legal principle in Manāhij 
al-Taḥṣīl while discussing women leading other women in prayer. He argues that 
Mālikī jurists prohibit women-only congregations by applying a general legal axiom 
that “whenever means are prevented, the category of rulings involved are to be taken 
as a unit.” What this means is that preventing women from leading men in prayer is a 
case of preventing the means to harm, and since means are being prevented, it should 
be done in all relevant instances. Al-Rajrājī differs with his school’s ruling on 
women-only congregations, so he then goes on to argue that women-only 
congregations are not a relevant instance, since the harm which the ruling seeks to 
prevent is entirely absent. This illustrates how impermanent rulings based on sadd al-
dharā’iʿ are, due to their dependence on circumstances, and it is this impermanence 
that al-Rajrājī is exploiting to refute the ruling. It must be noted, however, that al-
Rajrājī is the only Mālikī jurist in the survey presenting the prohibition of prayer 
leadership as an application of sadd al-dharā’iʿ, and he does so to refute an 
established Mālikī ruling. Therefore, his claim should be taken with caution, as a 
possible straw-man argument.  
  
 
C. Considerations of the General Welfare (al-Maṣāliḥ al-Mursalah) 
 
This refers to the application of general considerations of welfare that are not 
specified by any textual evidence. It allows for the establishment of new legal rulings 
and the suspension of earlier rulings in consideration of society’s general welfare. 
This principle is also based on the belief that all of the rulings of Islam exist to realize 
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the welfare of human beings in this world and the next. 274 Some Ḥanbalī legal 
theorists reject this principle outright.275 Others, like Ibn al-Qayyim, have a more 
favourable attitude towards it.276 Still, Abd-Allah discerns a difference in the Mālikī 
and Ḥanbalī application of this principle in that Mālikī Law allows for such 
considerations to specify or temporarily suspend rulings established by textual 
evidence, where Ḥanbalī Law does not.277 For Mālikī Law, this means that general 
statements in the Qur’an and ḥadīth can be specified under any circumstance where 
applying the general meaning would result in negating the realization of human 
welfare intended by the text’s ruling, or in cases where doing would brings about an 
unintended harm. 
 
Since the considerations of welfare that this source of legal reasoning is concerned 
with are those which are not expressly established by the sacred texts278, the legal 
theorists who recognise it have set down strict conditions for their validity. The most 
commonly cited of these conditions is that the resulting ruling does not bring about 
harm greater than the good it achieves. Also, according to al-Shāṭibī, considerations 
of the general welfare are never applicable in legal questions pertaining to matters of 
worship.279 
 
Abd-Allah identifies two types of results that can be obtained from applying this form 
of legal reasoning.280 The first are those that introduce rulings having no precedent. A 
clear example of this is Abū Bakr’s decision when he was Caliph to have the Qur’an 
compiled in a single volume. The second type of result is that which brings about a 
                                                 
274 Al-Qarāfī says: “God only sent the Messengers to secure the ongoing welfare of the servants. So 
whenever we find a consideration of welfare, it becomes our overwhelming belief that it is desired by 
the Law.” al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 424. 
275 Ibn Qudāmah says: “If a ruling is established on the basis of one of these considerations of welfare 
without knowing that the Law safeguards that consideration of welfare by establishing that ruling, then 
this is legislating on the basis of opinion, and giving legal verdicts on the basis of mere rationalisation.” 
Ibn Qudāmah, Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 2:541. 
276 See: Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn, vol. 3 for an extensive treatment of this subject. 
277 Abd-Allah, “Mālik’s Concept”, 269. 
278 Al-Qarāfī identifies three kinds of considerations: “Considerations of welfare, with reference to how 
they are recognized by the Law, are three categories: [1] what the Law attests to as being considered, 
which is the qiyās we have already discussed, [2] what the law attests to as being disregarded, like [the 
idea of] prohibiting the cultivation of grapes to curtail wine production, and [3] what it neither attests to 
as being considered or as being disregarded, which are the presumed considerations of the general 
welfare that Mālik recognises as evidence.” al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 423-424.    
279 He also mentions that istiḥsān does not apply to acts of worship. Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-
Iʿtiṣām. ed. Saʿd b. ʿAbd Allah Āl Ḥumayd et al. (Saudi Arabia:Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 2008), 2:72. 
280 Abd-Allah, “Mālik’s Concept”,  276. 
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ruling that suspends an earlier one, like the Caliph ʿUmar’s decision to suspend the 
practice of distributing lands of conquered territories among the soldiers. 
 
 
D. Differentiating between these Three Sources of Legislation 
 
The primary difference between istiḥsān and sadd al-dharā’iʿ is in their effect. 
Istiḥsān makes allowances for acts that are otherwise prohibited, while sadd al-
dharā’iʿ prohibits acts that are generally permissible. 
 
Istiḥsān and sadd al-dharā’iʿ are clearly distinct from the applications of al-maṣāliḥ 
al-mursalah that introduce an unprecedented ruling. As for applications of  al-maṣāliḥ 
al-mursalah which suspend pre-existing rulings, they bring about similar 
consequences to the applications of istiḥsān and sadd al-dharā’iʿ. Abd-Allah 
identifies two differences. 281 The first is that al-maṣāliḥ al-mursalah relates to the 
welfare of society at large, while the other two legal sources deal with rulings that 
operate on the individual level. The second is that there is a sense of emergency in 
applying maṣāliḥ al-mursalah that is not needed for the application of the other two 
methods of legal reasoning. 
 
An important feature that all three sources of legislation have in common is the 
impermanence of the rulings that result from them.282 Since these rulings are regarded 
as means to an end and not an end in themselves, they are subject to change whenever 
their intended ends are no longer being realised. 
 
 
                                                 
281 Abd-Allah, “Mālik’s Concept”,  277. 
282 Al-Qarāfī says: “Rulings in their origins are two categories, [1] those which are intended in their 
own right (maqāṣid) for how they directly pertain to benefit and harm, and [2] those which lead to 
(wasā’il) those ends through their consequences. They are conferred with the same ruling as what their 
consequences bring about, whenter it be prohibition or permissibility, but they have a lower status than 
the rulings which are intended in their own right.” He then  elaborates: “The principle is: Whenever the 
ruling intended in its own right ceases to be an issue, the ruling of what leads to it ceases to be 
considered, because it is subsidiary to it.” al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 426-427. 
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E. Local Customs (ʿUrf) 
 
Custom is recognised by all four schools of law, but it is presented in the legal theory 
works as having a very limited scope. Among other things, it has a crucial role to play 
in the practical application of Islamic legislation with respect to defining the intended 
meanings of terms under various circumstances. This is especially important for 
resolving the meaning of clauses in commercial and social contracts and determining 
what conditions are to be assumed to be in effect in a contract in the absence of an 
explicit contractual clause.283 Another use of local custom is to define the 
requirements of textually established Islamic laws where the sacred texts leave certain 
culture-dependent terms undefined. For instance, the ruling that men should not wear 
women’s clothing is established by textual evidence. However, what constitutes 
women’s clothing depends on the norms of the society where the law is to be 
enforced. Likewise it is used to define the parameters of customary usage (maʿrūf) 
when the sacred texts call towards observing it.284 Jurists might identify an effective 
cause for a ruling that depends on custom for its precise definition or for identifying 
its presence in a particular case.285  
 
Rulings based on local custom are even more highly susceptible to change than the 
three forms of legal reasoning described above. They are very sensitive to changes in 
practice from one place to another and from one point in time to the next. They have 
no semblance of permanence. The limited formal recognition of custom as a source of 
law in works of legal theory and its contingent nature explains why custom is never 
formally invoked in the post-formative legal literature regarding questions of 
women’s leadership. 
 
                                                 
283 A-Sarakhsī gives the following example: “The specification [of meaning] is according to the 
indications of custom, but only when there is no explicit statement of intent for another [meaning]. In 
the event there is an explicit statement, custom ceases to be considered. This is like when someone 
makes a purchase in dirhams without specifying [the currency’s country]; the local country’s currency 
is specified by way of custom.  If he explicitely makes the condition that another country’s currency is 
to be used for the purchase, custom ceases to be considered and the contract is binding according to 
what is explicitely stated. al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl, 1:61.  
284 For instance, Qur’an 2:233: “Mothers may breastfeed their children for two complete years for 
whoever wishes to complete the full period of nursing. Their support and clothing are incumbent upon 
the father in accordance with customary usage.” 
285 Al-Qarāfī gives the example of high and low social status. He says regarding using a custom-
dependent factor as an effective causes: “The condition is that it is consistently applicable [to the 
ruling] and easily discerned from other [attributes].” al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl, 381. 
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F. Summary 
 
These circumstance-dependent sources of law are not cited in the legal literature as 
evidence for the rulings under examination. The scholars understood questions of 
women’s leadership to be essential ones – conditions for the validity of the 
appointment –  permanent rulings that do not change in response to the situation from 
one place or time to another. This is especially clear with the rulings on prayer 
leadership. The conditions of validity for the prescribed prayers are intrinsic to the 
prayers themselves. The prayer is either valid or invalid. Questions of women’s 
suitability for political and judicial appointment can easily be imagined as 
circumstantially dependent, but this is not how the legal scholars conceived of them. 
Had they placed any of these questions under one of the four rubrics discussed above, 
it would have been an admission to the transient nature of the rulings themselves; that 
they are subject to change at any time. 
 
This means that post-formative jurists did not see these sources of law as furnishing 
evidence for these particular rulings. All the same, we can discern a marked impact 
that this form of legal reasoning has, especially on the schools of law that emphasise 
it. When we look at the works under survey, we find that the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī 
works often justify and defend their rulings by invoking the potential harms they 
avoid or benefits they secure. These justifications are less frequent in the Shāfiʿī and 
Ḥanafī works, as would be expected, but not entirely absent. This implies that these 
approaches to legal reasoning are more far-reaching in their effect on law than what 
their formal representation in legal theory indicates. They bear upon the rulings found 
in the post-formative legal literature, but not in a formally codified, systemantic way. 
The arguments invoked include the temptation women cause for men, the 
ineffectiveness of women in carrying out public duties, and the neglect of their proper 
domain of activity. Since all of these considerations deal directly with how women 
and their social roles are perceived, these arguments will be examined in greater detail 
in the next chapter. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The rulings that divest women of leadership roles are given support by evidence and 
arguments of various kinds. With respect to the four primary sources of Islamic Law, 
the Qur’an is not generally considered by the jurists to be a source for these rulings. 
Only the earliest Shāfiʿī works employ a verse of Qur’an in their arguments, most 
notably al-Māwardī, and as has been seen, his strategy in al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr is to 
present all potential lines of evidence, so his arguments in that work are not always an 
accurate reflection of his school’s legal reasoning. The Sunnah is the source of law 
used most frequently to justify the legal rulings of their respective schools, though the 
ḥadīth cited by each school to divest women of leadership positions do not fulfil the 
school’s evidentiary requirements. Nevertheless, each school has a demonstrably 
different strategy in presenting ḥadīth evidence that can clearly be traced back to its 
theoretical approach to ḥadīth. This establishes that legal theory does indeed influence 
the legal thinking of the jurists. Ijmāʿ, though occasionally invoked for political and 
prayer leadership, is not generally recognised as existing for the legal questions under 
discussion. Though a number of arguments based on qiyās are presented, they are 
found disproportionately in the surveyed works, most frequently in al-Māwardī’s al-
Hāwī al-Kabīr and the works of two Mālikī jurists, al-Rajrājī and al-Qarāfī. These are 
cursory in their presentation and not very workable at closer analysis. At the same 
time, the Mālikī use of qiyās seems to confirm Umar Abd-Allah’s contention that 
Mālikī qiyās is actually based on general precepts of law, even when it is presented as 
being based on particular established legal rulings. What emerges from this analysis is 
that the evidence presented in the Islamic legal texts is best understood as an attempt 
to justify the rulings advocated by the jurists, and is not representative of the actual 
reasons why those rulings came about or persisted.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
GENDER: CULTURAL & SOCIAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter  is to explore the gender attitudes exhibited in the legal 
texts and what affect they have on the jurists’ arguments. These include explicit 
statements about gender as well as the unarticulated gender assumptions underlying 
the statements and reasoning presented in the texts. The chapter is divided 
thematically into four topics: deficiency and inherent worth, the woman as temptress, 
the woman’s role in society, and gender hierarchies. Of course, these topics are 
closely related to each other and assumptions held with regard to one of these will 
have consequences for what assumptions will be held for the others. However, they 
differ in focus, and when analysed separately, present a more complete picture. Each 
section is divided according to the four schools of thought, and the analysis for each 
school is conducted in a roughly diachronic manner. 
 
 
II. DEFICIENCY AND INHERENT WORTH 
 
A. Mālikī Texts 
 
Ibn Rushd compares a woman to a slave to demonstrate why she cannot be a judge, 
and he cites the reason for the comparison as being “the deficiency in the reverence 
(ḥurmah) she is given”. This means that, like a slave, she does not command respect, 
which is a problem since a judge must be respected in order to effectively carry out 
the duties of the post. This indicates not only the reality of the scant regard men had 
for women in near-eastern society, but also the acceptability of their having such little 
regard. In order for such a meaning to have validity as the basis for qiyās, this state of 
affairs has to be taken for granted as something natural and unchanging. Ibn Rushd is 
therefore presenting it as a deficiency in the women themselves and not in the men’s 
attitude towards them. Otherwise, the ruling would be one based on custom (ʿurf) and 
would consequently be subject to change when the attitude of men changed. 
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There is another plausible way to interpret the word ḥurmah in Ibn Rushd’s statement. 
This is to understand it to mean that women are lacking autonomy in their decision 
making. In this case, Ibn Rushd would be addressing their independence, not to their 
intellect. His argument would be that, like a slave, a woman is subject to someone 
else’s authority and therefore might be put under outside pressure in the legal 
judgments she renders. This is a less likely interpretation linguistically, and also 
because a woman’s autonomy in Islamic Law is far greater than that of a slave, so the 
analogy would be an extremely weak one. This interpretation, however, also confirms 
a woman’s diminished status in society and in men’s regard.  
 
Ibn Rushd is giving what he thinks represents the arguments of those who support the 
ruling, and it may not reflect his personal views on women.286 Nevertheless, it is 
inconceivable that this argument would have been constructed if such attitudes were 
not present and widely accepted within the juristic community and reflected in society 
at large. These values are implicit in the argument. It would not have developed in 
their absence, nor would it have been found convincing. Indeed, the very act of 
comparing a free woman to a slave shows that women were conceived of in a lowly 
manner, since slaves were of the lowest social status possible and were viewed with 
utter contempt. They were property, not much better in status than cattle. Moreover, a 
male slave is capable of becoming a free man, whereas a woman will always remain a 
woman.287 This comparison, therefore, illustrates a significant level of contempt for 
women and their status in society.  
 
Al-Māzirī confirms this when he discusses the question of a woman leading men in 
prayer. Here, he discusses the possible argument that women might be allowed to lead 
men in prayers if they are compared to slaves, since slaves can lead prayers. He then 
dismisses this possibility, saying that “the deficiency of being female, when it comes 
to prayer leadership, is more certain and more severe.” The assertion that it is more 
                                                 
286 Catarina Belo argues that Ibn Rushd, in his philosophical writings, did not share the prevailing view 
that women were inherently inferior to men or unequal to men in their aptitudes. She cites where he 
criticises the way women were being marginalised in society. See: Catarina Belo, “Some 
Considerations on Averroes’ Views Regarding Women and their Role in Society.” Oxford Journal of 
Islamic Studies (2009) 20 (1), 1-20. 
287 As we shall see shortly, the Shāfīʿī jurist al-Māwardī cites this point to justify his opinion that a 
woman is more deficient than a slave. 
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certain probably refers to the permanence of the condition of being female as opposed 
to the condition of being a slave which can come to an end through manumission. As 
for it being more severe, it is because a woman is “deficient of intellect and religion, 
while a slave is not attributed with these qualities.” 
 
Al-Qarāfī, while speaking about prayer leadership, also confirms that “her situation is 
worse... than that of a slave”, because he counts as a member of the Friday 
congregational prayer while she does not. He also argues that the fact that she is sent 
back to the back ranks makes her situation “worse than that of a child.” It is important 
to note how al-Qarāfī makes claims about women’s worth on the basis of these legal 
rulings. It is not simply a matter of law that a slave’s participation counts for the 
Friday prayer and a child is not sent to the back. These rulings indicate, by al-Qarāfī’s 
admission, that women are worse off than slaves and children when it comes to their 
status in prayer. 
 
Al-Rajrājī takes this idea further while discussing the question of women leading men 
in prayer. He describes prayer leadership as “a degree of honour and a lofty station” 
and argues that women are not qualified for this position due to a legal principle that 
“everyone who is characterised by deficiency and lowliness has no share in positions 
of high status.” He cites the ḥadīth about women being deficient in intellect and 
religion as evidence for this. Yet, the woman is not merely deficient because of these 
reasons, she is also possessed of “lowliness”. This begs the question: How can al-
Rajrājī take her need for another woman to coorroborate her testimony in court and 
her being exempted from prayer during menstruation as indicating her lowliness and 
her unworthiness of “honour and a lofty station”?  
 
A clue to answering this question can be found earlier in Manāhij al-Taḥṣil where al-
Rajrājī discusses the legal rulings pertaining to menstruation. He speaks at length on 
the matter, describing it as a “curse” and a “punishment” for the woman in her 
worship and her worldly life. What is most startling is that his discourse on this matter 
is a digression; it has no bearing on the legal rulings about purification law that he is 
about to explain. However, it sheds considerable on how he can connect her siting out 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
during menstruation with her unworthiness to lead men in prayer, and it is worthwhile 
to quote the passage in full:288 
 
Menstruation is something God has decreed upon the daughters of Adam.289 He 
made it a means of safeguarding lineage and a sign that a woman’s womb is free 
[from a pregnancy]. At the same time, it is a punishment set upon them and a 
cause of vexation for them in worship and in everyday life. 
 
As for how it is a punishment in worship, it is in how it causes their exemption 
from prayers altogether. It is also in how it affects the validity of [the women’s] 
observance of the fast, and their ability to observe the fast at its appointed time 
so as to make their observance of it actually an act of making it up. This causes 
the reward [of the fast] to be reduced, since observing an act of worship at its 
appointed time is not equal to observing it after that time has passed. 
 
Though it is true that a legally accountable person is excused for offering it late, 
the excuses that necessitate doing so merely exempt the person from sin, 
because observing an act of worship on time and late are [not]290 equal in the 
amount of blessings they confer. This is because there is no problem with the 
fact that a person who oversleeps or is absentminded must make up the prayer 
and his reward is not like that someone who prayed on time. There is no dispute 
in this matter. It is on account of this consideration that the Lawgiver stated the 
“deficiency of their [the women’s] religion”. This deficiency refers sometimes 
to a factor compromising their prayers, and sometimes to the deficiency in the 
reward and blessings that she receives as a consequence of fasting outside of its 
appointed time. 
 
                                                 
288 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Saʿīd al-Rajrājī, Manāhij al-Taḥṣīl wa Natā’ij Laṭā’if al-Ta’wīl fī Sharḥ al-
Mudawwanahwa Ḥall Mushkilātih. ed. Abū al-Faḍl al-Dimyāṭī and Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. (Casablanca: 
Markaz al-Turāth al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 2007), 1:158-159. 
289 Al-Rajrājī is referring here to the ḥadīth related by ʿĀ’ishah that the Prophet found her weeping 
when they were about to perform. the Ḥajj pilgrimage. He said: “What is the matter? Have you got 
your period?” I [ʿĀ’ishah] replied: “Yes.” He said: “This is something God has decreed upon the 
daughters of Adam, so perform the ceremonies of the Ḥajj as the pilgrims do, but do not perform the 
circumambulation of the Kaʿbah until you are purified.” Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (305) and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 
(119). In the version in Muslim it reads: “until you perform the [ritual] bath.” It is worth noting that the 
statement is given in the context of comforting ʿĀ’ishah.  
290 This word is missing from the print edition, but the passage makes no sense without it. 
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As for how it is a punishment in everyday life, it is in how a woman practically 
every month is stained with filth, beset with faults, sullied with impurities, 
drowned in an abyss of dirtiness and pollution, and possessed of a disgusting 
smell. One is not drawn to her sexually but is rather repulsed by her more 
severely than one is frightened off by a lioness. What punishment and vexation 
could be worse than that? This is her inheritance from our mother Eve (peace be 
upon her). 
 
This view of menstruation was widespread in Arabia in pre-Islamic times, and was 
held by pagan Arabs and Jews alike. There are a number of ḥadīth traditions which 
are regarded as authentic where Prophet Muhammad is seen as calling people away 
this attitude. 
 
Equally interesting is al-Rajrājī’s claim that menstruation was inflicted upon women 
as a consequence of Eve’s disobedience. This is a matter of the unseen, and therefore 
one of theology, which can only be established by a verse of the Qur’an or a 
rigorously authenticated ḥadīth. This idea was certainly well circulated in the Muslim 
lands as part of the Isra’īliyyāt, but not as a ḥadīth.291 The fact that al-Rajrājī, writing 
in 633AH, can propound this attitude about menstruation and assert that it is a curse 
sent down upon Eve shows how commonplace and tenacious these ideas were in 
Muslim society, how firmly and permanently entrenched they were in the cultural 
mindset, regardless of how much those ideas might contrast with accepted Islamic 
teachings. Moreover, since al-Rajrājī’s claims about women are a digression, he is 
clearly not citing them to defend a ruling of the school. They can therefore be 
assumed to reflect his personal viewpoint and one that he thinks his readers will find 
amicable. 
                                                 
291 Al-Tabarī mentions in his Tārīkh, and his Tafsīr, 1:566, a non-prophetic tradition of this kind: “His 
Lord called out to him: ‘Adam, is it from Me that you are fleeing?’ Adam replied: ‘No, my Lord, but I 
feel shame before You.’ When God asked what had caused his trouble, he replied: ‘Eve, My Lord.’ 
Whereupon God said: ‘Now it is My obligation to make her bleed once every month, as she made this 
tree bleed. I also must make her stupid, although I created her intelligent (halimah), and must make her 
suffer pregnancy.’ Ibn Zayd continued: ‘Were it not for the affliction that affected Eve, the women of 
this world wound not menstruate, and they would be intelligent and, when pregnant, give birth easily’.” 
As translated by Franz Rosenthal in History of al-Tabari, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1989, Vol. 1, pp. 280-281. Spellberg suspects it to be derivative from the Jewish Midrash. D. A. 
Spellberg, “Writing the Unwritten Life of the Islamic Eve: Menstruation and the Demonization of 
Motherhood” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28:3  (1996), 323. Al-Ṭabarī narrates it 
from `Abd al-Rahmān b. Zayd b. Aslam al`Umarī who lived in  Madinah and died in 182 AH. This 
indicates how widely these ideas were circulating in the Muslim world from an early time. 
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All the same, these ideas about woman and menstruation do ultimately reflect upon 
al-Rajrājī’s legal arguments. He brings them to bear upon the unworthiness of women 
to lead prayer. This shows a strong connection between the interpretation of Islamic 
Law and the broader social attitudes and biases under which that interpretation takes 
place.  
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, al-Rajrājī does not consider a woman 
unworthy of leading other women in prayer. He argues, contrary to the generally 
accepted Mālikī opinion, that such a prayer is valid and explains that she poses not 
temptation to her fellow women. This means that he views the woman’s deficiency 
relative to the completeness of the man, and her unworthiness of honour as being 
relative to the man’s greater worthiness.  
 
This is not the case for the much later Mālikī scholar al-Nafrāwī. Writing in al-
Fawākih al-Dawānī, he takes al-Rajrājī’s argument about honour almost verbatim and 
applies it to women-only congregation. He writes: “This is the case even if men are 
absent, since leadership in prayer is a position of honour in religion and in the rites of 
the Muslims.” Al-Nafrāwī, therefore, goes further than al-Rajrājī, because he asserts 
that a woman is not worthy of honour or any kind of leadership in her own religion, 
even among women where no other rationale, like temptation or the presence of 
someone more “worthy”, exists for divesting her of such an honour. In al-Nafrāwī’s 
argument, her unworthiness of religious honour is not relative to that of a man, but 
rather an assessment of her inherent worth as a human being. 
 
 
B. Shāfiʿī Texts 
 
We find a similar attitude about a woman’s worthiness to lead men in prayer quoted 
from al-Shāfiʿī in al-Bayhaqī’s Manāqib, which is that “since prayer leadership is a 
degree of favour, it is impermissible for her to have a degree of favour over the one 
whom God has given a degree of favour over her.” This ideas does not appear in al-
Umm. However, since it comes from al-Shāfiʿī himself, this attitude could definitely 
help to explain the origin of the ruling within the Shāfiʿī school. 
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Likewise, al-Māwardī declares that a woman cannot lead prayer because it is “a 
position of authority and a position of honour, and a woman is not qualified to assume 
positions of authority.” Implicit in this is that she is not qualified for the honour it 
entails as well. This reading is supported by the fact that he compares women to 
(male) sinners with respect to being judges by explicitly invoking the “deficiency of 
being female”. He argues that since sinners are not allowed to be judges, it makes 
even more sense to prohibit women from being judges as well. The implication of this 
argument is that habitually and wantonly committing sin is less of a deficiency than 
being a woman. The same “deficiency of being female” is what he argues prevents 
her from holding positions of political authority. 
 
He also declares that the deficiency of a being a woman is greater for prayer than that 
of being a slave, chiefly because slavery “is an accidental quality that may cease to 
apply, whereas being female is an essential quality that never ceases to apply.” We 
can recall that a similar argument is also quoted from al-Shāfiʿī in Manāqib. 
Interestingly, this same argument could apply to a male sinner, since he can repent for 
his sinful behaviour and cease being deficient, but she can never remedy the 
deficiency of being a woman. 
 
It is important to understand here that al-Māwardī is trying to refute an argument he 
attributes to Abū Thawr that a woman can lead men in prayer because a slave can. 
The gist of the argument is that a slave is more deficient than a woman since the slave 
can be killed in retribution for killing a free woman while the reverse is untrue. Al-
Māwardī could have defused the argument by appealing to the fact that a slave is 
property and the destruction of property is different than the need for justice felt by 
the free victim’s kinsfolk. Al-Māwardī does not have to appeal to deficiency here at 
all. He chooses to do so, by emphasising the way in which a woman is more deficient 
than a slave.  
 
Another thing to note is the role that deficiency plays in the argument attributed to 
Abū Thawr. Even though Abū Thawr is trying to prove that a woman can lead men in 
prayers, the argument does not assert her completeness, but depends upon comparing 
her deficiency relative to that of a slave. This does not necessarily mean that Abū 
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Thawr thought women were deficient, especially since we do not have the argument 
from him directly, but it does mean that deficiency was the issue of contention for 
why women should or shoud not lead men in prayer.  
 
Al-Māwardī’s contemporary, al-Juwaynī admits that the need for the imām to possess 
completeness could be an argument for prohibiting women from leading men. 
However, he does not consider this a convincing reason, since their aptitude to lead 
prayers is demonstrated by their ability to lead other women. Al-Juwaynī does not 
deny that a woman lacks completeness; he just does not see in her incompleteness a 
legal justification for the ruling. This shows that at least in his case, the negative 
attitude about women is not merely being maintained to support a favoured legal 
ruling, but represents what al-Juwaynī acknowledges to be the prevailing point of 
view, if not indeed his own. 
 
Al-Rāfiʿī states that two of the reasons the supreme political leader must be male is 
that the leader must be “complete” and “respected”, meaning that a woman is neither. 
This is significant, not only in showing how women could be regarded with 
disrespect, but also that this lesser respect was deemed to be a natural and necessary 
state of affairs, something that could be used to justify rulings of a permanent and 
absolute nature. We have seen a similar argument given by the Mālikī scholar Ibn 
Rushd.  
 
It is worth noting that al-Rāfīʿī, while speaking about illiterate imāms292, compares the 
deficiency of being a woman to that of being illiterate, by arguing that one woman can 
follow another in the same way that one illiterate person can follow another, due to 
the shared deficiency in both cases. It is important to stress here that he is not saying 
the deficiency is of the same degree, just that they the essential concept of deficiency 
is the same for both. 
 
The commentators on the Minḥāj continue to assert deficiency as justification for 
prohibiting women from being judges and leading prayer. Al-Ramlī and al-Khaṭīb al-
Shirbīnī cite a woman’s deficiency as an independent reason for why she cannot be a 
                                                 
292 Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad al-Rāfiʿī, al-ʿAzīz Sharḥ al-Wajīz. ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad 
Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjud. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1997), 2:159. 
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judge. They also both assert that “the female is less than the male” as a reason why 
women cannot lead men in prayer. 
 
 
C. Hanbalī Texts 
 
The Ḥanbalī texts all cite that one reason a woman cannot be a judge is due to her 
being “deficient in intellect”. Though mentioned briefly in each text, it is presented in 
a straightforward manner as a primary justification for the ruling. It is coupled with 
her propensity to forget, her weak opinion, and her lack of perspicacity. 
 
Ibn Qudāmah describes four qualities as necessary for “completeness” in legal 
capacity. These are that a person is “adult, sane, male, and free.” This direct 
implication of this is that the opposite term embodies a deficiency in legal capacity. 
The seriousness of this deficiency can be seen when we consider the opposite terms: 
“juvenile, insane, female, and slave”. The state of being female is grouped with the 
staes of childishness, madness, and being the property of others.  
 
Why is he constructing legal capacity in this way? It can be noticed that two of the 
other constituents, being adult and sane, are descriptions of intellectual competence. 
For this to be the reason for adding being male to the list, it means that a woman’s 
intellectual deficiency must be assumed to be severe enough to curtail her legal 
capacity. She is, in other words, too intellectually incompetent to possess full legal 
capacity. Ibn Qudāmah does not need to take the notion of intellectal deficiency this 
far in order to argue against appointing a woman as a judge. It certainly goes farther 
that what can be drawn from the ḥadīth about a woman being deficient in intellect and 
religion. The fact that Ibn Qudāmah feels it is reasonable to categorise a woman in 
this way betrays how little regard there was for a woman’s intellectual capabilities. 
 
 
D. Hanafī Texts 
 
Ḥanafī Law is unique among the four schools in permitting women to be judges in 
matters wherein their testimony is allowed. Consequently, Hanafī jurists needed to 
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counter the other schools’ argument that a woman’s intellectual deficiency prevents 
her from being a judge. They did this by comparing her capacity to judge to that of 
her giving testimony. For instance, al-Zaylaʿī says: “She is qualified for the legal 
agency by which she is qualified to give testimony. Consequently, she is qualified to 
be a judge.” It is important to note, however, that in doing so they did not refute the 
principle that women are intellectually deficient. 
 
Indeed, Ibn al-Humām takes the question head-on. He openly admits to their 
intellectual deficiency, saying: “There is nothing in the Law [to prevent a woman 
from being a judge] aside from the deficiency of her intellect, and it is well known 
that this does not reach the extent of negating her authority altogether.” He argues that 
deficiency is relative and that some women can be exceptions to it. He asserts the 
“truth of our saying ‘man is better than woman’” while allowing for individual 
women to be better than individual men. Nevertheless, according to Ibn al-Humām, 
this innate deficiency is what ensures that granting her authority will result in those 
doing so being unsuccessful, and he goes so far to claim that this was the Prophet’s 
reason for saying so. His concession of this deficiency ultimately leads his to assert 
the ruling that appointing a woman as a judge is a sinful act, in spite of the validity of 
her appointment. His modification of the ruling of permissibility is readily adopted by 
the Ḥanafī jurists who come after him. 
 
We also have an elaborate argument by al-Bābartī, which al-Zaylaʿī and al-ʿAynī 
adopt, which categorises the intellect in the context of an Aristotelian distinction 
between the passive and active intellects, and then identifies the woman’s place of 
competence within it. They claim that a woman is competent at forming thoughts on 
the basis of “self-evident knowledge through the sensory perception of particular 
things”, but she is deficient in even simple abstract reasoning. They link this 
conclusion to the famous ḥadīth about women’s deficiency.  
 
As Bauer rightly asserts, this argument is meant to refute the Shafīʿī claim that a 
woman’s intellectual deficiency severely curtails her ability to be a witness.293 Bauer 
identifies it to be relatively more positive than the Shāfiʿi view on woman’s 
                                                 
293 Bauer, “Debates”, 11. 
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intellectual capacity, and cautions that it does not have to reflect the Ḥanafī scholars’ 
true attitude about women, which is probably no different than their Shāfiʿī 
counterparts.  
 
However, the argument is actually not more positive; it is just elaborate, and its 
negativity is far in excess of the more general and dismissive claims that Ḥanafī 
scholars had made earlier. The only point they need to argue in countering their 
Shāfiʿī opponents is that intellectual deficiency does not have to be all-encompassing, 
so it does not have to negate a woman’s competence as a witness.  It is clear why they 
would want to recruit a Greek philosophical framework. It provides their argument 
with a kind of “scientific” authority it otherwise would not have. This is gained at the 
expense of a good fit to their purposes. The argument is too strongly negative for their 
needs. To say that women are fully capable of elementary thinking in processing 
sensory input, but are deficient in engaging with abstract though on even a basic level, 
actually hurts the Ḥanafī position that not only gives women an expanded role as 
witnesses where processing sensory input is needed, but allows them to be judges, 
where abstract reasoning is required. It would have been enough for them to say that 
women’s intellectual deficiency is real but relative, like Ibn al-Humām does, or to say 
that it refers to a greater propensity to forget, like al-Marghīnānī does. This latter 
argument accords better with the hadith, since the ḥadīth links the deficiency to a 
Qur’anic verse which identifies forgetfulness as the problem.  
 
Instead, they introduce a needless argument limiting the woman’s ability to engage in 
abstract thought. Since they feel compelled to do this, it must have been a widely-held 
view of the woman’s intellect at the time. This is indeed the case.  For instance, al-
Ghazālī actually defines abstract knowledge as something women are unable to 
grasp.294 He states this in al-Mustaṣfā, a legal theory work which enjoyed widespread 
popularity at the time with all four schools of law, and he is followed in this by other 
legal theorists. Therefore, it was a widespread view, at least among intellectuals from 
the fifth century A.H. onwards, that women were incapable of all but the most 
rudimentary abstract thought. 
                                                 
294 al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā 1, 131: “Abstract [knowledge] is that which is subject to doubt and for 
which [people’s] circumstances vary, so that some people will know it while others will not, and it is 
not known by women, children and others who do not have an aptitude for abstract thinking.” The 
Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Qudāmah adopts the same definition in Rawḍah al-Nāẓir, 1, 350. 
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Under such pressure, Ḥanafī scholars would have had to defend their opinions. Here, 
a complex philosophical categorisation of the intellect is read back into a ḥadīth 
which gives no indication of such things. Then, women are categorised in such a way 
to conclude, implicitly on the ḥadīth’s authority, that they cannot be political leaders. 
Needless to say, the ḥadīth does not refer to political leadership, and the specific 
context in the Ḥanafī legal texts does not call for bringing it up, since what is being 
discussed in both cases is a woman being a witness. The only reason it is brought up 
is because al-Mārghinānī presents it as point in the Shāfiʿī argument he quotes, but 
one he does not respond to in his refutation. Therefore, when al-Bābirtī grants this 
point on political leadership to his Shāfiʿī opponents, he is appealing to a point of 
commonality between them which he can use to contrast where their schools’ 
positions differ. For this to work, al-Bābirtī has to be invoking an already widespread 
assumption about women’s intellectual competence and its relationship to leadership. 
Later on, we will see this line of thinking having a marked affect on the Ḥanafī 
position on women judges, with Ibn al-Humām effectively negating the possibility. 
This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Though directed at their Shāfiʿī opponents, this Ḥanafī argument provides nothing for 
Shāfiʿī jurists to refute. This is because it does not show where to draw the line in 
allowing women to be witnesses, which remains a judgement call. The Ḥanafīs draw 
the line at matters wherein an element of doubt (shubhah) negates legal consequences. 
This principle is intrinsic to Ḥanafī thought. It is therefore not surprising that non-
Ḥanafī jurists do not take up this appeal to Greek philosophy in their discourse on 
women’s intellectual deficiency. It is easier for them to make vague and general 
references to women’s limited intellectual competence which they can use to justify a 
broad spectrum of legal consequences.  
 
Deficiency is again addressed in the surveyed Ḥanafī works where al-Kāsānī rules out 
the possibility that a woman’s lowliness negates a man’s prayer when she prays in 
congregation alongside him. However, the argument he uses is that: “a woman is not 
lowlier than as a dog or a pig and their coming in line [with a man] does not nullify 
[his prayer].” This asserts her lowliness while negating its relevance to the legal ruling 
in question. His choice of words is telling. He specifically says she “is not lowlier 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
than” (lā takūn akhassa min), which does not rule out that her lowliness might be 
commensurate with theirs. 
 
Likewise, we see no hurry on the part of al-Bābirtī and Ibn al-Humām to deny a 
woman’s deficiency or even minimise its extent when they discuss whether it it 
possible for her deficiency to be the reason why she cannot lead men in prayers. They 
just point out that a sinner and a slave (al-Bābirtī also adds a blind man) can lead 
prayer, so deficiency is ruled out as the reason. Admittedly, this implies that the 
woman’s deficiency is not greater than that of a sinner or a slave, but it also clarifies 
the nature of deficiency as these jurists understand it. It is not some abstract 
theoretical concept, but something acutely real with tangible examples. 
 
 
E. Summary 
 
The assumption that women are deficient is prevalent in the works of all four schools 
of thought. Intellectual deficiency is cited uniformly as a reason to prohibit women 
from being judges. Even the Ḥanafī jurists concede this point, with the later one’s 
declaring the appointment of women to judicial posts a sinful act on account of it, 
understanding this deficiency to be the reason why people do not succeed when 
women are placed in authority over them.  
 
Notions of deficiency are not limited to specific limitations in reason and religion. 
They go much further. The most explicit statements in this regard are seen in the 
Mālikī works. Ibn Rushd compares a woman to a slave to prohibit her from being a 
judge, while al-Māzirī, and al-Qarāfī, while discussing prayer leadership assert that a 
woman’s deficiency is worse than that of a slave, with al-Qarāfī making her situation 
in congregational prayer “worse than a child.” Al-Rajrājī takes this line of thinking to 
the greatest extent, divesting the woman of any entitlement to honour in Muslim 
society – an attitude also expressed by the late Mālikī jurist al-Nafrāwī – and accusing 
her of being punished by her monthly menstrual cycle. 
 
Such extensions of the notion of deficiency are not limited to the Mālikī school. Al-
Māwardī also expresses the opinion that women are not entitled to positions of 
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honour. He also offers analogical arguments that depend on a woman’s deficiency 
being greater than that of a wanton sinner or a slave, ostensibly because those other 
afflictions can be remedied, as opposed to the state of being a woman. We see with 
another Shāfiʿī scholar, al-Rāfiʿī, that a woman inherently does not command respect. 
He is also willing to compare the nature of her deficiency to that of an illiterate 
person. Likewise, the Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn al-Qudāmah defines human completeness in 
terms of being “adult, sane, male, and free,” lumping the condition of being female 
with the opposites of those other attributes. The Ḥanafī jurist al-Kāsānī has no 
inhibitions about making a comparison between a woman and a dog or a pig. These 
ideas cannot be attributed to the textual evidence found in “deficient in intellect and 
religion”, and therefore must represent broader attitudes about gender. It is worth 
noting that the attitudes identified above cover the entire geographical and temporal 
scope of the works in the survey. 
 
 
III. THE WOMAN AS TEMPTRESS 
 
A. Mālikī Texts 
 
Al-Qarāfī states that a woman cannot be a judge because of the temptation she poses 
for the men present in court. He compares this situation with two rulings about prayer 
to argue that since she is not supposed to be seen or heard by men even in this most 
respectful and reverent of circumstances due to the temptation she poses to the male 
worshippers, she should likewise not appear as a judge in court where she will pose a 
temptation to criminals. 
 
What is most significant in this is how he places the blame for this upon the woman 
herself. He does not argue that sending women to the back rows in prayer is simply 
for the welfare of the worshippers, but says that it represents “the utmost deficiency” 
for women. This casts the woman as an innate temptress, so that the desire her body 
inspires in men is a deficiency of her being and not of theirs, even when she is not 
acting in a willfully provocative manner. This is what is given here as the rationale for 
the analogy. It is significant, therefore, that the text he cites to assert that the woman 
must keep away from men in prayer is “Send them to the back…” which has its 
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origins in a story of a woman from the Children of Israel who was behaving 
provocatively in the temple, necessitating that women be sent behind the men. 
 
Al-Māzirī also justifies not allowing a woman to lead prayer because her voice is 
shameful. Al-Rajrājī reiterates this and goes further to describe the problems that a 
woman prayer leader would pose for the male worshippers who would have to look at 
her in order to follow her motions in prayer, describing this situation as the “utmost in 
temptation”. It seems almost inconceivable that a man can look at a woman without 
immediately sexualising her, even if she is fully dressed and engaged in prayer. 
Moreover, we can discern from his previously quoted discussion on menstruation that 
he regards her sexualisation as an important constituent of her human worth. He 
argues that menstruation is a punishment for her in her worldly life because it makes 
her less sexually attractive to men, and concludes: “What punishment and vexation 
could be worse than that?” 
 
 
B. Shāfiʿī Texts 
 
Al-Māwardī describes the woman as a “shameful being” and that her leading prayers 
will cause male worshippers to feel temptation towards her. One of the reasons it is 
allowed for a male slave to lead men in prayers but not a free woman is because his 
voice will not bring temptation to the men following him.  
 
His contemporary al-Juwaynī does not agree that the risk of temptation can be the 
rationale to prohibit women from leading prayers, because a man would then be able 
to follow his wife or sister without a problem. However, he agrees with the sentiment, 
by declaring that otherwise the argument would not be far-fetched. His wording 
shows his confirmation of the idea that being visible and in public is “inappropriate 
for the status of women.” Al-Juwaynī finds the attitude about the temptation posed by 
women to be perfectly reasonable, but he does not see in it a legal justification for the 
ruling. This is another case where the attitude being expressed cannot be interpreted 
as an argument to defend the legal ruling, but rather an attitude that the jurist 
considers to be widespread and acceptable, and likely his own personal view.  
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Al-Rāfīʿī states that it is inappropriate for a woman to be a judge because she will 
unavoidably sit among men and raise her voice in their presence. He describes this 
behaviour as “inappropriate” but does not say it is because she causes men temptation 
by exhibiting this behaviour. In any case, al-Rāfiʿī’s choice of words shows he 
considers such behaviour to show impropriety. 
 
All three commentators on al-Minhāj cite the prohibition of women mixing with men 
to be a reason why they cannot be political leaders, and it is reiterated again in 
Nihāyah al-Muhtāj with reference to being a judge, with the addition that a woman is 
supposed to remain in seclusion, and again with reference to leading men in prayers. 
 
 
C. Hanbalī Texts 
 
The Ḥanbalī texts consistently assert that one of the reasons a woman cannot serve as 
a judge is because she is “unsuited to be present in the assemblies of men.” This is a 
problem because the “judge is approached by men”. Though not explicitly stated, it is 
safe to assume the reason for this is the temptation women cause to men. It certainly 
indicates that a woman mixing with men is deemed impropriety, as she is not “suited” 
for such behaviour. 
 
The need to prevent temptation can be seen in the justification Ibn Qudāmah and Ibn 
Mufliḥ give for why a woman stands in the rank with the congregation while leading 
them in prayer, since this is more concealing for her than standing ahead of them, 
because she is partially blocked from view by the women on either side. The fact that 
this rationale would be seen as reasonable to explain a practice in a women-only 
congregation which usually does not take place in view of men illustrates the great 
risk of temptation women were perceived as posing to men. 
 
 
D. Hanafī Texts 
 
Some of the earlier Ḥanafī texts assert that the reason a woman nullifies a man’s 
prayer when a woman prays alongside him in the same congregation is due to the 
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temptation she poses for the man. Al-Sarakhsī writes that: “the state of prayer is one 
of communion, so it is inappropriate that any thoughts of lust should cross his mind. 
Such [thoughts] are rarely avoidable with a woman standing in line with him”. In 
other words, her very proximity at his side makes temptation almost inevitable for a 
man, even when both of them are engaged in prayer and intent on following someone 
else as an imām. Al-Sarakhsī cannot even argue in this case that the man would have 
to look at the woman in order to follow her, as would be the case with prayer 
leadership. Moreover, thoughts of lust are nearly inevitable regardless of the woman’s 
appearance, attire, personality, or deportment. Even if we were to assume that he does 
not intend elderly women here, it still presents a picture where men are rarely able to 
view women as anything other than sex objects. 
 
Al-Sarakhsī also argues that the reason why women-only congregations should not be 
performed is because of “the temptation posed by their congregating.” He certainly 
does not mean that they cause temptation for each other. Rather, a group of women 
praying together brings added enticement to any men who might chance to see them. 
 
Al-Kāsānī does not agree that the reason the man’s prayer is nullified is because the 
woman poses a temptation for him. The reason he gives, rather, is that the temptation 
is too pervasive for it to be the effective cause of the ruling. He says that “the man’s 
heart is occupied and stricken with lust” and then adds that: “the woman shares in this 
meaning with the man.” Since the woman’s prayer is still valid, he concludes there 
must be some other reason why the man’s prayer is nullified. He is nearly alone in the 
surveyed works for taking the woman’s sexual desire into consideration. Only he and 
al-Zaylaʿī who comes after him recognize the existence of a woman’s sexual feelings. 
All other discussions focus only on the temptation that that women pose for men. 
Still, for al-Kāsānī, it is nearly impossible for men and women to be in proximity with 
each other without temptation posing a threat. 
 
Regarding women-only congregations, al-Kāsānī upholds the notion that the woman 
leading prayer stands in their midst because the woman’s “circumstance is based on 
concealment.” Concealment of women, and of women alone, is required to prevent 
sexual temptation; therefore, al-Kāsānī maintains al-Sarakhsī position on the matter. 
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This also indicates that al-Kāsānī does not intend by the mutual temptation he 
discussed earlier that it is equal for men and women.  
 
Al-Zaylaʿī reasserts temptation as a rationale for the ruling about women coming in 
line with men and returns the focus on the temptation suffered by men, though he 
acknowledges women have sexual feelings. He says that in prayer: “It is not 
appropriate to occur to his mind any reason to excite him, on account of it possibly 
causing the nullification of his prayer, and her being in line with a man is not free 
from that most of the time.” Here, the woman’s unavoidable role as temptress is clear. 
She has this effect on him “most of the time.” In spite of his acknowledging the 
existence of desire on the woman’s part, it is only the man who is in peril by the lust 
provoked by her proximity, and this danger of lust is so great that even its possibility 
can cause his prayers to God to be nullified. 
 
With Ibn al-Humām, the idea is put to rest that the man’s prayer is nullified due to the 
temptation the woman causes. However, the idea that the woman presents a 
temptation is still very much in evidence in the attitudes of the later Ḥanafī jurists. 
They uphold the idea that the requirement to “send them to the back” applies to a 
“woman of desirable age”, regardless of whether the woman is sexually mature. A girl 
of “desirable age” is described in Tanwīr al-Abṣār as “any woman who has reached 
the age of nine, but eight or seven if she is plump.” What matters for the ruling to take 
affect is her potential to attract men. The unavoidable temptation that women present 
to men is still seen to underlie the ruling, though this may not be recognised as the 
immediate cause of the man’s prayer being nullified. Likewise, the idea persists in 
later Ḥanafī works that women-only congregations cause too much exposure, in spite 
of arguments presented by al-ʿAynī to the contrary. 
 
We can also note that the Ibn ʿĀbidīn justifies that women are not allowed to be heads 
of state because they are “commanded to remain in their homes and their 
circumstances are structured upon concealment.” The theme persists that women must 
be confined and concealed because of the threat of temptation they cause for men.  
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E. Summary 
 
The idea that the presence of women causes excessive sexual temptation for men is 
common to all four schools of thought. It is considered a sufficient reason to prevent 
women from holding public office. It is also accepted that women engaged in prayer 
are a temptation for the men who might see them. All but the Ḥanafī scholars cite this 
directly as a reason to disallow women to lead men in prayers, but we find even they 
suggest that a woman prayer leader would cause temptation for men if she is seen 
standing ahead of a women-only congregation. The Ḥanafī jurist al-Zaylaʿī suggests 
that the mere proximity of a woman worshipper can inspire enough lust in a man to 
directly nullify his prayer. The concern is almost universally for the sexual desires of 
men, with only two works in the survey acknowledging that women feel sexual desire 
as well. 
 
 
IV. THE WOMAN’S ROLE IN SOCIETY 
 
A. Mālikī Texts 
 
We have already seen that the woman is denied any participation in society in any 
lofty station or position of honour, due to her innate deficiency. The comparison made 
by Ibn Rushd between a woman and a slave wavers between the idea that she cannot 
command respect in society or that she is always subject to someone else’s authority. 
All of this has been discussed above. Clearly, this indicates a very low status for 
women in society and an attitude that a woman’s role in public life should be severely 
curtailed. The Mālikī texts are direct and explicit on the subject. 
 
 
B. Shāfiʿī Texts 
 
Al-Shāfiʿī, arguing in al-Umm why women should not lead men in prayer, makes a 
general appeal to men’s responsibility over women, and their being restricted from 
holding positions of authority, “among other things”. This is a clear reference to a 
woman’s place in society, and it is the only reason he gives why a man’s prayer is 
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invalid if he follows a woman. This argument is given more clarity in the passage al-
Bayhaqī’s quotes in his biography of al-Shāfiʿī. Here, al-Shāfiʿī depicts the man’s 
responsibility as being absolute, so that it should never be undermined by the woman 
being placed in a position of authority over him. In other words, his prayer is nullified 
because he is allowing the woman access to what is outside and above her proper 
place in society. In this way, a verse about marital duties is brought to bear on the 
validity of a man’s prayer. 
 
Al-Māwardī also cites the verse about marital duites “Men are responsible for 
women...” to divest women of leadership positions, for both prayer and judicial 
authority. However, he provides his own rationale for interpreting the verse in this 
way. He argues that what God has “favoured some over others” in the verse refers to 
the man’s intellect and opinion, and that this is why women are not to be placed in 
positions of responsibility over men. He is identifying two separate things here; first 
her intellectual capacity which is less than a man’s, then her opinion, which God has 
given to men more than women. This latter quality is not entirely dependent on the 
former. It is also dependent on education and life experience. Al-Māwardī, by arguing 
that men are favoured over women in this matter as well, is assuming that men are 
blessed with greater experience and education by divine favour. Women, 
consequently, are of weaker opinion. What al-Māwardī is doing is taking the 
consequences of limited educational and advancement opportunities for women as 
something inherent to the women and their divinely-ordained position in society. In 
short, women are silly and ill-informed by nature and by nurture. 
 
This attitude is also seen in al-Nawawī’s discussion about women praying in 
congregation where he argues that it is better for the women to follow a man as imām 
instead of another woman, because the man “is more knowledgeable about prayer.” 
His argument takes it for granted that this will be the case, and that this state of affairs 
is common enough to be the basis for a legal ruling.  
 
Al-Rāfiʿi states that the head of state must be a man in order to be able to devote 
himself to his duties. Al-Rāfiʿī is suggesting it is not possible for a woman to be able 
to do so, that the proper woman’s role is so intrinsically tied to domestic duties that 
the idea of a woman foregoing such duties is not even entertained. He is followed in 
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this line of thinking by al-Ramlī in Nihāyah al-Muḥtāj. This does not mean to say that 
women were actually limited to domestic roles in the society of these jurists’ time, but 
it does show that such expectations were held to be reasonable and proper.  
 
Al-Rāfiʿi’s argument also brings up the question of a woman’s perceived autonomy in 
society. In order to categorically rule out the possibility of a woman relinquishing 
domestic duties, it means that al-Rāfiʿī has to assume there is some authority in place 
within society to prevent her from doing so, like her relatives or her husband. 
Moreover, according to him, the threat of causing temptation for men makes her 
“(un)able to mix with men”, thus further limiting her to the domestic sphere. He is 
followed again in this justification by the three commentators of al-Minhāj, with al-
Ramlī asserting that women are supposed to remain in seclusion. 
 
These perception of women had a profound effect on the rulings regarding women in 
leadership. The fact that al-Shāfiʿī appeals to the responsibility of men over women to 
divest women of positions of power is indicative of how a general attitude towards the 
role of women in society could be instrumental in the development of these rulings 
during the formative period. 
 
 
C. Ḥanbalī Texts 
 
Like we have seen above with al-Māwardī, the Ḥanbalī texts distinguish between a 
woman’s intellectual deficiency and her poor opinion. They all repeat the assertion 
that she is “weak of opinion” or “lacking in opinion” as well as her being “deficient in 
intellect.” This is in opposition to the qualifications required of a judge, which Ibn 
Qudāmah describes as: “to be possessed of a full range of opinions, and have 
complete intellectual faculties and perspicacity.” 
 
Al-Zarkashī accentuates the distinction between intellectual deficiency and poor 
opinion by how he justifies each. He says her intellectual deficiency is “established by 
textual evidence”, which is an obvious reference to the ḥadīth in which women are 
described as being “deficient in intellect and religion”. He then supports his assertion 
that the woman is “lacking in opinion and perspicacity” by saying it is indicated by 
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the verse where a woman’s testimony needs to be supported by that of another woman 
in case she errs. Again, we see the lack of worldly wisdom and broad experince cast 
as an inherent quality of women and the natural order of things. Women are not 
assumed to be capable of properly understanding the public sphere, let alone engaging 
in it. This can also be seen in Ibn Qudāmah’s describing complete legal capacity as 
entailing the qualities of being “adult, sane, male, and free.” A woman’s public 
participation is limited like that of a child, a mad person, and a slave. In the first of 
these cases, the person does not have the worldly experience and maturity of vision to 
act with discretion and self-interest in matters requiring legal capacity. In the second, 
the person lacks the sense to do so. In the third, the person lacks autonomy. 
 
Also, the threat of temptation women present to men requires limiting them to the 
domestic sphere, since any public engagement is deemed “inappropriate”. 
 
 
D. Hanafī Texts 
 
We see here again that the threat of temptation caused by women forces them into 
being limited to the domestic sphere. We have seen where Ibn ʿĀbidīn justifies why 
women are not allowed to be heads of state because they are “commanded to remain 
in their homes and their circumstances are structured upon concealment.” Indeed he 
presents this as the primary reason for prohibiting women from leadership positions, 
citing the ḥadīth of Abī Bakrah almost as if it were a confirmation of this meaning. 
 
In the rulings on congregational prayer, we find a drastic measure to exclude women 
from public participation in Muslim ritual life. The imām is expected to exclude 
women from his intention when he leads the prayers, and thereby prevent them from 
being able to participate. Ḥanafī jurists argue that this is necessary to safeguard the 
prayers of the men from being nullified by a woman coming in line with them.  
 
It is reasonable that the jurists would want to safeguard the men’s prayers. Yet, there 
are many other recommendations they could have come up with, like mosque 
arrangements for women that are found throughout the Muslim world. Instead, they 
preferred to have the imām consciously exclude women from his intention. In this 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
way, barring women from a ritual act of worship becomes an aspect of the ritual itself. 
As serious as this is, Ḥanafī jurists found it much easier than devising more 
accommodating ways of protecting the men’s prayers. 
 
Of course, this ease comes as a consequence of the Ḥanafī jurists’ general negative 
attitude towards women attending the mosque, whom they variously discourage or 
prohibit due to the temptation that women cause for men.295 They arrive at these 
rulings  in spite of numerous prophetic traditions describing how women attended the 
mosque during the Prophet’s lifetime as well as traditions where he is quoted as 
expressly advocating for the women’s right to so, like: “Do not forbid the 
handmaidens of God from the houses of God.”296   
 
What is significant here is how the jurists handle the threat of temptation. They do so 
by excluding women form the mosque, not by finding ways to accommodate them 
and their right to participate. This shows the effect that prevailing perceptions about 
women’s public role can have on the development of legal rulings. The pressures to 
exclude women from the mosque due to temptation first appeared during the 
formative period, as evidenced by traditions like the one related from Ibn ʿUmar 
where he tells his son that the Prophet said: “Do not forbid the women from the 
mosques if they seek your permission to go.”, to which his son replies: “By God, we 
will surely forbid them.” after which Ibn ʿUmar curses him and says: “I inform you of 
what God’s Messenger says and you say ‘By God, we will forbid them.’!”297  
 
The is also the tradition from ʿĀ’ishah that she said: “Had God’s Messenger known 
what women would start doing, he would have forbidden them from the mosques just 
like the women of the Children of Israel were forbidden.”298 These traditions affirm 
that women attended the mosque during the Prophet’s lifetime as well as after his 
death, while also informing us of when and why social pressures began mounting for 
the practice to be discontinued. 
                                                 
295 For those who want a thorough, diachronic treatment of the Ḥanafī rulings, evidence, and legal 
arguments for barring women from attending the mosque, they should refer to Behnam Sadeghi, The 
Logic of Law Making in Islam, 105-127. He shows this to be a negative trend where the ruling becomes 
more restrictive over time, slowly overcoming legal inertia. 
296 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (900) and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (136). 
297 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (135 and 140). 
298 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (869) and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (144). 
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The perceived problem is that social life cannot function when men and women are 
present together, due to the inevitable temptation that women cause for men. The  
solution is to exclude women, even in a matter like their right to observe prayer at the 
mosque. The ease by which exclusion is preferred over accommodation attests to the 
social values present from the formative period onwards, and it brings the Ḥanafī 
school to the point where it makes the imām’s mental exclusion of women a 
recommended aspect of the prayer ritual. 
 
 
E. Summary 
 
There is a uniform perception that women are to be limited to the domestic sphere. 
This is often linked with the necessity for concealment to prevent the temptation of 
men, who must be granted the opportunity to carry out their public functions without 
distractions. 
 
There is also the notion that women are unable to devote themselves to public duties 
because of their domestic commitments. This is explicitly stated by the Shāfiʿī jurist 
al-Rāfiʿī and implied in the comparison made by the Ibn Rushd in his comparison 
between women and slaves.  
 
The perception of women as ill-informed and unable to comprehend weighty affairs is 
evident in the works of all but the Ḥanafī school, which has a different understanding 
of women’s competence to be judges. The Shāfīʿī jurist al-Māwardī and Ḥanbalī texts 
are most explicit in presenting this attitude. The strong Mālikī assertions of women’s 
deficiency suffice to include them as well, and ultimately the Ḥanafī jurists reveal 
themselves to consider women’s intellectual deficiency – which they never went so 
far as to deny – to be a sufficient impediment to high-level engagement in public life. 
There is an interesting phenomenon at work here. The inability of women to develop 
the competence to engage in public life in an informed and competent manner is a 
direct consequence of their relegation to the domestic sphere and the limitations and 
demands that this places on them. However, their “weakness of opinion” is not being 
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perceived as consequences of their limited life opportunities, but as a further 
justification to limit them. 
 
 
V. GENDER HIERARCHIES 
 
This topic is closely related to the notions of deficiency discussed above. Indeed it 
depends on them. The concept of a gender hierarchy is implicit wherever a woman’s 
innate deficiency in essential matters is posited relative to a man’s completeness, 
especially where the consequence is an expanded public role for men, as is the case 
with all four schools of thought. In a few instances, however, jurists have gone further 
and elaborated this hierarchical structure more explicitly. The difference is one of 
focus. With gender hierarchies, the focus is on the arrangement of various genders in 
degrees according to inherent status and the way placement within the ranking is used 
to justify the legal rulings.  
 
 
A. Mālikī Texts 
 
Ibn Rushd asserts a gender hierarchy in matters of prayer when he justifies the 
possibility that women can lead other women since they are “of the same rank 
(martabah) when it comes to prayer”. He understands the positioning of men and 
women in congregational prayer to be a disparity of rank. He is discussing that “the 
Sunnah with respect to their prayers is for them to be kept behind the men”. He does 
not perceive this as a mere ritual requirement, or even simply a means to prevent 
temptation, but an actual disparity in status when it comes to conducting worship. 
 
This idea is echoed by al-Qarāfī when he says that “her situation is worse than that of 
a child, due to the command that she be sent to the back ranks, unlike him.” The word 
he uses is aswa’, the comparative form of sayyi’, which means to be bad or evil. Al-
Qarāfī is describing the woman’s state and not the woman herself with this 
comparative adjective, meaning that her status in prayer is worse to that of a male 
child, because unlike him she is sent to the back. This is telling, since a male child is 
not legally accountable for his prayer, while a woman’s is, but this does not prevent 
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him form positing a hierarchical ranking between the adult woman and the male child 
based solely on gender. 
 
An interesting connection between the tradition “Send them to the back” and the 
subordinate status of women is made by the eight-century Mālikī jurist Ibn al-Ḥājj in 
his legal work al-Madkhāl where he uses the tradition to justify why he places the 
chapter on washing the corpse before the chapter on childbirth. He writes:299 
 
It would have been appropriate for this chapter to be placed ahead of the 
previous one on washing the corpse and its aforementioned associated rulings. 
This is because the creation [of life] comes first and death follows thereafter. 
However, since the rulings of childbirth are specific to women, they are 
mentioned later, on account of the Prophet’s saying: “Send them to the back 
whence God has sent them to the back.” 
 
It is interesting that he does not cite this tradition to support any legal ruling in the 
book. He only mentions it this once to justify his organization of the book’s chapters. 
Here, there is no question of polemical motives, since he is not debating any legal 
question. He sees women as being subordinated in the most general possible sense 
and understands the tradition to be proof of this. As a consequence, even Islamic legal 
rulings that pertain only to women are inherently subordinate to those that apply to 
men, even when the man in question is a corpse. 
 
In Ḥashiyah al-Dasūqī, we see that the gender hierarchy in prayer proves problematic 
for Mālikī scholars coping with the question of an angel leading the prayer, as 
depicted in the account of the Prophet’s night journey. Since an angel is not 
understood as being male, what status does an angel have? One solution given is that 
the condition of being male only means that the person is “neither confirmed a woman 
nor a hermaphrodite”. This makes a woman’s status very low indeed. Others more 
sensibly suggest that the relevance of gender applies only to human beings, not to 
other beings upon whom prayer is enjoined. A consequence of this latter line of 
thinking is a ruling that a male jinnī can lead humans in prayer while a human female 
                                                 
299 Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-ʿAbdarī al-Fāsī (Ibn al-Hājj), al-Madkhal. (Dār al-Turāth, no date or 
city), 3:281. 
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cannot. It would indeed follow from this logic that a female jinniyyah should be able 
to lead human men in prayer, but al-Dasūqī is careful to assert that the jinn “share our 
legal rulings.” 
 
 
B. Shāfiʿī Texts 
 
The principle that equality of status is a crucial consideration for prayer leadership is 
suggested by al-Rāfiʿī in his discussion about illiterate people being able to play 
together as well as women being able to pray together. The issue in both cases is one 
of “equal deficiency”. 
 
The rationale of inherent gender-based inferiority as the reason for women not leading 
men in prayer persists in the Shāfiʿī legal literature, both within and outside the works 
under survey, and at times becomes very elaborate pronounced.  In the following 
passage from the foremost Shāfīʿī scholar of his day, Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, people are 
categorizes into eight levels, in ascending order, with respect to their eligibility to lead 
prayers, with level one, the lowest, being for the unbeliever who can lead no one in 
prayer and level eight, the highest, being for a person who is “safe” from the various 
negative qualities possessed by all the others. What concerns us are categories near to 
the bottom, categories three and four:300 
 
The third [category] is that of one whose prayer leadership is invalid except for 
those who are beneath him. This is the hermaphrodite, since his prayer 
leadership is valid for the female, but not for a man, since he is less than [a 
man], nor for a hermaphrodite due to the possibility that he is a man while the 
[hermaphrodite] imām is a woman. 
 
The fourth category is one whose prayer leadership is invalid save for one who 
is similar. This is the female and the illiterate person, [the latter being] one who 
mispronounces a letter from the Fātiḥah. The female’s prayer leadership is valid 
                                                 
300 Zakariyyā b. Muḥammad  al-Anṣārī, Tuḥfah al-Ṭullāb fī Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Lubāb. ed. Khalaf  Mafḍī 
jabr al-Muṭlaq. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2006), 155. 
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for a female like her, but not for a man or a hermaphrodite, since she is less than 
they are. 
 
We can see here that prayer leadership is not status-neutral. It is linked to inherent 
status. There is a clear hierarchy at play based on gender. A woman is prohibited to 
lead men in prayer, not because of some consideration of the general welfare or 
simply divine writ, but rather as a consequence of her lesser worth in the gender 
hierarchy. She is less than a man, so she should not lead a man. We can see here that a 
hermaphrodite, by virtue of possessing some male characteristics, is represented as 
being more perfect and complete than a woman and that is why the hermaphrodite can 
lead a woman but not a man.  
 
What is interesting here is how the hermaphrodite is brought into the system. The 
hermaphrodite provides a serious challenge to the gender binary and to any legal 
ruling or social system that makes sharp distinctions between male and female. This 
can be seen in the confusion here regarding their ranking. Hermaphrodites are placed 
in the third category, which is apparently below the fourth. However, the difference 
between the two categores is that members of the third cannot lead people of an equal 
rank, but only those who are below them, while member of the fourth can lead people 
who are equal to them in rank. However, it turns out that women, ostensibly in the 
fourth category, are the very people identified as being beneath the heromaphrodite in 
rank.  
 
It is easy to imagine how hermaphrodites could have been made a kind of legal 
outcast, pushed to the farthest margins of the gender hierarchy, but this is not what we 
see here. Instead, hermaphrodites are placed above women. This move is 
understandable only if the woman is presented as representing the greatest possible 
human deficiency in contrast to the human completeness of the man. It then follows 
that to whatever extent a particular hermaphrodite possesses male genitalia, that 
hermaphrodite is more complete than any woman not so endowed. This idea persists 
in the Shāfiʿī legal literature. The idea that “the female is less than the male” is used 
to justify women not being allowed to lead men or hermaphrodites in prayer in the 
late Shāfiʿī works Nihāyah al-Muḥtāj and Mughnī al-Muḥtāj. 
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C. Summary and Analysis 
 
As already discussed, gender hierarchies are implicit in all of the schools of thought,  
discernible through the three themes of deficiency, temptation, and limited public life. 
They are brought into sharper focus in certain texts. What is interesting to note is that 
these hierarchies are presented most explicitly in matters of spiritual leadership, rather 
than in reference judicial or political leadership. This appears to be in stark contrast to 
a number of verses of the Qur’ān that attest to the innate spiritual equality of men and 
women, like Sūrah al-Aḥzāb (33): 35: 
 
For Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for devout men 
and women, for true men and women, for men and women who are patient and 
constant, for men and women who humble themselves, for men and women 
who give in charity, for men and women who fast (and deny themselves), for 
men and women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage 
much in God's praise; for them God has prepared forgiveness and great reward. 
 
Another pertinent verse is Sūrah al-Tawbah (9): 71, since it establishes a reciprocal 
relationship between men and women as being guardians to one another and then 
makes an explicit reference to prayer: 
 
And (as for) the believing men and the believing women, they are guardians of 
each other; they enjoin good and forbid evil and keep up prayer and pay the 
poor-rate, and obey God and His Messenger; (as for) these, God will show 
mercy to them; surely God is Mighty, Wise. 
 
These verses would seem to negate the existence of any hierarchy in religious worship 
based on gender. Asma Barlas observes that “such a regime of mutuality is 
conceivable only in the absence of hierarchies and inequalities based in the idea of 
sexual differentiation.”301 
 
                                                 
301 Barlas, Believing Women, 148. 
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It is obvious that the jurist who felt the need to set up explicit gender hierarchies to 
justify why women cannot lead men in prayer. must have thought that doing so 
provided a more compelling argument. The question remains as to why they felt this 
to be the case.  
 
These explicit hierarchies begin appearing in the legal literature at roughly the same 
time. We see them with Shāfīʿī scholar al-Rāfiʿī and the Mālikī scholars Ibn Rushd 
and al-Qarāfī. If we go back about a century, during the time of al-Ghazālī, we find 
that the answer might lie in the field of ethics and the manner in which it was 
developing in the Arab world at the time. Leila Ahmed points out that verses like 
33:35 balance virtues and ethical qualities between the genders302. She also points out 
that “the egalitarian conception of gender inhering in the ethical vision of Islam” were 
in stark contrast to “the social and political dimensions of virtue” espoused by 
Aristotle, who saw women as innately different and socially inferior to men. The 
development of ethical thought in Islam was very much influenced by classical Greek 
thinking, and this means that the intellectual classes of urban Muslim society were 
engaging with the perspectives found in those teaching at the very time when the four 
schools of thought were coming into their fullness. Indeed, Aristotelian arguments 
about women seem to be echoed by the Shāfiʿī scholars from the fifth century AH 
onwards.  
 
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 502 AH) is a very pivotal figure in the assimilation of Greek 
teachings into mainstream Sunni ethical thought. He identified himself as Sḥāfīʿī in 
Law and he had considerable influence on al-Ghazālī’s thinking.303 He writes:304 
                                                 
302 She also points out just how much is at stake when she observes: “Ethical qualities, including those 
invoked here – charity, chastity, truthfulness, patience, piety – also have political and social 
dimensions.” Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 65. 
303 The extent of al-Iṣfahānī’s influence on al-Ghazālī’s ethical thought is a central thesis of Yasien 
Mohamed’s The Path to Virtue. Another is the extent to which al-Iṣfahānī, in turn was influenced by 
Greek thought, especially through earlier Muslim philosophers like Miskawayh. Yasien Mohamed, The 
Path to Virtue: The Ethical Philosophy of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī. (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 2006). 
304 al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Dharīʿah ilā Makārim al-Akhlāq. ed. Abū al-
Yazīd Abū Zayd al-ʿAjamī. (Alexandria: Dār al-Salām, 2007), 116. Translation by Yasien Mohamed in 
The Path to Virtue: The Ethical Philosophy of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī. (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 2006), 
522-523 with some modifications. Mohamed makes the astute observation that al-Iṣfahānī does not cite 
the verse concerning men as protectors, since he probably realized that the verse “cannot be used to 
substantiate the subservience of women.” Mohamad adds that though al-Iṣfahānī generally supports his 
assertions with verses from the Qur’ān, he “does not cite a single Qur’ānic verse on the subject of 
women.” This leads Mohamed to conclude that “Iṣfahānī’s views reflect the status of women in the 
tenth century Arab and Persian society, and not the position of women in Islam.” 
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Much of what is virtuous in a woman is disgraceful in a man, like simple-
mindedness, bashfulness, niggardliness, and timidity. This is why it is said that 
the best traits in men are the worst in women. Thus, astuteness, gallantry, and 
open-handedness305 are a disgrace in women.  
 
His contemporary, al-Ghazālī takes matters much farther, making it an ethical 
mandate for the man to excel the woman, due to his innate spiritual superiority. 
Before relating his depictions of eminent women of piety, he says:306 
 
Consider the women who have struggled in the path of God and say: “O my 
soul, be not content to be less than a woman, for it is despicable for a man to be 
less than a woman in matters of religion or of this world.” 
 
Not only, then, are men inherently better and preferable to women, it is imperative 
that they act to ensure that this superiority is always manifested in the world. With 
men possessing such a mandate, it is understandable why a woman leading men in 
prayer would be intolerable.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Negative attitudes towards women are clearly prevalent in the works of all four 
schools of thought. These attitudes are firmly rooted in the discussions on women and 
leadership, and are often presented as primary justifications for the rulings. They are 
also instrumental in the interpretation of textual evidence, like the interpretation of 
Abū Bakrah’s ḥadīth that the cause of people being unsuccessful is a consequence of 
the woman leader’s deficient intellect. We can also see negative gender assumptions 
underlying many of the instances of qiyās presented to justify legal rulings.  
 
                                                 
305 It is worth pointing out that this seems to be in direct contradiction to verse 33:35 where it says: “for 
men who give and for women who give”. 
306 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā ʿUlūm al-Dīn. (Beirut: Dār al-Māʿrifah, no 
date) 4:414; as translated by Leila Ahmed with some modifications. She rightly points out that al-
Ghazālī, though talking about universal spiritual matters, is presuming his audience to be male. Ahmed, 
Women and Gender in Islam, 68. 
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In a few case, a jurist argues against justifying a particular ruling with a rationale that 
presents an unfavourable opinion about women. We see this in Juwaynī’s argument 
that women’s deficiency and the inherent sexual temptation they pose do not explain 
the prohibition of women leading men in prayer. Nevertheless, al-Juwaynī still 
upholds these attitudes regarding women. We can see this also in the Ḥanafī jurists’ 
confirming women’s intellectual deficiency while ruling it out as a means to overturn 
their preferred ruling. In these cases, they are not merely invoking these attitudes to 
further their arguments, so it is clear that these are attitudes they actually share or at 
least perceive the broader society in which they live already accept.  
 
Gender attitudes are clearly an important factor in justifying the legal rulings 
divesting women of leadership positions, and this is strengthened by the fact that these 
attitudes are presented both explicitly and implicitly in the legal texts. They are found 
persistently over the temporal and geographical scope of post-formative legal activity.  
There is no reason to believe that such attitudes about women’s intellectual capacity, 
inherent worth, and social functions were remarkably different in the Near East during 
the formative period when these laws were being developed. As discussed in the 
introduction, historical research attests that they were, and, in the absence of any other 
compelling justification for the rulings in question, it is safe to assume that these 
attitudes played as important a role during the formative period that they are seen to 
play in the post-formative legal literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
180 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
RULINGS & ARGUMENTS: THE LAW JUSTIFYING 
ITSELF 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter follows the legal rulings over time, along with evidence and arguments 
presented for them in the legal works. The chapter is divided according to school of 
thought. These sections are, in turn, sub-divided by legal question. Each question is 
traced diachronically to determine and analyse trends in the rulings themselves as well 
as trends in the types of arguments used to justify them. 
 
 
II. MĀLIKĪ RULINGS & ARGUMENTS  
 
A. Political and Judicial Appointments 
 
Ibn Rushd and al-Rajrājī claim there is consensus on the prohibition of a woman 
aspiring to the office of head of state. However, their focus in doing so is elsewhere. 
Al-Rajrājī asserts it as a basis for a qiyās to argue that women cannot lead men in 
prayer, while Ibn Rushd asserts it as the basis for a qiyās prohibiting women from 
assuming judicial authority. One thing that deserves attention is al-Rajrājī’s referring 
the prohibition of political leadership not only to the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah, but also to 
the arguments he has just presented about prayer leadership, namely that it is “a 
degree of honour and a lofty station” requiring someone who, unlike a women, is 
“complete in religion and in essence”. 
 
The arguments presented for judicial authority are applicable by implication to 
political authority. Ibn Rushd, interestingly, does not cite the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah 
anywhere in his discussion. His is the only Mālikī work in the survey that cites textual 
evidence which refrains from doing so. He merely cites two instances of qiyās, the 
aforementioned one on political authority and a second one on the situation of a slave. 
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Al-Rajrājī cites the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as his primary evidence for prohibiting a 
woman from being a judge. He also quotes al-Qāḍī Abū al-Walīd’s statement that it is 
“enough” for him that a woman being appointed as a judge never occurred in the era 
of the Prophet or in any subsequent era. That this would be considered sufficient 
evidence in and of itself shows how important the Muslims’ general practice is for the 
Mālikī school, even when consensus is not being suggested, not even a Madinite 
consensus, since all we have here is the absence of an action, not an clear, agreed-
upon course of action.  
 
Al-Qarāfī cites the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as his chief evidence. He then argues two 
instances of qiyās on the basis of prayer leadership and an analogy on political 
leadership. The problematic nature of these analogies have already been discussed, 
and it appears that al-Qarāfī is seeking to test the range of evidence that can be 
brought to bear on the issue, even if such evidence is not very convincing.  
 
He also echoes al-Qāḍī Abū al-Walīd by invoking the lack of historical examples of 
female judges, even suggestion a kind of ijmāʿ on the basis that a female judge is 
“contrary to the way of the believers.” We can be certain that he does not mean a 
binding consensus upon the Muslims on this issue, since he explicitly brings this 
argument up to argue against al-Ṭabarī and the position of the Ḥanafī school of 
thought. What it does mean, however, is that al-Qarāfī considers this to be a 
compelling enough argument for the Mālikī school. Existing practice is paramount, 
even outside the formal parameters of Madinite practice. In essence, he is saying that 
whatever aspects of Muslim community life women have not traditionally been 
engaged in are things they should never be engaged in. 
 
The later works in the Mālikī school do not focus on evidence, though the ḥadīth of 
Abū Bakrah is cited by ʿUlaysh in Minaḥ al-Jalīl. The discussions in these later works 
are typically limited to stating and clarifying the school’s rulings. However, they do 
provide valuable insights. For instance, Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar is explicit in uniting the 
questions of political and judicial leadership, listing a single set of conditions for both 
and adding Qurayshī lineage as an aditional condition for the head of state. This 
leaves no doubt as to how the relationship between two questions are conceived in the 
later Mālikī school. Al-Ḥaṭṭāb mentions in Mawāhib al-Jalīl that Ibn al-Qāsim 
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permitted women to serve as judges, possibly like al-Ṭabarī without restriction. This 
is quite significant. The view of one of Mālik’s foremost students and one of the 
school’s mujtahid imāms shows that the early Mālikī school could accommodate such 
a ruling and that its prohibition by the school was neither inevitable nor merely the 
product of legal inertia. 
 
 
B. Leading Men in Prayer 
 
The general Mālikī ruling is that it is impermissible for women to lead prayers at all. 
The prayers of the men and women who follow a woman in prayer are invalid, though 
the prayers of the woman imām are valid for herself. This position is held uniformly 
with respect to women leading men in prayer, with some disagreement regarding 
women-only congregations.  
 
Al-Māzirī provides a number of arguments to prohibit women from leading prayers, 
whether for men or for women. He begins by citing the ḥadīth that “The best ranks for 
women are the last ones.” He says this is used by Mālikī scholars to argue for “the 
categorical prohibition” of women leading prayers. Since the ḥadīth merely shows 
what is preferable for a woman, it is clear that it is being used here merely to illustrate 
and reinforce a broader principle that women are supposed to remain behind the men, 
and not as direct self-sufficient evidence for prohibiting her prayer leadership. 
 
He argues separately that a woman’s voice is shameful, significantly presenting this 
as a distinct and independent argument. This is a direct citation of a general principle 
being used as evidence. 
 
He also cites an analogy on political leadership. Though he does not immediately 
suggest the effective cause for the ruling, it soon comes out in his discussions that a 
woman suffers from “the deficiency of being female” and “a deficiency of intellect 
and religion.” As discussed in chapter one, a direct qiyās on political leadership is 
unwieldy due to the disparity between prayer and politics which is generally 
acknowledged, particularly by al-Qarāfī. When this qiyās is understood as based on 
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the general principle that those who are deficient should not lead in any capacity, it 
becomes more coherent. 
 
He then follows the Shāfiʿi jurist of a century earlier, al-Māwardī, by arguing that 
women are not included in the generality of the ḥadīth that the “most well-versed 
among the people (qawm) should lead them in prayer.” The near word-for-word 
correspondence of his argument makes it certain that this is a direct borrowing form 
al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr. Though this argument is not taken up by the later works in the 
survey, it is an interesting case of the influence the works of one school of thought 
can have on another. 
 
In summary, though a ḥadīth text and an instance of qiyās are cited, in both cases it is 
clear that general principles are really at play. The ruling that women should not lead 
prayer is based on the principle that women are to be kept behind the men in prayer 
and also because of general considerations of their shamefulness and deficiency. 
 
Ibn Rushd articulates two of the principles underlying the prohibition of women 
leading prayer. Moreover, he cites these as being the “only” reasons to prohibit her. 
The first is that the practice is absent from the first generations of the Muslims, and 
this is sufficient to indicate impermissibility. Here we again see the importance of the 
community’s practice, even to the extent that if there are aspects of Muslim 
community life women have traditionally been excluded from, they should continue 
to be excluded. He then states the principle that “the Sunnah with respect to their 
prayers is for them to be kept behind the men.” This is an explicit statement of the 
principle alluded to by al-Māzīrī’s ḥadīth in his use of the ḥadīth “The best ranks for 
women are the last ones.” Likewise, Ibn Rushd cites the text “Send them to the 
back...”to illustrate this principle. 
 
Al-Rajrājī is even most explicit in citing norms and general judgments about women 
in is arguments. He cites that the “only” reason why jurists prohibit women from 
leading prayer is because: “prayer leadership is a degree of honour and a lofty station, 
so only someone who is complete in religion and in essence should assume it.” He 
then states this as a principle. “[T]his is built upon the principle that everyone who is 
characterised  by deficiency and lowliness has no share in positions of high status.” 
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His makes it clear that his analogy of prayer leadership on political leadership is based 
on what he has “already mentioned” regarding her deficiency in assuming such 
leadership roles. He then cites the two ḥadīth texts mentioned by his predecessors to 
affirm another principle that women are to be kept behind the men. He argues as well 
that a woman’s appearance and voice are shameful and that making it necessary for 
men to look at her is “unlawful for the Muslims to take as religion.” 
 
Al-Qarāfī’s chief argument is a reference to the deficiency of women, that her 
situations is “worse than a child” and “worse than a slave”, and he cites legal 
comparisons to other rulings to affirm this principle. He also argues that “it is 
impermissible to send her forward to lead the prayer” on the strength of the text “Send 
them to the back...” 
 
Al-Nafrāwī focuses all attention on the principle that the deficiency of women 
excludes them form all positions entailing honour and status within Muslim society. 
He uses it to explain how the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah is relevant to prayer and other 
forms of leadership. His statement “even if men are absent” is a dismissal of the 
considerations of temptation and of the importance of women being behind men. The 
matter for him hinges upon women being categorically and universally unworthy of 
“positions honour in religion and in the rites of the Muslims.” 
 
The later Mālikī works follow the typical pattern of eschewing evidence and defences 
of the rulings in favour of further clarifications and greater detail. These later works 
explore the question of the hermaphrodite, and address the validity of the prayer of 
the woman imām for herself, even if she intends to lead others in prayer. These later 
works reaffirm that the ruling is upheld even when “no man is present”. This means 
that the school has ultimately dismissed considerations of temptation as being relevant 
to prohibiting women from leading prayers and has focused solely on “the principle 
that everyone who is characterised  by deficiency and lowliness has no share in 
positions of high status.” 
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C. Women-Only Congregations 
 
The ruling adopted by the Mālikī school of thought is that women are categorically 
ineligible for prayer leadership, even if the followers are all women. The prayers of 
the women who follow a female imām are invalid. However, this is not the only 
opinion attributed to Mālik. Al-Māzirī and al-Rajrājī identify a narration from Mālik 
by way of Ibn Ayman that a woman can lead other women in prayer. Al-Qarāfī also 
acknowledges that this permissibility has been narrated from Mālik. 
 
Al-Māzirī limits his focused discussion on women-only congregations to addressing 
the views held by other schools of thought. He does not attempt to justify the Mālikī 
view, probably because he deems he has sufficiently addressed this in his general 
discussion on women leading prayers. He acknowledges that those who permit 
women-only congregations have textual evidence to support them. He dismisses the 
ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah as “a narration we regard as strange” and one that “must not 
be relied on.” He does not make any judgements about its chain of transmission, so it 
is unclear whether his dismissal has anything to do with the criticisms levied against 
some of its narrators, or simply its variance with accepted practice. 
 
His dismissal of `Ā’ishah’s practice is more revealing. He casts doubts on whether it 
is authentically established. This reveals that he perceives authenticity as requiring 
more that just a sound chain of transmission. He also suggests that she was merely 
going through the motions of prayer or that her practice was abrogated. We see here a 
clear response to how a Companion’s practice is to be handled when it contradicts 
what is regarded as accepted Madinite practice, and this illustrates the importance of 
received practice in Mālikī Law. 
 
Ibn Rushd, like many Mālikī scholars, does not address women-only congregations 
separately from the general ruling of women leading prayer. He affirms that the ḥadīth 
of Umm Waraqah is used as evidence by those who permit it. He does not argue in 
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favour of the Mālikī position on this matter, and his reticence may indicate his 
personal sympathy for the other point of view.307 
 
Al-Rajrājī challenges the school’s accepted ruling by arguing in support of women-
only congregations. First, he clarifies that there are indeed two opinions in the school, 
so he is not going outside if the school by adopting this stance, though he concedes it 
is one of the school’s “strange” positions. It is interesting that al-Rajarajī is the most 
articulate jurist in describing the principle of women’s ineligibility for positions of 
honour and lofty stations. Here, however, he is not arguing on the basis of general 
principles, but with textual evidence. He upholds the ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah as 
establishing the practice of women-only congregations.  
 
He further argues that the prohibition is “weak in theory”, but instead of bringing up 
the honour and leadership principle, he tries to represent the prohibition as a case of 
prohibiting the means to sin. He claims the general ruling relies on the axiom that 
“whenever means are prevented, the category of rulings involved are to be taken as a 
unit.” He then argues that women-only congregations fall outside of the category of 
rulings due to the absence of any harm, which would appear to be the threat of 
causing temptation.  
 
It is difficult to reconcile this stance with what al-Rajrājī says earlier in Manāhij al-
Taḥṣīl. His position on women-only congregations looks like a consequence of his 
desire to place discussions of Malikī Law on a clearer evidentiary basis, a goal for 
writing the work that he articulates in his introduction. What we see here is a conflict 
between two conceptualisations of the Law. His position on women leading men 
represents the Law as conceived through received practice, and his arguments clearly 
show this to be the case, while his opinion on women-only congregations represents 
and alternative conceptual vision of the Law based primarily on textual evidence, 
particularly individual-narrator ḥadīth. 
 
                                                 
307 Since the Mālikī ruling prohibiting women from leading other women in prayer hinges on their 
inherent inferiority and unworthiness of positions of honour, it is understandable that Ibn Rushd would 
not personally share this view, in light of his philosophical writings. However, here he is presenting the 
general opinions of the jurists. See: Belo, “Some Considerations”. 
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The later Mālikī works do not provide separate discussions on women-only 
congregations, since they do not differentiate between the two issues of leading men 
and leading women. Ultimately, both rulings are subsumed under the single principle 
that woman are ineligible for any position of honour or high status. 
 
 
D. Summary 
 
The Mālikī works rely openly upon received practice and general principles. Textual 
evidence and qiyās are better understood as supporting and clarifying those principles 
than as directly establishing the rulings. Many of these principles are inseparable from 
prevailing negative attitudes about gender. 
 
The Mālikī rulings that women cannot be judges and that they cannot lead women in 
prayer were not the only opinions expressed within the school, though they were the 
opinions that were adopted. The only challenge to an adopted ruling was given by al-
Rajrājī on women-only congregations, but it had no discernible impact on the later 
jurists of the school. By contrast, his depiction of women’s inferiority and the 
principle that women are consequently unworthy of positions of honour and lofty 
status were embraced. This ultimately became the dominant line of reasoning for the 
school to divest women of all forms of leadership, as well as to explain the historical 
absence of women leaders. This latter point is important, since the absence of women 
in these roles is the only basis upon which the school can discern a pattern of general 
practice. 
 
 
III. SHĀFIʿĪ RULINGS & ARGUMENTS  
 
A. Political and Judicial Appointments 
 
The position of the Shāfiʿī school is that women cannot be heads of state or serve as 
judges in any capacity. At the same time, Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, who holds that a woman 
can serve as a judge in an unrestricted capacity, is a scholar associated with the Shāfiʿī 
school. 
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The Shāfīʿī arguments depend heavily on the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah, though al-
Juwaynī also argues that there is ijmāʿ on the issue of political leadership. 
Significantly, al-Māwardī does not assert the existence of ijmāʿ on this matter, though 
he goes so far in al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah to prohibit a woman from even being a 
junior minister “because of what it entails of [her assuming] positions of authority that 
are denied women” on the strength of Abū Bakrah’s ḥadīth.308 He also argues the 
woman’s deficiency in intellect and opinion makes her unsuitable for holding 
positions of authority. Al-Māwardī then lists a number of weak lines of evidence not 
taken up by the later Shāfiʿī jurists, including verse 34 of Sūrah al-Nisā’ and 
comparisons with prayer leadership. 
 
Al-Rāfiʿī makes his primary argument for women not being heads of state that they 
cannot carry out the duties of that office due to their not being complete, not 
commanding respect, not being free to devote themselves to their work, and not being 
able to be present among men. Since he cites the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as the only 
textual evidence to prohibit her from being a judge, it is safe to assume that he regards 
this as evidence for prohibiting her from being a head of state as well, and that he 
omits mention of it there for the sake of brevity. 
 
The commentators on the Minhāj are uniform in citing the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as 
the only textual evidence to prohibit a woman from being head of state or a judge. 
They all cite that that she is not supposed to be in the company of men to prohibit her 
from being a head of state and al-Ramlī argues this as well with respect to her being a 
judge. 
 
Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī and al-Ramlī also argue against a woman being head of state 
due to the “weakness of the woman’s intellect”. Al-Shirbīnī does not mention this, but 
he is alone in arguing that she will not be able to devote herself to her duties. With 
respect to her being a judge, al-Ramlī and al-Shirbīnī cite her deficiency, while Ibn 
Ḥajar al-Haytamī mentions nothing other than the ḥadīth of Abu Bakrah. 
 
                                                 
308 al-Māwardī. al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah, 36. 
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The Shāfīʿī school rests its case primarily on the argument that the ḥadīth of Abū 
Bakrah denies women any share of political authority. They then go on to support 
their interpretation of the ḥadīth on the basis of women’s inherent deficiency and 
weak intellects. This is why al-Māwardī takes pains to point out that issuing legal 
verdicts and giving testimony do not entail any exercise of authority. 
 
 
B. Leading Men in Prayer 
 
The position of the Shāfīʿī school is that women cannot lead men in prayer but they 
can lead other women. If a woman leads men in prayer, her prayer is valid, as well as 
the prayers of any women present in the congregation, but the prayers of the men 
following her will be invalid. This position is stated clearly by al-Shāfiʿī in al-Umm. 
He supports this ruling by arguing that God has made men responsible for women and 
prohibited women from positions of authority and “the like”. He is deliberately vague 
here, alluding to both textual evidence and to other rulings without specifically stating 
them. His invoking these matters as general principles about women shows his 
awareness that the texts cannot be used on their own to arrive at the desired 
conclusions. It also shows how pre-existing assumptions and legal decisions worked 
to limit the potential for rulings that this ḥadīth-based school would otherwise have 
been able to entertain. Looked at in this way, the dissenting view of al-Ṭabarī, Abū 
Thawr, and al-Muzanī can be seen as actualizing this unrealised potential. 
 
Al-Māwardī makes all of al-Shāfiʿī’s references explicit and introduces a number of 
other arguments, in accordance with his overall approach in al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr. He 
cites verse 34 of Sūrah al-Nisā’, the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah, the text “Send them to the 
back…” attributed to the Prophet, and a number of instances of qiyās whose 
unwieldiness has already been addressed. 
 
Al-Māwardī’s approach is in stark contrast to that of his contemporary al-Juwaynī. A 
comparison between the two is revealing, since their works fulfil the same role of 
asserting the rulings within the Shāfīʿī school of law and furnishing those rulings with 
evidence, arguments, and rationales. Both scholars’ works take al-Muzanī’s 
Mukhtaṣar of al-Umm as a starting point, and they draw upon the same generations of 
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al-Shāfiʿī’s students. These two scholars, therefore, are giving the school of thought 
its first full presentation.  
 
In spite of the fact that they acknowledge the same ruling prohibiting women from 
leading men in prayer, their strategies could not be more different. Al-Juwaynī was, in 
his day, the foremost authority on Shāfiʿī legal theory. Indeed, it could be argued that, 
apart from his student al-Ghazālī, there is no one of greater importance in this regard 
for the school of thought. As a consequence, he presents a very careful and objective 
approach to selecting evidence in defence of the school’s opinions. 
 
As opposed to the hodgepodge of arguments al-Māwardī presents, al-Juwaynī begins 
by stating a general legal principle that “whoever’s prayer is valid for himself, it is 
valid for those who follow him” which he argues “is consistently applied in al-
Shāfiʿī’s school except in two instances.” Women leading men in prayer is one of 
these instances. Since Shāfiʿī law is based on the primacy of textual evidence and not 
the application of general principles, al-Juwaynī sets himself to the task of finding the 
evidence for this exceptional ruling, which violates the dictates of qiyās. He comes up 
with nothing, declaring the legal rationale to be “problematic”. In other words, he 
cannot find any direct textual evidence for the ruling, nor can he find any established 
ruling in the Shāfīʿī school with an effective cause that can provide an analogy for 
prohibiting women from leading men in prayer.  
 
He brings up two commonly cited arguments and dismisses them both. He rejects the 
idea that the ruling is due to prohibiting women from being seen by men, since this 
would not apply to a man following his wife or sister in prayer in the privacy of their 
home. He also debunks the argument of completeness, since a woman can lead other 
women in prayer so she must have the legal capacity to lead prayers. It is rather the 
man’s prayer which is nullified because he chooses to follow her. 
 
It is significant that al-Juwaynī does not attempt to brings up direct textual evidence 
for the ruling. The very fact that he, a Shāfiʿī scholar, is seeking an analogy upon 
which to base the ruling means that he does not consider the question to be addressed 
by any verse of the Qur’ān of authentic prophetic ḥadīth. Even though he may not 
have had access to al-Māwardī’s work, he was certainly aware of the verse from 
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Sūrah al-Nisā’ and the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah. Al-Shāfiʿī’s references in al-Umm to 
these two texts would not have been lost on him. We can be reasonably sure that he 
was aware of the other ḥadīth commonly used by jurists to justify prohibiting women 
from leading men in prayer. This means that he did not regard any of those texts as 
providing evidence for the ruling, either due to their irrelevance to the question or due 
to their weakness. 
 
Al-Juwaynī is not alone among Shāfīʿī scholars in reaching this conclusion. It is 
probably no accident that the three jurists who categorically permit women to lead 
men in prayer are affiliated with the Shāfiʿī school of thought and operated within that 
school’s methodological approaches and theoretical assumptions. It is quite likely that 
those three jurists arrived at the conclusion they did for the same reasons al-Juwaynī 
presents in Nihāyah al-Maṭlab. However, al-Juwaynī does not go as far as they did by 
adopting a position at variance to his school of thought. He simply concludes that he 
cannot suggest a justification for the ruling. His honesty in this matter is the most 
eloquent example of a jurist’s desire to preserve the school’s rulings. It shows that this 
was indeed an extremely important consideration. It is a testament to al-Juwaynī’s 
integrity that he was willing to admit not having an answer rather than suggest 
something at variance to the school’s methodology and evidentiary standards. 
 
Al-Rāfīʿī asserts the school’s ruling that a woman cannot lead men in prayer and cites 
the ḥadīth “A woman does not lead men in prayer” as the basis for the ruling. His use 
of this ḥadīth in spite of its weakness is probably an attempt at a best-fit solution. He 
does not follow al-Māwardī in citing the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah, probably because he 
deems it irrelevant to the question of prayer leadership. Nor does he follow al-
Māwardī in citing “Send them to the back...”, since he would be well aware of that 
text’s status.  
 
Al-Nawawī is not satisfied with al-Rāfiʿī’s solution of relying on the ḥadīth “A 
woman does not lead men in prayer.”, which is also the evidence favoured by al-
Shīrāzī in al-Muhadhdhab. He dismisses it as weak. Al-Nawawī seems to echo al-
Juwaynī’s sentiment that this is simply the position of the school of thought as well as 
that of “the vast majority of scholars from the earliest and later generations”. We 
cannot assume that he is basing the ruling on generally accepted practice. He is 
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simply refraining from providing clear textual evidence or a valid qiyās for the ruling, 
and this must be put down to his not being able to identify any evidence. Like al-
Juwaynī, he is not prepared to depart from the school on this matter. 
 
His appeal to the vast majority of jurists is not to suggest there is ijmāʿ on the issue, 
nor even the consensus of his own school of thought. He openly attributes the 
categorical permissibility of women leading men in prayer to Abū Thawr, al-Ṭabarī 
and al-Muzanī, and relates their opinion from al-Qādī Abū al-Ṭayyib and al-ʿAbdarī, 
who are leading authorities in transmitting the opinions of the school’s earlier jurists. 
As if this were not enough, he also mentions Sheikh Abū Ḥāmid’s affirmation that it 
is the opinion of Abū Thawr. Al-Nawawī leaves the ruling on no surer a footing than 
al-Juwaynī does. If anything, his further dismissal of evidence and his emphasising 
the dissenting view places the school’s official position in greater doubt. However, he 
again demonstrates the importance of preserving the ruling of the school. In his 
abridged text, al-Minhāj, he writes: “It is invalid for either a man or a hermaphrodite 
to follow either a woman or a hermaphrodite in prayer.” 
 
Two of the commentators of the Minhāj, al-Ramlī and al-Shirbīnī adopt the ḥadīth of 
Abū Bakrah as their primary textual evidence, despite its lack of direct relevance to 
the question of prayer leadership. However, as has already been discussed, it makes 
sense that the Shāfīʿī school would opt for the only available authentic ḥadīth that 
could possibly be recruited. They may have been emboldened to do so by al-Shāfīʿīs 
oblique reference to it in al-Umm. Al-Shirbīnī also enlists “A woman does not lead 
men in prayer.” His awareness of its weakness is clear in the way he presents it. By 
contrast to Abū Bakrah’s ḥadith which he quotes as something “[t]he Prophet said”, 
he tacks on the other ḥadīth by saying “Ibn Mājah narrates...” 
 
What is peculiar is that al-Ramlī and Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī invoke ijmā’ as their 
foremost argument. Indeed al-Haytamī does not justify the ruling with anything else. 
However, they do not mean any genuine kind of ijmā’, not even within their own 
school of thought. They say that the prohibition “is by consensus (ijmāʿ) for a man 
following a woman, except for the rare disagreement like that of al-Muzanī.” Their 
mention of al-Muzanī instead of al-Ṭabarī and Abū Thawr is probably due to his 
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remaining within the school of thought, so his opinion would be a “rare disagreement” 
within the school rather than an opinion from outside of it.  
 
Their invoking ijmā’ shows their dissatisfaction with other lines of textual evidence 
just like al-Shirbīnī’s bringing up “A woman does not lead men in prayer.” shows his 
dissatisfaction with the suitability of the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah. 
 
What we see here is the Shāfīʿī school confronting its own rigorous evidentiary 
standards and not finding any way to match those standards while maintaining the 
school’s established ruling. Moreover, this problem did not result from a gradual, 
growing dissatisfaction with the evidence. It was around from the school’s earliest 
days with the dissenting views of al-Shāfīʿī’s students al-Muzanī and Abū Thawr, as 
well as of al-Ṭabarī who followed very similar juristic standards. It is clear from al-
Juwaynī’s admission that the ruling has no discernible rationale and from al-
Nawawī’s presentation of the question in al-Majmūʿ. Its final manifestation is seen 
with the commentators of the Minhāj in their disagreement on the ḥadīth evidence and 
their ineffectual appeal to the word ījmāʿ. 
 
 
C. Women-Only Congregations 
 
Al-Shāfīʿī declares in al-Umm that women can lead other women in prayer, both 
compulsory and voluntary prayers. He cites the practice of the Prophet’s wives and 
describes in detail how the prayer is carried out, highlighting that the only differences 
between a female imām and a male imām is that a female should preferably stand in 
the middle of the first row of worshippers and lower her voice for all recitations. He 
also discusses the complexity caused by the discrepancy in dress code between a free 
woman and a slave, but deems this problem to be less critical than that of a seated 
imām leading standing worshippers. 
 
Al-Shāfīʿī does not expressly state at this point that it is better for a woman to lead 
other women in congregational prayer than for them to pray individually, though this 
can be understood from his relating the statement of Ṣafwān b Sulaym that it is the 
Sunnah for them to do so. Indeed, the Shāfīʿī school is unique in its emphasis on this 
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preferentiality, which is not so much in evidence in the Ḥanbalī school which shares 
in the ruling that women-only congregations are permissible. 
 
Al-Māwardī asserts that al-Shāfīʿī’s position is that it is preferable for one woman to 
lead the other women. He stresses this point, repeating it twice, once at the beginning 
of his discussion and once at the end. Al-Māwardī introduces the ḥadīth of Umm 
Waraqah to the list of evidence, but nothing else. He also addresses the opposing 
views of the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools and others. 
 
Al-Juwaynī cites the same evidence and also explicitly states that “it is good for one 
of them to lead them in prayer” and that “the congregation as we have described is to 
be preferred for them”. 
 
Al-Ghazālī does not state expressly that it so preferable for a woman to lead other 
women in prayer. However, he does state in al-Wasīṭ: “The virtue of congregational 
prayer applies to the woman, regardless of whether she follows a man or a woman in 
prayer.” The implication, of course, is that there is virtue to be had in a woman 
leading the other women in prayer that is lost if they each pray on their own. 
However, there is a subtle but clear change of emphasis here. We see a blurring of the 
distinction between two distinct issues. The first is whether it is preferable for women 
to participate in congregational prayer as followers as opposed to their praying 
individually. The second is whether it is preferable for a woman to lead the other 
women in prayer in order for them to have the opportunity to offer prayer in 
congregation when no men are present. There is a degree of overlap between these 
questions, but they are not the same.  
 
This shift in emphasis is complete with al-Rāfiʿī. The primary question becomes to 
what degree women praying in congregation is preferable for them at all, regardless of 
whether the imām is a man or a woman.309 When he cites the practice of Umm 
Salamah, ʿĀ’ishah, and Umm Waraqah, it is more in the context of this broader 
                                                 
309 Al-Rāfīʿī presents this general question as follows: “As for women, praying in congregation is not 
obligatory for them individually or collectively. It is preferable for them, but al-Rūyānī mentions there 
are two positions on the question. One is that it is preferable for them just like it is for men, on account 
of the generality of the textual evidence. The clearer position held by the majority is that it is not as 
emphatic for them as it is for men, so it is not disliked for them to forego the congregation though it is 
disliked for men to do so.” al-Rāfiʿī, al-Azīz, 2:142. 
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question. He also takes the trouble to point out that “a man leading the prayer for 
them is better than a woman leading them in prayer.” The ruling is still intact that 
women-only congregations are better than each woman praying by herself, but it must 
now be teased out from the al-Rāfīʿī’s words by way of implication. It is no longer 
directly stated as it has been before. This is a far cry from the forthrightness of al-
Māwardī and al-Juwaynī, who presented it almost as a point of distinction for the 
Shāfīʿī school. 
 
Al-Nawawī reasserts the fact that it is preferable for women to congregate on their 
own rather than pray individually. Interestingly, he does so by pulling the more 
general pronouncements about the preference of congregation back into the context of 
women-only congregations. He clearly seeks to restore the question to its earlier 
prominence. However, he also states that a male imām is better than a female one 
because he is more knowledgeable about prayer and he always recites out loud. 
Though this ruling favours men, it also serves to bring the question of women imāms 
back to the fore. 
 
This renewed emphasis on women imāms is not found among the commentators of al-
Nawawī’s Minhāj. They cite the practice of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah to assert the 
validity of women leading other women in prayer. The only time preference in 
invoked is to state that the woman imām should stand in line with the others rather 
than stand ahead. Elsewhere they discuss the general question of how preferable it is 
for women to pray in congregation, upholding the position that “the preference is not 
as emphatic as it is for men.” In Nihāyah al-Muḥtāj, al-Ramlī justifies this by saying 
that making them pray in congregation would cause them undue hardship because it 
would require them to go out to the mosques in most cases. These later jurists are 
clearly conceiving the question as one of women praying in congregation behind men 
in most cases and not as a question of women imāms. That emphasis is entirely lost in 
the later works. 
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D. Summary 
 
The Shāfīʿī school maintains the prohibition of political and judicial authority on the 
basis of the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah, which is taken to divest women of all positions of 
authority due to their inherent deficiency and intellectual weakness. It also affirms the 
invalidity of the prayers of men if they follow women in prayer, in spite of not being 
able to present a satisfactory justification for the ruling within the school’s 
framework. It affirms the preference of women-only congregations on the basis of the 
practice of the Prophet’s wives, though with a discernible change in attitude regarding 
it. What began as a point of distinction for the Shāfiʿī school in declaring it preferable 
for a woman to lead other women in prayer becomes a neglected question that is 
presented only by implication. This shows a subtle but negative tendency in the 
ruling’s development.  
 
 
IV. ḤĀNBALĪ RULINGS & ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Political and Judicial Appointments 
 
The Ḥanbalī texts are uniform in citing the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as the sole textual 
evidence to directly prohibit women from being judges. Implicitly, this is also their 
evidence for prohibiting women from being head of state, though this becomes 
explicit in the final two works where political leadership is finally addressed as a 
separate issue.  
 
All of the Ḥanbalī works are equally consistent in citing that women are weak of 
opinion, deficient in intellect, and unsuited to be present in the assemblies of men. 
The wording of their various pronouncements to this effect vary only slightly, in what 
is clearly a direct paraphrase of each jurist from his predecessor. Significantly, they 
all present this as a valid and independent justification for the ruling. They expressly 
state that the ruling is because of the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah, and that “it is also 
because” of this list of reasons. The phrase “it is also because” is consistently cited in 
all five works. Only the first two works mention a woman’s forgetfulness and 
propensity to err, invoking verse 282 of Sūrah al-Baqarah as proof for this 
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contention. The absence of this additional reference in the later works might be due to 
the way the verse can limit the scope of deficiency that can be attributed to women. 
 
Ibn Qudāmah is the only jurist to identify being male, along with being adult, sane, 
and female, as the four constituents of complete legal capacity. The others simply 
present these qualities among a longer list of qualifying conditions for the judicial 
post, without differentiating between those that pertain to legal capacity and those that 
pertain to physical attributes. Ibn Qudāmah is also the only jurist to mention the 
contrary opinions of al-Ṭabarī and Abū Ḥanīfah. The only jurist to introduce a new 
line of evidence into the discussion is al-Zarkashī, citing the ḥadīth “The judges are 
three... a man” to argue that judgeship is limited to males. The extreme weakness of 
this argument is probably the reason why it is not seen again. 
 
The tendency over time is one of simplification and abridgement, while the ruling and 
arguments remain the same. This is a clear pattern of juristic inertia where the legal 
ruling faces no serious challenges from within the school of thought nor from outside 
of it. 
 
 
B. Leading Men in Prayer 
 
1. Women Leading Men in Compulsory Prayers 
All of the Ḥanbalī jurists rely on the ḥadīth “A woman does not lead men in prayer” 
as their sole textual evidence. All but al-Zarkashī invoke the qiyās on insane men due 
to their inability to give the call to prayer. The rationale behind this qiyās can be 
discerned from Ibn Qudāmah’s discussion about the call to prayer. However, he gives 
other arguments later in al-Mughnī that show his own dissatisfaction with this kind of 
reasoning. The repetition of this qiyās in the later works without the corresponding 
rationale shows the Ḥanbalī propensity to repeat the arguments of their earlier 
scholars almost verbatim. As mentioned before, the reason why al-Zarkashī does not 
mention this qiyās may have less to do with his recognition of the argument’s 
weakness than with his greater openness to the older view of women leading men in 
voluntary prayers. Asserting this qiyās would mean committing himself to the view 
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that women cannot lead men in any prayer, regardless of whether it is compulsory or 
voluntary. 
 
2. Women Leading Men in Sunnah Prayers 
The Ḥanbalī school is unique among the four canonical Sunnī schools in that a 
significant number of its early scholars permit a woman to lead men in some or all 
voluntary prayers. This prevalence changed over time. Due to the lateness of the 
Ḥanbalī school in developing encyclopaedic legal works, we do not have a dynamic 
history for most of this change. Instead, we have to rely on references from later 
Ḥanbalī scholars who have more or less already dismissed this opinion as weak and 
discuss the matter in hindsight.  
 
Ibn Qudāmah cites that “some” Ḥanbalī scholars permitted a woman to lead the 
Tarāwīḥ prayer and does not allude in his discussion to any other voluntary prayers. 
He then cites the general wording of Umm Waraqah’s ḥadīth of as their evidence for 
it. He rejects this possibility outright, and counters this with the ḥadīth “A woman 
does not lead men in prayer” as well as al-Dāraquṭnī’s variant narration of Umm 
Waraqah’s ḥadīth. 
 
The presence of a prayer caller gives him a strong argument to support his contention 
that Umm Waraqah’s ḥadīth must refer to compulsory prayers. He also argues that the 
conditions some earlier Ḥanbalī jurists set for a woman leading men – like her 
standing in the back or limiting it to the Tarāwīh prayer – are not supported by the 
ḥadīth and are contrary to established rulings. However, his purpose in doing so is to 
rule out the ḥadīth’s applicability for a congregation including men and to insist upon 
adopting al-Dāraquṭnī’s variant narration, which he describes as an “extra clause.” He 
appeals to the the impossibility of accepting her leading men in compulsory prayers, 
and argues that this is the inevitable consequence of understanding that she was 
leading men in any prayers. 
 
Finally, his own reasoning comes back to haunt him, since the presence of an 
appointed prayer caller in Umm Waraqah’s ḥadīth does not correspond to a women-
only congregation, but indicates she was leading a general one. He then resorts to the 
argument that the ruling for leading men might have been uniquely for her and for no 
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other woman thereafter. The strangeness of this argument has already been discussed, 
and none of the later Ḥanbalī scholars in the surveyed texts bring it up. 
 
It is important to note that Ibn Qudāmah does not argue his case on the basis of 
considering Umm Waraqah’s ḥadīth to be weak. He accepts the ḥadīth and attempts to 
explain it in different ways. This is how the ḥadith is approached by the other Ḥanbalī 
jurists in the survey. 
 
Al-Zarkashī asserts that the ruling of permissibility for women to lead men in at least 
the Tarāwīh prayer, and from the back of the congregation, was the position of the 
“generality of the close associates” of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, acknowledging that there 
were two narrations form him, one permitting it and the other prohibiting it. He also 
admits that some Ḥanbalī scholars permit a woman to lead men in all voluntary 
prayers. He also cites a variant position that she leads only apparently through her 
recitation while a man leads in actuality. He does not present counter-arguments or 
take sides in the matter, but leaves all of the opinions standing. Al-Zarkashī provides a 
lot of history on the ruling. He identifies al-Mārūdhī as the associate of Aḥmad who 
narrated the permissibility which was adopted by the majority of Ḥanbalī scholars 
early on, and he identifies Abū Mūsā as the one who narrated the opinion of 
prohibition. He identifies Abū al-Khaṭṭāb and Abū Muḥammad as the earlier scholars 
who favoured prohibition. 
 
Ibn Mufliḥ reasserts Ibn Qudāmah’s view that a woman should not lead men in any 
voluntary prayers, stating that that the prayers of any man who does so would be 
invalid. He then elaborates on the other views and the manner of a woman leading 
men in prayer on the basis that someone chooses to adopt that view. 
 
By the time of al-Bahūtī, the debate is over. He asserts that the school of thought has 
settled upon the view that women cannot lead men in any prayer, though admitting 
that most of the early Ḥanbalī scholars thought otherwise. Al-Ruḥaybānī, in the final 
surveyed work, does not even refer to the disagreement on the subject.  He says that 
the prohibition for women leading men “is categorically the case for compulsory and 
voluntary prayers.” 
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The later Ḥanbalī rejection of women leading men in Tārāwīḥ prayers is a complete 
reversal of the prevailing view followed by the majority of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal’s own 
associates and early Ḥanbalī scholars. It shows that the prevailing ruling of the school 
of thought could change completely, as long as there was a narration from Aḥmad to 
support the alternative ruling. It also shows a tendency over the course of time to 
narrow, rather than expand, the domain allowed to women when more than one 
possibility was available. Even in the surveyed texts, despite their lateness, the overall 
trajectory is one of narrowing the possibility of women leading men. Al-Zarkashī 
leave the matter wide open, despite ibn Qudāmah disfavouring women leading men. 
Ibn Mufliḥ rejects the idea but still makes concessions for those who wish to follow it. 
Al-Bahūtī at least mentions that disagreement once existed on the matter. Al-
Ruḥaybānī does not do so, but simply asserts that the prohibition includes voluntary 
prayers. 
 
3. 20th Century Changes 
The Ḥanbalī scholars in the survey do not rely on the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah to prohibit 
women from leading men in prayer, though they cite this ḥadīth frequently to prohibit 
them from political and judicial leadership. This seems to be the case for all classical 
Ḥanbalī legal works. I am unaware of any Ḥanbalī legal scholar before the twentieth 
century who cites the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as proof that a man’s prayer under a 
woman’s leadership is invalid. Indeed the concept of authority (wilāyah) does not 
even come up in their discussions about prayer leadership. 
 
It seems that Ḥānbalī scholars have universally rejected the particular analogous 
reasoning that is required to use the ḥadīth as evidence in prayer which necessitates 
recognizing prayer leadership to be a position of authority akin to that of political 
authority. Ibn al-Qayyim, in Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn, clearly excludes the question of 
prayer leadership from what the ḥadīth indicates. He writes, while defending the 
position that women can lead other women in prayer:310 
 
These traditions [supporting a woman leading women in prayer] are being 
[wrongly] rejected due to an ambiguous reading of the Prophet’s statement: “A 
                                                 
310 Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn, 2:488. 
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people who grant a woman authority to rule them will not succeed.” This refers 
only to the highest authority and leadership, and to judicial appointments. As for 
narrating [ḥadīth], giving testimony, issuing legal verdicts, and leading prayers, 
these matters do not enter into its [meaning]. It is strange that those who go 
against this Sunnah permit a woman to serve as a judge and preside over the 
affairs of the Muslims.311 So how can they be successful when she is ruling over 
them, but her sisters among the women cannot be successful if she leads them in 
prayer? 
 
This is a powerfully stated rejection of using this ḥadīth as evidence for anything 
regarding prayer leadership. Ibn al-Qayyim sees it as referring specifically to political 
authority, and he extends its meaning to judicial appointments. He does not extend it 
by way of analogy to any other position of responsibility or leadership. 
 
This is in marked contrast with the Ḥanbalī legal scholarship of the twentieth century, 
particularly in Saudi Arabia, where there has been an explosion of recent 
commentaries on classical Ḥanbalī legal treatises. These commentaries are typified by 
an originality of thinking with respect to evidence as well as with an occasional 
willingness to depart from the established rulings of the Ḥanbalī school. Otherwise, 
they are fully within the classical Ḥanbalī tradition. A good example is the 
commentary on Zād al-Mustaqniʿ312 by al-Bulayhī entitled al-Salsabīl. Regarding a 
woman leading men in prayer, he writes:313 
 
[A man’s prayer] is invalid [following] behind a woman. This is the position of 
the three, due to the general meaning of the Prophet’s statement: “A people who 
grant a woman authority to rule them will not succeed.” Its [authenticity] is 
agreed upon [by al-Bukhārī and Muslim] from the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah. The 
Prophet also said: “Send them to the back whence God has sent them to the 
back.” 
 
                                                 
311 He is referring to the Ḥanafī ruling against women leading women in prayer and their ruling on the 
validity of a women serving as a judge. 
312 Zād al-Mustaqniʿ is a short legal treatise by al-Ḥajjāwī (d. 968), the author of al-Iqnāʿ. 
313 Ṣāliḥ b. Ibrāhīm al-Bulayhī, al-Salsabīl fī Maʿrifah al-Dalīl. (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Maʿārif, 1986), 
1:184. 
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We can note here that two ḥadīth are used in an unprecedented manner. The ḥadīth “A 
people who grant a woman authority to rule them will not succeed” is presented as if 
it by virtue of its general wording – and not by way of analogy – prohibits women 
from all forms of leadership, including prayer, and moreover to invalidate the prayers 
of the men who follow them in prayer. Secondly, the ḥadīth “Send them to the back 
whence God has sent them to the back.” is used as proof to invalidate the prayers of 
men following a female imām, which is not the case in earlier Ḥanbalī works. This 
ḥadīth is often quoted by classical Ḥanbalī scholars in their legal works, but only as 
proof for where a woman should preferably stand in relation to men during 
congregational prayer, not as proof that her leadership of men invalidates their 
prayers. 
 
Another good example is the commentary on Zād al-Mustaqniʿ by al-ʿUthaymīn 
entitled al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ:314 
 
[A man’s] prayer is invalid [following] behind a woman. The proof for this is 
what is related from the Prophet that he said: “A woman does not lead a man in 
prayer.” This ḥadīth is weak. However, it is supported by the Prophet’s 
statement: “A people who grant a woman authority to rule them will not 
succeed.” The congregation grants their affair to the imām, so it is not valid for a 
woman to be the imām for them. 
 
Al-ʿUthaymīn tells us the reason for the unprecedented use of this ḥadīth by 
acknowledging that the primary ḥadīth text the Ḥanbalī school relies upon is too weak 
to stand as evidence, and therefore other evidence is needed to maintain the school’s 
position. Al-ʿUthaymīn argues here that his interpretation of Abū Bakrah’s ḥadīth 
supports and strengthens the directly worded ḥadīth in Sunan Ibn Mājah to the point 
of making it valid as evidence. In another unprecedented move, he also cites as 
evidence: “The best rows for women are the last rows.”315 This ḥadīth was cited in the 
                                                 
314 Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn, al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ ʿalā Zād al-Mustaqniʿ. ed. Sulaymān b. 
ʿAbd Allah  b. Ḥamūd Abā al-Khayl and Khālid b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Mushayqiḥ. (Riyādh: 
Mu’assasah Āsām, 1995), 4:312-313. 
315 al-ʿUthaymīn, al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ, 4:313. He argues: “This is evidence showing that she has no 
place at the front, and the imām is not anywhere else but in the front. If we were to say that her leading 
men in prayer is valid, the situation would be reversed and she would be put ahead of the men. This is 
not supported by the Sharīʿah.” The subjectivity of this argument is interesting. He takes evidence 
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classical Ḥanbalī legal literature, but only for determining the preferential rows for 
women, not as proof that their leading men in prayer is invalid. 
 
An even more recent Saudi Ḥanbalī fatwā from ʿAbd Allah b. Ḥumayd is worthy of 
interest in this regard:316 
 
 It is impermissible for a woman to lead men in prayer, because the Prophet 
said: “Send them to the back whence God has sent them to the back.” Moreover, 
prayer leadership in the mosque is authority, and only men are qualified to be in 
authority. “A people who grant a woman authority to rule them will not 
succeed,” as the Prophet said. 
 
However, there is an exception in the Ḥanbalī school, though it is a weak 
opinion, that a woman can lead prayer in Tarāwīḥ if she is a proficient reciter 
and the men are illiterate. She stands behind them and leads them. However, 
there is no evidence for this. 
 
In brief: It is impermissible for a woman to lead men in prayer. Yes, she may 
lead other women like herself – there is no objection to her leading women due 
to the report of Umm Waraqah – or some of her close relatives (maḥārim). As 
for [her leading] unrelated men or [holding a position of] public authority like 
her being imām of the mosque, this is impermissible. 
 
Here, the case is made for prohibiting a woman from leading prayer primarily because 
it is a position of public authority (wilāyah ʿāmah). Following this line of reasoning, 
he permits a woman to lead her close male relatives in prayer, since it does not entail 
her aspiring to any position of public authority. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
stating what is best in virtue for a woman in the ranks of prayer and summarily concludes the invalidity 
of her leading prayers on the basis that she would not be in the row that is best for her. This is 
indicative of the high levels of subjectivity in interpreting textual evidence exhibited by many post-
taqlīd Islamic jurists. 
316 ʿAbd Allah b. Ḥumayd, “al-Mar’ah Ta’umm al-Nisā’ Lā al-Rijāl” in Fatāwā al-Mar’ah al-
Muslimah, ed. ʿAbd al-Maqṣūd, Abū Muḥammad Ashraf. (Riyadh: Maktabah Aḍwā’al-Salaf, 1996), 1: 
319 
 
 
 
 
204 
 
What we see in all of these cases a complete rethinking of the evidence for 
invalidating a woman’s leadership of men in prayer, while essentially preserving the 
ruling that her leadership is invalid. It introduces the notion of prayer leadership being 
akin to political authority, a comparison that Ibn al-Qayyim, for one, explicitly and 
clearly rejected. 
 
The need for this change in thinking derives from the current religious culture in 
Saudi Arabia, which places a high value upon reliance upon authentic ḥadīth and 
exhibits a distaste for blind following (taqlīd). This has introduced some instability 
into the state of affairs and poses a challenge to legal inertia. In this case, the Ḥanbalī 
scholars have opted for an evidentiary basis requiring a high level of interpretative 
reasoning and an implicit qiyās of an act of worship on a question of public policy, 
both of which are highly incompatible with Ḥanbalī thinking. On the other hand, by 
acknowledging the extreme weakness of the ḥadīth Ḥanbalī scholars have 
traditionally relied upon, they threaten the ruling itself. This is an unwelcome 
consequence, which is not surprising considering the current position of women in 
Saudi society.  
 
What is surprising is how the Saudi religious culture, by demanding evidence and 
eschewing blind following, has produced a fatwā from one of its mainstream scholars 
which would allow a woman to lead close (maḥram) male relatives in prayer, even in 
compulsory prayers. This fatwā might be seen as a return to earlier Ḥanbalī attitudes 
about women leading men in voluntary prayers, but it is quite different. In one way, it 
is more restricted than what had once been the school’s most prevalent opinion, that a 
woman can lead all men in some prayers. In another way, it is less restricted, since it 
is inclusive of both compulsory and voluntary prayers. This new ruling simply 
prohibits cases where women will be seen by non-relatives, which is frowned upon in 
Saudi society, and her being a public imām because that would be a position of public 
authority. However, even with these objections, once the validity of the prayer of a 
close male relative following a woman in a compulsory prayer is acknowledged, it 
becomes difficult to maintain the stance that the prayer of a non-relative male is 
invalid. This is an interesting case of instability in the law challenging the school’s 
legal inertia, a case which is unfolding at the present time. It is too early to determine 
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how this matter will be resolved, but the response of other Ḥanbalī scholars indicates 
that it will probably not lead to the adoption of Ḥumayd’s more liberal opinion. 
 
 
C. Women-Only Congregations 
 
The Ḥanbalī texts are uniform in the position that it is permissible for a woman to lead 
other women in congregational prayer and that she should stand in their midst when 
doing so. Ibn Qudāmah is the only jurist who presents the opinions of other schools of 
thought, which is his general approach in al-Mughnī when discussing major legal 
issues. Otherwise, the Ḥanablī texts differ only slightly. There is some variation in the 
presentation of evidence. There is also some differences regarding whether or not the 
woman imām can stand ahead of the first row, and whether or not women-only 
congregations are preferable to each woman praying on her own.  
 
With respect to the presentation of evidence, Ibn Qudāmah mentions that it was the 
opinion of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salaman that women can lead other women in prayer, 
without citing their practice. He relies instead on the ḥadīth of Umm Waraqah as his 
chief piece of evidence.  He is unique in presenting the analogy that women resemble 
men in leading prayer since prayer is equally incumbent upon them both. He does this 
to refute the Mālikī stance that women-only congregations are impermissible. This is 
significant, because it weakens his own earlier argument against women leading men 
in prayer, where he compares women to insane men in their both being unable to 
make the call to prayer. Here, he dismisses the call to prayer issue as being irrelevant 
to the question at hand. Ibn Qudāmah is non-committal as to whether it is valid for the 
woman imam to stand ahead, citing the Ḥanbalī school’s two divergent opinions 
without giving preference to either. He also presents the school’s two opinions on 
whether women-only congregations are preferable or merely allowed, and seems to 
slightly favour the ruling of preferability in his introduction to the topic. 
 
Al-Zarkashi relies upon the practice of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah as proof for the 
validity of women-only congregations, and cites their practice to clearly assert a 
ruling of preferability, though he also mentions there are two opinions related from 
Aḥmad on the matter. He does not discuss whether the woman imām can stand ahead. 
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Ibn Mufliḥ also cites the practice of ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah and favours the 
ruling that women-only congregations are preferable. He asserts the validity of the 
woman imām standing ahead, though he accepts the possibility of the opposing 
opinion that her standing ahead it is invalid. He is unique in discussion the question of 
whether the lone follower should pray to the right of the imām or behind her. 
 
We see a change in attitude with al-Bahūtī. He merely states that it is “valid” for a 
woman to lead other women in prayers, and returns to citing the ḥadīth of Umm 
Waraqah, particularly the alternative narration of al-Bayhaqī that restricts Umm 
Waraqah’s practice to women. Al-Ruḥaybānī also limits the question to the “validity” 
of women-only congregations. This indicates a shift in attitude about the preferability 
of such congregations, possibly tending towards the alternate view on the matter that 
they are merely permissible. To the extent that this is true, it would be another 
negative tendency in the school of thought regrding women leading prayer, albeit a 
subtle one. 
 
 
D. Summary 
 
The Ḥanbalī texts are the most uniform in presenting evidence and arguments, and the 
the verbatim replication of passages is not uncommon. There is no significant 
variation in rulings or the presentation of evidence in the surveyed works. The most 
severe example of the replication of evidence is the uniform citation of the qiyās of 
women on insane men to disallow the practice of women leading men in prayer, since 
the underlying rationale Ibn Qudāmah gives for this complex analogy is absent from 
the later works, though the qiyās is consistently mentioned by them all, nonetheless. 
 
In spite of the near-uniformity of presentation, a few trajectories are in evidence. The 
most significant is the change in the Ḥanbali position on women leading men in 
voluntary prayers. In the early school, the predominant position had been that it was 
permissible, with disagreement between the jurists relating to the scope of this 
permissibility. There was a complete reversal later on, and this change had nearly run 
its course by the time of Ibn Qudāmah who comes out strongly against the practice. 
Nevertheless, a negative tendency still unfolds within the surveyed works themselves, 
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with only the final works completely ruling out the possibility. A more mild negative 
trajectory can be seen in the question of whether it is preferable for a woman to lead 
other women in congregation, rather than each woman praying on her own. The 
earlier jurists lean towards preferrability, with the later one’s merely declaring the 
practice to be valid.  
 
A twentieth-century challenge to the evidentiary basis for prohibiting women from 
leading men in prayer, though outside the time-period of the survey, sheds light on the 
dynamics of Ḥanbalī legal reasoning. They adopt the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah in a 
radical departure from their traditional attitude against using this ḥadīth for matters of 
worship. However, they are willing to resort to this strategy rather than challenge their 
school’s ruling against women leading men in prayer. Though ʿAbd Allah b. Ḥumayd 
points out that the shift in evidence has implications for allowing a limited scope for 
women to lead men, it is unlikely that his view will be adopted. If it is, it would mark 
the first-ever positive trend in a ruling pertaining to women’s leadership in the history 
of “classical” Islamic Law, though it is still too early to tell if this will be the case. 
 
 
V. ḤĀNAFĪ RULINGS & ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Political and Judicial Appointments 
 
1. Judicial Appointments 
The Ḥanafī school of law is unique in permitting women to serve as judges in cases 
not involving capital punishments. The crux of the their argument is that a woman’s 
legal capacity to give testimony demonstrates her legal capacity to serve as a judge. 
Consequently, since she cannot give testimony in capital crimes, she cannot preside as 
a judge in those matters. Al-Zaylaʿī uses this justification to counter the argument of 
non-Ḥanafī jurists that a woman’s deficiency in intellect disqualifies her from being a 
judge. He specifically implicates al-Shāfīʿī in framing his refutation: “We say: She is 
qualified for the legal agency by which she is qualified to give testimony. 
Consequently, she [is qualified] to be a judge, just like a man.” Here, al-Zaylaʿī 
asserts that wherever a woman is allowed to preside over a case, her eligibility for 
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judgeship is exactly the same as that of a man. This remains the Ḥanafī ruling until 
the time of the revisionist scholar Ibn al-Humām. 
 
Ibn al-Humām begins his discussion by confirming the Ḥanafī position. He then 
commences to discuss the opposing view of the other three schools of thought, citing 
the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah as their evidence. This is the first time this ḥadīth is 
mentioned in the surveyed Ḥanafī works.317 He points out that al-Marghīnānī’s does 
not address this ḥadīth, almost as if he is accusing him of evading the issue. Ibn al-
Humām then goes on to concede to his opponents that men are better than women and 
that women are deficient in intellect, and that as a consequence people will not be 
successful if they grant women authority to rule them. Most importantly, he concedes 
its relevance to judicial authority, declaring that the men whom the ḥadīth addresses 
are not permitted to appoint a woman as a judge. 
 
Ibn al-Humam does not go so far to say the other schools were right all along. Instead, 
he argues that deficiency is relative and that some individual women can be more 
competent than some men. This means that if a woman happens to be appointed as a 
judge and she judges correctly, her judgement will be legal and binding. He presents 
this as a rhetorical question: “Why should her correct judgement be nullified?” 
 
Ibn al-Humām presents his explanation as if he is clarifying what the Ḥanafī position 
was all along. In reality, he is overturning their position, making what was once a 
substantial disagreement between the Ḥanafī school and the others something purely 
hypothetical: What if a woman is appointed as a judge, even though it should not 
happen? His revision may very well reflect the reality on the street, where women 
were never appointed judges. It definitely conforms with society’s attitudes about 
women at the time. Nevertheless, it is not what the earlier Ḥanafī jurists were saying. 
 
There is a sense that Ibn al-Humām is responding to the discourse of the scholars of 
the other schools of law, as if to cover up for something embarrassing in his own 
school. It is as if he is saying: We have never really disagreed with you that women 
                                                 
317 In a broader survey of over thirty Ḥanafī legal texts, I have not found this ḥadīth cited with reference 
to a woman being a judge before it was introduced by Ibn al-Humām. Afterwards, it continues to 
appear. 
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should not be judges. You do not get the subtlety of our argument. We are just saying 
that her ruling does not have to be overturned in the unlikely event that a woman is 
made a judge. 
 
Ibn al-Humām’s revised ruling is adopted by the later Ḥanafī works, and Abū 
Bakrah’s ḥadīth also becomes a regular feature in their discussions. 
 
2. Political Appointments 
The question of political leadership is first brought up in the surveyed texts by al-
Bābirtī as an incidental point to a discussion focusing on women’s intellectual 
capacity and their competence to give testimony as witnesses. He is followed in this, 
almost verbatim, by al-ʿAynī and Ibn Nujaym, the latter of whom identifies al-Bābirtī 
as the original source of this argument and presents it as a direct quotation from him. 
 
Al-Bābirtī’s argument employs a quasi-Aristotelian distinction between the passive 
and active intellects to categorise the human mind. He then identifies the woman’s 
place of mental competence, claiming that a woman is fully capable of forming 
thoughts on the basis of “self-evident knowledge through the sensory perception of 
particular things” but is deficient in even basic abstract reasoning. He then argued that 
this was Prophet Muḥammad’s intention when he said that women are deficient in 
intellect. As a further clarification of his argument’s implications, al-Bābirtī says this 
is why women cannot be political leaders.  
 
This argument provides a very negative depiction of women’s intellectual ability, and 
it predates Ibn al-Humām’s about-face on women being judges due to their 
intellectual deficiency. It indicates a negative trend towards women’s competence in 
the Ḥanafī school which could very well have influenced Ibn al-Humām’s 
conclusions, though he does not bring up that particular argument in his work. 
 
The surveyed works do not address this question of political leadership directly until 
very late. It is first brought up as a direct topic by Ibn Nujaym in al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq. 
Surprisingly, he states that it is valid for a woman to be head of state (sulṭanah). Even 
more surprising is his argument for it. He does not bring up any textual or theoretical 
evidence. Instead, he cites history, mentioning the reign of Shajarah al-Durr in Egypt. 
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This is not a legal argument. He accepts it simply because it happened. This reveals a 
lot about the possible thought processes in operation behind the legal rulings across 
the four schools of thought. It shows how social reality could be translated into 
codified law. Certainly, we have seen where a number of jurists cite the absence of 
women leaders, judges, and imāms as proof that women should not assume these 
roles. Here is an ruling based on one occurrence – very late in Islamic history – that 
concludes the opposite. Shajarah al-Durr died in 655AH/1257 CE, and marked the 
rise of the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt. This is too late to be precedent-setting in 
Islamic Law. At the same time, since Ibn Nujaym died in 970 AH/1563 CE under 
Ottoman rule, her reign is too early for Ibn Nujaym to have been political motivated 
to assert its validity. 
 
Ibn Nujaym is one of the jurists who quotes al-Bābirtī’s argument about women’s 
intellect and how her inability to grasp abstract thinking disqualifies her from being 
head of state. It is easy to reconcile Ibn Nujaym’s position here with his quoting al-
Bābartī, since the question of her being head of state is part of al-Bābirtī’s much 
larger argument that Ibn Nujaym is quoting in full, and he does not have to agree with 
all of its conclusions, especially those that are mentioned only incidentally.  
 
On the other hand, Ibn Nujaym’s position does need to be reconciled with his own 
stance on a woman being a judge. He comes after Ibn al-Humām, so he adopts the 
ruling that it is sinful to appoint a woman as a judge. Since he does so on the strength 
of the ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah, it is inconceivable that he would apply this ruling to a 
judge and not to the head of state. We are forced to conclude that Ibn Nujaym upholds 
the validity of her appointment and the legitimacy of her reign, but that she should not 
be the one granted such authority if there is a choice to be made.  
 
All the same, it is significant that Ibn Nujaym discusses the question of a woman 
assuming political power in conjunction with her being a judge. He draws our 
attention to how the unique Ḥanafī position on a woman’s capacity to exercise 
authority left the question of political leadership wide open, and that this had been the 
case for a very long time. If we consider that, for most of the school’s history, 
appointing a woman as a judge was not regarded as sinful or objectionable in any 
way, we can appreciate just how open the question really was. Ibn al-Nujaym 
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regarded her political leadership as valid, implying that this had been the true 
implication of the school’s teachings all along.  
 
Ibn Nujaym is not followed in this opinion by later Ḥanafī jurists. Ibn ʿĀbidīn makes 
being male an explicit condition for possessing supreme political authority. He argues 
that women should stay at home and keep themselves hidden, and then mentions the 
ḥadīth of Abū Bakrah. If Ibn ʿĀbidīn intends this for the Caliph and not for a lesser 
head of state, he is silent on the matter, though the mention of Qurayshī lineage makes 
this a possibility. Moreover, since he lists being male after the condition of being free 
and before that of being sane, it is ambiguous whether this condition is to be waived 
in the event a woman is appointed head of state, as is the case with the appointment of 
a child. 
 
 
B. Leading Men in Prayer 
 
Ḥanafī scholars are agreed that it is impermissible for a woman to lead men in prayer, 
and the prayers of the men who follow her are invalid. Al-Sarakhsī relies solely on the 
statement: “Send them to the back whence God has sent them to the back.” Though 
al-Sarakhsī does not elaborate on it, it is clear that sending them forward to lead the 
prayer violates the command given in the text, which he claims to be a ḥadīth from 
the Prophet. 
 
Al-Kāsānī mentions “Send them to the back” to demonstrate that a woman coming in 
line with a man or standing directly ahead of him nullifies his prayer, but he does not 
cite this text as being direct evidence for prohibiting a woman from leading prayer. 
Instead, he uniquely asserts that “the woman does not have the legal capacity to lead 
men in prayer.” He does not elaborate on why this is the case, but states that the 
consequence of her lack of legal capacity is that “her prayer is nonexistent with 
respect to the man.”  
 
Al-Marghīnānī asserts the ruling on the basis of “Send them to the back” since 
making her imām would require the prohibited act of sending her forward. He also 
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addresses the objection to using an individual-narrator ḥadīth to establish a farḍ 
obligation by claiming that it is a well-known ḥadīth. 
 
Al-Zaylaʿī asserts the prohibition of a woman leading men in prayer on the basis of 
the text “Send them to the back”. He explicitely states that the reason his prayer in 
nullified is his obligation to send her to the back. He also addresses the status of the 
narration as being an individual-narrator ḥadīth, and likewise claims that it is a well-
known ḥadīth and therefore strong enought to stablish the ruling. He further tries to 
assert that there is ijmāʿ on the issue.  
 
Al-Bābirtī follows him in the interpretation of the ḥadīth as well as the assertion of 
ijmāʿ. He also suggests the ḥadīth of Anas and his grandmother as textual evidence 
for a woman negating a man’s prayer by coming in line with him, but does not 
elaborate on how it does so. 
 
Al-ʿAynī follows him in the interpretation of “Send them to the back.” He says: 
“Since the command was gives to send her back, it is not permissible to send her 
forward. Therefore it is impermissible to follow her in prayer.” He also cites the  
claim of ijmāʿ without going so far as to endorse it, but he identifies the source of the 
claim as al-Zāhidī’s al-Mujtabā. Though he calls the text “Send them to the back” 
into question as a prophetic ḥadīth, he does not challenge it very strongly. He also 
addresses its status as an individual-narrator ḥadīth and argues that acceptable for 
establishing binding obligations, because it clarifies the ambiguity in verse 228 of 
Sūrah al-Baqarah. 
 
Ibn al-Humām follows al-Zaylaʿī’s example in asserting ijmāʿ. This is crucial for him, 
since he dismisses the text “Send them to the back” as spurious. Because this ijmāʿ is 
not valid, Ibn al-Humām leaves the prohibition of a woman leading prayer with 
nothing more than the flimsy justification of the ḥadīth of Anas and his grandmother, 
which is argued primarily to provide evidence that a woman coming in line with a 
man nullifies his prayer. He seems to recognise the weakness in the argument, 
admitting that it is only possible evidence. 
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Ibn Nujaym returns to relying solely on “Send them to the back”. He acknowledges 
that Ibn al-Humām denies it is a ḥadīth, but he does not even bother to dismiss the 
allegation. He continues to accept the text as a ḥadīth and argues that it is acceptable 
for establishing binding obligations in spite of being an individual-narrator report, 
because it clarifies the meaning of a verse in the Qur’ān. Ibn al-Nujaym seems to 
realise the weakness of the situation, because he also feels the need to mention al-
Zāhidī’s dubious claim of ijmāʿ, though he does not go so far as to endorse it. 
 
When we arrive at Ibn ʿĀbidīn, we find a technical discussion of what constitutes a 
man, a woman, and a boy and no discussion of the evidence that prohibits a woman 
from leading men in prayer. It is implicit, however, that “Send them to the back” is 
what he is relying upon. 
 
The ruling remains constant. What we see unfolding over time, however, is a growing 
sense of the precarious textual basis upon which the ruling is justified. “Send them to 
the back” is first challenged as an individual-narrator ḥadīth and then exposed not to 
be a ḥadīth at all. However, it is not a simple matter for the Ḥanafī jurists to switch 
their textual evidence for why a woman cannot lead men in prayer, because they need 
this particular text to establish their argument by istiḥsān for their particular ruling 
regarding a woman coming in line with a man in prayer. For the argument by istiḥsān 
to work, the two rulings must be linked together, and need to be anchored by “Send 
them to the back.” This is what compels some later Ḥanafī scholars to assert an 
unlikely – and what could be described as desperate – claim of ijmāʿ in the face of the 
well-established disagreement that exists on women’s prayer leadership. This is also 
why those who rely on ijmāʿ have to develop an elaborate inductive argument to 
establish that sending the women to the back is the only possible effective cause for 
the ruling. In this way, they seek to preserve the meaning of the text without having to 
rely on the text itself.  
 
 
C. Women-Only Congregations 
 
Al-Sarakhsī argues that women-only congregations as practiced by ʿĀ’ishah were 
abrogated because of the temptation they can pose for men. However, he 
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acknowledges it is nevertheless permissible for women to hold these congregations 
and even for the imām to stand ahead of the congregation, though it is better if they 
pray individually, and if they pray together, for their imām to stand in the ranks of the 
women, like the case for naked men. He asserts that it is preferable for women to pray 
individually, but he does not claim that their congregating is disliked. 
 
Al-Kāsānī says also compares the performance of women praying together to the 
prayer of naked men in congregation. He states that women are suited to lead women-
only congregations and that these prayers are permissible, but mentions in the same 
breath that these congregations are disliked. He also adds that the practice of women-
only congregations was only at the beginning of Islam, establishing an early period 
for the abrogation. 
 
With al-Marghīnānī, mention of permissibility is dropped and the woman’s 
congregation is simply declared disliked.  The reason he gives is that “unavoidably a 
prohibited act must be perpetrated” by her standing in the middle of the row of 
worshippers. 
 
Al-Zaylāʿī presents the argument in far greater detail. He makes mention of the ḥadīth 
that a woman’s prayer in her private chamber is better for her, and he also adds the 
argument that the congregation leads inevitable to “one of two forbidden things”: 
either the imām stands in the middle of the row which is the wrong place for the 
imām, or she stands ahead which is disliked for women. He asserts that 
congregational prayer is not prescribed at all for naked men, so comparing women to 
them leads to the same consequence.  
 
Al-Bābirtī provides a more detailed discussion wherein he brings up counter-
arguments to the prevailing Ḥanafī position. This indicates that the question had 
become one of serious discussion within Ḥanafī circles. The length of his exposition 
indicates how much attention Ḥanafī scholars were giving to this matter at the time. 
This trend continues with al-ʿAynī and Ibn al-Humām, in what are the lengthiest 
passages in the survey. This was clearly a protracted and serious discussion within the 
Ḥanafī juristic community. 
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Al-Bābirtī is intent on defending the established Ḥanafī ruling that women’s 
congregations are disliked, and he mentions the objections only to answer them. The 
first objection he addresses is that it is historically impossible for ʿĀ’ishah’s practice 
to have been at the beginning of Islam due to her young age at the time of the 
Prophet’s death. He answers this by saying that when al-Marghinānī’s says “the 
beginning of Islam” he means the time before the ruling was abrogated, “since this is 
the beginning with respect to what comes after it.” Al-Bābirtī is implying that the 
abrogation could have taken place at any time, and that she could have led prayers for 
a short time before it happened. 
 
Al-Bābirtī then addresses the theoretical problem of how a ruling can be abrogated 
and permissible at the same time. He answers that the permissibility is retained in the 
new ruling of being disliked after the old ruling of being Sunnah had been abrogated. 
He also attempts to assert this default permissibility by way of ijmāʿ. He embeds this 
permissibility within the ruling of dislike in order to rescue it from being abrogated, 
which means that the dislike in question is “disliked as disdainful” (makrūh tanzīhan), 
not “disliked as prohibited” (makrūh taḥrīman). 
 
He also addresses the problem of increased exposure being what necessitates the 
female imām standing in the women’s midst. This exposure, it had been argued, does 
not exist for women who are covered from head to toe and praying among 
themselves. Al-Bābirtī replies that this covering on the part of women is a rare 
situation and that, in any case, the legal rationale is not needed to demonstrate the 
effective cause, because the ḥadīth of ʿĀ’ishah is sufficient to establish the practice. 
None of al-Bābartī’s counter-argument are particularly strong. 
 
Al-ʿAynī challenges all of these counter-arguments and comes out strongly in favour 
of women-only congregations. He does not bring much that is new to the table. He is 
more intent on pointing out the weakness in al-Bābirtī’s counter-arguments to the 
original objections. There is a strong sense of exasperation in his tone. He is basically 
saying that the problems that have been identified are valid and have not been 
adequately answered for well over a century, so Ḥanafī scholars are obliged to 
reconsider their ruling.  
 
 
 
 
 
216 
 
For instance, the objection that ʿĀ’ishah’s practice could not have been at the 
beginning of Islam is nothing new. It had been raised by al-Sarūjī a century and a half 
before al-ʿAynī’s time and nearly a century before al-Bābirtī. Al-`Aynī simply 
reiterates al-Sarūjī‘s argument and then tersely dismisses al-Bābirtī’s counter-
argument as “far-fetched”. His own contribution is to go further than al-Sarūjī and 
reject the possibility of abrogation altogether. Though he does not elaborate, his 
emphasis appears to be on ʿĀ’isha’s young age. This provides a very small window 
for her to be old enough to feasibly serve as an imām for women  and then to have it 
abrogated, especially since no evidence exists to substantiate that abrogation ever 
occurred. Ibn al-Humam later points out that calling ‘Ā’isha’s age into doubt would 
change the dynamics of the argument.  
 
Al-ʿAynī is equally terse in dismissing al-Bābirtī’s complex argument about the 
Sunnah nature of the congregation being abrogated with the permissibility being 
subsumed in the ruling of dislike. He just mentions al-Bābirtī’s claim of ijmāʿ and 
then waives the matter away as being an unsubstantiated claim of abrogation. 
Likewise, he points out that women being covered, far from being “a rare situation”, 
is the norm.  
 
One thing al-ʿAynī does argue strongly for is how wrong it is to describe a woman 
leading prayer within the ranks of women as an innovation or as a prohibited act, 
since ʿĀ’ishah and Umm Salamah used to do so. He introduces nothing new by  
mentioning the traditions that establish this practice, since his opponents admit to 
their practice and cite it themselves. What he does is excoriate them for daring to 
describe the act as prohibited, disliked, or an innovation.  
 
Al-ʿAynī is followed in a more subdued manner by Ibn al-Humām. For instance, he is 
willing to concede that there might be inaccuracy as to ʿĀ’ishah’s age and to the 
leading of Tarāwīḥ prayers, but still considers the claim of abrogation to be far-
fetched and without any proof to establish it. The point about Tarāwīḥ is one that al-
ʿAynī does not bring up, but Ibn al-Humām’s discussion of it shows that it had 
already been addressed. If it were allowed to stand, it would show conclusively that 
women-only congregations had not been abrogated. He likewise shows the fallacy in 
asserting increased exposure as the legal rationale for the female imām standing in the 
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women’s midst, but concedes it is one of many possible but undeterminable rationales 
for the ruling. In all these instances, he is engaging with the counter-arguments 
brought by al-Bābirtī and others. As I have discussed in the first chapter in the section 
on ḥadīth, it appears that with these concessions, strained as they are, he is employing 
a rhetorical strategy to illustrate the strongest legitimate arguments his critics can 
hope to mobilize against women-only congregations. Considering Ibn al-Humām’s 
prominent position among later Ḥanafī jurists, the fact that he does not endorse the 
ruling that women-only congregations are disliked provides the school with the 
greatest possibility of overcoming its legal inertia after two hundred and fifty years of 
prolonged discussion. A return to the idea that praying individually is better for 
women without their congregating being disliked would seem a viable option.  
 
Instead, with Ibn al-Humām, the debate had run its course. The arguments in support 
of women-only congregations simply disappear and make no discernible impact on 
the later works in the survey. The later Ḥanafī jurists go to the opposite extreme and 
take the strongest possible stance against the women-only congregation that the 
school can muster, the ruling of disliked as prohibited. This is significant, since these 
same jurists rely on Ibn al-Humām in discussing other particulars of women-only 
congregations. Ibn Nujaym and Ibn ʿĀbidīn both assert on the strength of Ibn al-
Human that a woman imām commits a sin by standing forward. Ibn ʿAbidīn also cites 
Ibn al-Humām’s discussion on women leading funeral prayers. This is indicative of 
his status with later Ḥanafī jurists.  
 
Most ironic is how Ibn ʿĀbidīn cites Ibn al-Humām to affirm the ruling that women-
only congregations are disliked as prohibited, saying: “This is stated explicitly in Fatḥ 
[al-Qadīr].” What Ibn al-Humām does is point out al-Margīnānī’s intent, based on the 
Hidāyah’s wording. It is certainly not Ibn al-Humām’s own view, which Ibn ʿĀbidīn 
males np mention of. Nevertheless, Ibn ʿĀbidīn finds himself compelled to 
demonstrate a sense of continuity between the ruling of his time and that of Ibn al-
Humām’s, and likewise between Ibn al-Humām and al-Marghīnānī, even if that 
continuity is more apparent than real. 
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D. Summary 
 
Two rulings were challenged in the Ḥanafī school of law. The first is the ruling that 
women can be judges just like men, as long as the case is not one of a capital crime or 
retribution. The other is that it is disliked for women to prayer among themselves in 
congregation. Both of these challenges were championed by Ibn al-Humām, who is a 
pivotal figure in Ḥanafī Law. The result was that later jurists readily embrace Ibn al-
Humām’s reform on the question of women judges, which reduces it to hypothetical 
question, while making it effectively unlawful for all practical purposes. By contrast, 
they do not even acknowledge the arguments he and al-ʿAynī advance in favour of 
women-only congregations. Instead, they move to the most extreme possible position 
they can take against such congregations, that of being disliked as prohibited. There 
were two potentials for change, one which broadened the scope of women’s 
leadership and one which narrowed it. The change which narrowed that scope was 
adopted, while the change which broadened that scope was rejected. 
 
It might be argued that the change that narrowed the scope had some face-saving 
aspects to it. They could still say their ruling on women judges remains intact, even 
though it is sinful to appoint a woman as a judge. By contrast, saying that women-
only congregations are not disliked is a more conspicuous change. However, the 
permissibility of women-only congregations was invoked in the early Ḥanafī works in 
the same breath as their being disliked, in what amounted to a contradiction. 
Moreover, this dislike was not stated in very strong terms, or like in al-Sarakhsī’s 
case, not at all. Indeed, the ultimate trajectory, even without considering the opinions 
of al-ʿAynī’and Ibn al-Humām, is a sharply negative one. 
 
Finally, Ibn Nujaym’s statement about women being heads of state shows the 
potential for the school of law to accommodate this possibility to a limited extent. 
This potential was not embraced by the school in its final realization, which presents a 
third negative trajectory towards women’s leadership in the school’s historical 
development. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is a clearly discernible conservative trend in all four schools of thought with 
respect to the preservation of the school’s legal rulings. There is no doubt that the 
primary objective of each school’s jurists is to preserve and justify their particular 
school’s rulings. Yet, in all four schools of thought, there were some alternatives to 
the rulings that the school ultimately settled upon.  
 
At times, this took the form of competing opinions expressed by the school’s 
founding jurists. We see this in Mālik’s position on women judges as well as his 
opinion on the validity of women-only congregations. It can be seen in Aḥmad b. 
Ḥanbal’s view on women leading men in voluntary prayers, and the Ḥanbalī 
perspective on whether women-only congregations are preferable. In the Mālikī case 
of women judges, the adoption of the negative opinion went unchallenged from the 
start. By contrast, the alternative opinion on women-only congregations found a 
champion in al-Rajrājī. In the case of the Ḥanbalī view on women leading men in 
voluntary prayers, we see the favoured opinion was originally one of permissibility, 
but this was overturned by the school later on in preference for the alternative 
negative view. Though this transformation had mostly taken place by the time the 
major Ḥanbalī legal works were written, it was not yet complete. The negative 
trajectory which led ultimately to the complete dismissal of the ruing can still be 
observed within the surveyed works. 
 
At others times, the alternatives were opinions brought later on to challenge the 
original point of view. This can be seen in al-Muzanī’s positive opinion regarding 
women leading men in prayer, Ibn al-Humām’s negative view on women serving as 
judges, and his and al-ʿAynī’s positive view on women-only congregations. 
Moreover, Ibn Nujaym’s positive statement about women heads of state might be 
regarded as a chance to develop a new coherent ruling on a legal matter at a later 
stage in the school’s history. Here again, the outcome was always against women’s 
leadership. In every instance where an alternative presented itself, the result was the 
adoption of the ruling that provided the narrowest scope for women. There were no 
exceptions to this trend in any of the four legal schools. This cannot be explained 
solely by legal inertia. It did not matter whether adopting the more negative ruling 
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conserved the school’s existing position or effected a change in it. The negative ruling 
always prevailed. In the case of preserving an existing ruling, legal inertia might 
appear as if it were the only factor involved. Nowhere is this clearer than in the 
Shāfiʿī position on women leading men in prayer. However, in the case of negative 
change, legal inertia can at best be said to have had the effect of slowing it down or 
postponing it, but not of preventing it. Moreover, it cannot explain why the more 
negative of two opinions expressed by a school’s foundational scholar was adopted 
instead of the more positive one, and it cannot shed any light on how these negative 
rulings originally came about. 
 
The negative tendencies that make themselves apparent in the post-formative 
literature can very well be a reflection of tendencies that existed beforehand. What we 
do know about the formative period is that the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools emerged 
from a conception of the Law that looked heavily at the established practice of the 
Muslim community. This means that there was considerable scope for the attitudes 
and tendencies that existed within society to be implicitly imbedded in that practice 
and then canonised as law. From what we have seen, especially with the Mālikī 
arguments about women’s leadership, assumed general practice is given considerable 
weight, and not only that which is formally presented as Madinite practice. This is 
quite visible in the post-formative texts. Even with the Ḥanafī arguments on prayer, it 
is easy to move from the actual lack of female participation in congregational prayer 
in society to the development of elaborate legal justifications that effectively exclude 
them from participation. The Ḥanafī position on women judges is therefore 
anomalous, since it is clearly a legal stance that cannot be drawn from the practice or 
attitudes of the society at the time the ruling was formulated. However, social reality 
ultimately prevailed in changing the ruling to one which would perpetuate the 
exclusion of women in the judiciary. Once Ibn al-Humām provided a way to overturn 
the ruling without negating its existence entirely, it was adopted without hesitation.  
 
As for Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī Law, which were formally organised from the start on a 
text-based conception of the law, we would expect some differences. It is no accident 
that the scholars who allowed women to lead men in prayer and to be judges without 
restriction all came after al-Shāfi`ī and were affiliated with his school of thought. 
Likewise, those who at least allowed women to lead men in voluntary prayers came 
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from the Ḥanbalī school. Their arguments in favour of doing so were not drawn from 
the practice of their day, but seem to come from strictly textual reasoning, either the 
existence of a text in favour of the practice or the absence of a text to establish 
impermissibility. However, the schools themselves did not adopt these rulings, at least 
in their final formulation, and brought rulings that were no different than the other 
schools, though framed with different arguments. Moreover, the arguments they 
brought did not conform very well with the demands of their juristic theory. This 
lends support to the idea that the cultural momentum that was already underway when 
these two schools were first developed proved irresistible and dictated what types of 
rulings could be contemplated and adopted by these two schools of thought. This is 
reinforced by the works of these schools echoing similar sentiments about women that 
are found in the works of the other schools, and even the argument from established 
practice, especially in the Ḥanbalī works. 
 
This is not just the case for the Shāfīʿī and Ḥanbalī works. For all four schools, the 
presentation of evidence and arguments reinforce the conclusions drawn from the 
uniformity of negative trajectories. Negative rulings about women’s leadership seem 
to represent not only the general attitudes at the time of writing, but of earlier periods 
as well. It is easy to discern form the arguments presented, even when ḥadīth or 
examples of qiyās are invoked, that they are being understood against a backdrop of 
common practices and general perceptions about women. Sometimes these are 
explicitly stated.  
 
The same cannot be said for the more positive rulings suggested regarding women. 
They seem, by contrast, to rely almost exclusively on academic arguments, either the 
explicit indications of a ḥadīth text or the rational consequences of following through 
on a particular line of reasoning. We see the former in al-Rajrājī’s challenge to the 
Mālikī school regarding a woman leading other women in prayer, as well as in ʿAynī 
and Ibn al-Humām’s stance on the matter, and also in the early Ḥanbalī position of 
women leading men in voluntary prayers. We see it also in the evidence suggested for 
the positions of al-Tābarī, Abū Thawr, and al-Muzanī for women leading men. We 
see the latter in the Ḥanafī position permitting women to serve as judges and al-
Juwaynī’s assertions regarding the problematic aspects of prohibiting women from 
leading men in prayer. The historical pattern of these rulings shows that the backdrop 
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of common practices and general perceptions about women are what ultimately held 
the greatest sway. 
 
The clearest indication of the true role that common practice and perceptions play in 
these rulings can be seen in the jurists’ behaviour where more formal lines of 
argument break down, particularly in how they introduce a formally unsustainable 
appeal to ijmāʿ. This is the case for the Ḥanafī and Shāfīʿī views on women leading 
men in prayer. This may be more than just a last-ditch effort to salvage the ruling. If it 
is only that, it is ineffectual, because in all cases it is suggested in the face of 
established disagreement, a disagreement those who invoke ijmāʿ are often willing to 
acknowledge. Instead, it appears to be an appeal to what society accepts, to the 
general and overwhelming attitude people have on the matter. With al-Ramlī, this 
appeal to ijmāʿ is coupled with declarations of a woman’s inferior status and the 
inherent temptation that she causes for men. Even when ijmāʿ is not invoked, we can 
see how al-Nawawī, when faced with the absence of other evidence, makes an appeal 
to “the vast majority of scholars from the earliest and latest generations.” 
 
While assumptions about gender remained relatively constant, the rulings themselves 
were sometimes challenged and even changed. The result was always to uphold or 
increase restrictions on women’s leadership. Though legal inertia can explain the ease 
by which negative rulings were perpetuated and the slowness in adopting changes, the 
uniform negativity of these processes indicate that gender attitudes have played a 
significant role in the development and perpetuation of rulings divesting women of 
leadership positions. Changes in rulings do not necessarily indicate concurrent 
changes in social additudes. Legal inertia can postpone changes in a law long after it 
had grown intolerable to society at large, especially in the absence of any fear that the 
law might be put into practice. The lag time between the unacceptability of the law 
and the law being changed could be substantial. In the case of the Ḥanafī ruling on 
women judges, it was probably intolerable in practice from the start. There were no 
indisputable cases of this ever occurring in Ḥanafī-dominated lands, and it is doubtful 
if anyone would have tolerated a woman judge. However, the law persisted in the 
legal texts until Ibn al-Humām found a way to bring it in line with practical reality 
and the position of the other schools, while retaining it on the books in principle. 
Rather than indicating a change in perspective regarding women’s capacity to serve as 
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judges, the negative trajectory shows the pressure of consistently held attitudes about 
women ultimately prevailing over legal inertia. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Scriptural sources, or adherence to certain hermeneutical and juristic principles in 
combination with those sources, do not satisfactorily account for the rulings in the 
post-formative Islamic legal literature prohibiting women’s leadership. This applies 
equally to those principles elaborated in the legal theory works and those which are on 
display in the legal texts themselves. This means that not only were other 
determinative factors at work, they were more important.  
 
The legal literature exhibits numerous negative attitudes and beliefs about the nature 
and status of women and their role in society, showing that gender attitudes played a 
major part in the development of the laws. These attitudes and perceptions about 
gender are evident in the legal literature of all four schools of law across the 
geographical and temporal scope of the survey. Moreover, they appear in various 
ways: as direct justifications for the rulings, as implicit components of larger 
arguments, as opinions volunteered independently of legal considerations, and even as 
concepts upheld where the jurist denies their relevance to the legal point in question. 
This rules out the possibility that these attitudes and values were merely recruited to 
defend the legal rulings.  
 
The persistence of these attitudes and values in the legal literature, in the absence of 
convincing justifications from the scriptural sources and juristic principles, makes 
them a prime candidate to explain the origins and persistence of the legal rulings. If 
these values were not a primary factor, why are they so evident in the legal literature? 
Why do so many cases of analogy depend upon their implicit acceptance? Why is it 
that even when a jurist does not consider a certain negative idea about women to be 
the justification for the ruling, the idea is never challenged? It is always conceded as 
true and then shown to be irrelevant to the ruling. This is best explained by by what 
Sa`diyya Shaikh describes as “specific understandings of gender relationships 
assumed by dominating discourses in the fiqh canon” operating in the development 
and persistence of the rulings. 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
By contrast, the variety and changing nature of formal legal arguments both within 
and among the four schools of thought, even when the rulings themselves remained 
constant, indicates that defending preferred rulings was a very strong determinative 
factor in citing evidence and developing arguments, rather than the evidence and 
formal arguments determining the rulings or accurately representing the reasons 
behind them.  
 
Finally, the fact that many rulings did change over time, and alternatives were often 
available in each school of thought to the rulings which were ultimately adopted, 
shows a limited willingness of the jurists to depart from the past. The ultimate 
trajectory of these changes, however, was always against women holding leadership 
positions. This strengthens the conclusion that perceptions about women were a 
primary factor in determining the rulings, since they proved to be a stronger factor 
than the desire to preserve the established rulings of the school. These trajectories 
took a long time to unfold, in spite of negative attitudes towards women being 
relatively constant throughout the period under study, and this shows a genuine 
motivation to preserve the school’s inherited rulings, but this motivation was not 
strong enough to keep relatively positive rulings on women’s leadership from 
ultimately being overturned or undermined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
